

# Regime Legacies and the Adversaries of Democracy: Evidence from Latin America

Wynand Kastart\*

Department of Political Science

Indiana University Bloomington

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## **Abstract**

The received wisdom among scholars and policymakers generally maintains that an extensive history of democracy bodes well for democratization. This study explores its antithesis, and contends that over time democracy creates and empowers its own adversaries, whereas authoritarian regimes leave behind legacies that are conducive to the peaceful and democratic resolution of domestic political conflict. First, by proliferating and strengthening organized interests, the historically accumulated stock of democratic experiences – the “stock of democracy” – augments the stakes and intensity of the competition for political power, which in turn radicalizes competing collective actors. Furthermore, by eliminating and weakening opposition groups, an extensive authoritarian history, which amounts to a greater “stock of dictatorship”, mitigates the competitive struggle for political power, thereby fostering moderation among the societal actors that survived its onslaught. I test these claims through an empirical focus upon 952 societal actors in twenty Latin American countries (1944-2010).

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\*E-mail: [wkastart@indiana.edu](mailto:wkastart@indiana.edu).

# 1 Introduction

Prevailing assessments of Latin America's third wave of democratization maintain that democracy in the presence of its violent and authoritarian adversaries should be taken as proof of democracy's resilience in the face of inauspicious circumstances, as well as of the need to make democracy work and democratize the region even further.<sup>1</sup> Within the field of comparative democratization, these appraisals stem from the theoretical primacy of the causal symbiosis between democracy and democrats, where democracy fosters democrats, and democrats create and sustain democracy.<sup>2</sup> Seen from this perspective, the single most notable achievement of present-day Latin American democracies is their mere survival, if not to say their consolidation. In a similar vein, influential theories in contentious politics research have posited positive causal links between democracy and civil peace, where democracy pacifies domestic conflict, and civil resistance produces and consolidates democracy.<sup>3</sup> As democracies endure, these views in effect also downplay democracy's twin accomplishment, in that they assign a self-reinforcing quality to democracy, contending that democracies become more resilient and less prone to armed resistance as they grow older. To the extent that longstanding democracies break down or succumb to political violence, they do so in spite of their longevity. In the wake of their collapse, an extensive history of democracy even helps resuscitate them. By the same token, these scholarly traditions trace the conditions that are inimical to successful democratization to the dictatorships of the past.<sup>4</sup>

This study adopts an alternative perspective by developing and testing a theory about *regime legacies*, which involve the lasting impact of previous instances of democracy and dictatorship. Contrary to the received wisdom on the topic, I argue that over time democracy creates and strengthens its own adversaries. In doing so, I treat democracy primarily as a "stock" concept that encompasses the historically accumulated stock of all prior democratic experiences, rather than as a "level" concept that reflects contemporaneous levels of democracy. I refer to this conceptualization of democracy as the *stock of democracy*.<sup>5</sup> Likewise, I focus on the legacies left behind by the dictatorships of the past, rather than the immediate effects of authoritarian rule, and argue that a more extensive authoritarian political history, which amounts to a greater *stock of dictatorship*, narrows the field of powerful opponents of democracy.

As I explain in Section 2, this study complements and builds upon, but also differs in important ways from the existing research literature on comparative democratization and contentious politics. Its contribution to comparative politics comes in the form of claims that link historical

experiences with democracy and dictatorship to conditions that are detrimental and favorable, respectively, to democratization. This study also carries implications for domestic political contention, as it treats the emergence of violent political actors and the adoption of peaceful methods of political resistance as the legacies of democracy and dictatorship, respectively.

The central tenets of my argument, which I discuss in detail in Section 3, are as follows. First, I contend that a greater stock of democracy spurs the proliferation and empowerment of organized interests, such as political parties, labor unions and social movements. By doing so, it augments the stakes and intensity of the competition for political power, which in turn encourages these and other collective actors to *radicalize*, understood as the adoption of an intransigent and impatient approach to political conflict. This radicalization is associated with authoritarian ambitions and a propensity for violence.<sup>6</sup> Together, these legacies of democracy expand the range of powerful adversaries of democracy. By the same token, by eliminating and weakening opposition groups, a greater stock of dictatorship attenuates the degree of political competition, which in turn deradicalizes all societal actors, including opponents and allies of the government. These authoritarian legacies amount to the suppression of democracy's adversaries, in that the polities that inherit them involve political actors that are likely to be moderate (as opposed to radical) and few in number to begin with.

Figure 7.1 visualizes the core implications that flow from my argument. To test these propositions, I draw upon evidence from twenty Latin American countries (1944-2010), observed at the level of 343 presidential administrations and 952 non-state political actors, and which I describe in Section 4. The empirical analysis (Section 5) uncovers empirical associations at these two levels of analysis that lend considerable support to my claims. First, I find that the stock of democracy empowers societal actors, whereas the recently accumulated stock of dictatorship eliminates them. Furthermore, by exposing societal actors to heightened levels of political competition, prior democratic experiences radicalize their approach to political conflict. Finally, by narrowing the field of powerful organized interests, the stock of the most severe instances of dictatorship deradicalizes them.

## 2 The Literature

Existing scholarship within the field of Latin American politics treats democracy as one of the causal forces that drive the adoption of peaceful and democratic methods of political influence

by both governments and opposition groups.<sup>7</sup> To the extent that political violence persists and prevails in the region, the task at hand is therefore to expand and consolidate democracy, improve its quality and enhance its performance.<sup>8</sup> Viewed from this angle, to say that the Third Wave democratized political conflict without pacifying it would gloss over the region's incomplete democracies, as well as the authoritarian governments that survived. Several of the region's competitive regimes that emerged in the wake of dictatorship have been governed in a partially authoritarian manner, prompting scholars to develop a plethora of labels to denote the various democratic deficiencies that this entails.<sup>9</sup> Some of these competitive regimes even transitioned back and succumbed to outright dictatorship.<sup>10</sup> For civil peace to thrive, as the logic goes, regimes such as these should democratize as well.

The extension of the optimism about democracy's prospects in Latin America to its capacity to bring about and sustain domestic peace especially applies to historical experiences with democracy. That is, whereas some question democracy's immediate pacific impact upon political conflict or even warn against the destabilizing effects of democracy or any movement towards democracy, no such doubt has been expressed about the pacifying legacy of a predominantly democratic political history.<sup>11</sup> Instead, several studies of Latin American politics embrace the notion that, at least in theory, prior experiences with democracy advance the peaceful resolution of political conflict. Schatzman argues that over time, democracies institutionalize power and norms, thereby lessening the need of opposition groups to engage in (violent) acts of disruption.<sup>12</sup> Smith and Ziegler contend that a history of democracy attenuates the fears of democracy among elites and as a result weakens their inclination to revert to repression.<sup>13</sup> Pérez-Liñán and Mainwaring maintain that political actors that are formed or appointed under democracy (such as political parties and judges), including the democracies of the distant past, are more supportive of democratic norms and therefore less prone to support repressive governments.<sup>14</sup>

Yet the empirical record established so far on the topic cautions against extending the current appraisals of democracy's resilience to its pacifying potential. Quantitatively oriented studies that compare Latin America's varying levels of political violence to democratization outcomes reveal several empirical patterns that do not bode well for democracy's ability to pacify domestic politics. Not only do these findings defy theoretical expectations, they also remain theoretically unaccounted for. The first such finding concerns a positive empirical association between contemporaneous levels of democracy and the number of violent political challenges carried out by domestic opposition groups against governments.<sup>15</sup> In addition, no consistent empirical patterns

are registered linking each country's democratic history (or lack thereof) to political violence. On the one hand, Smith and Ziegler find that the age of present-day democracies inhibits transitions to less repressive forms of government, whereas the number of previous democratic spells do not exert any effect upon such transitions.<sup>16</sup> On the other hand, Pérez-Liñán and Mainwaring find that previous exposure to greater levels of democracy yield less repressive governments.<sup>17</sup> Schatzman does not register any effect of the age of democracy upon violent political dissent.<sup>18</sup>

The long-term pacific impact of democracy, and the effects of historical experiences with democracy specifically, are ambiguous in global samples as well. Whereas consolidated democracies are less likely to witness the outbreak of violent civil conflict than new democracies, any pre-dictatorial instances of democracy fail to exert any impact upon the emergence of violent challengers in democratic environments.<sup>19</sup>

In qualitative empirical research on the broader topic of the sources of successful democratization in the region, the evidence in support of auspicious assessments of the democratizing potential of an extensive history of democracy is even less conclusive. Here, the benevolent effects of a democratic history are taken as a given, and incorporated into research as an assumption. It is on the basis of this assumption, for instance, that Hagopian and Mainwaring exclude Costa Rica, Uruguay and Chile from their edited volume's set of case studies. Since these countries have experienced "the strongest democratic heritages in Latin America", the editors consider the endurance and quality of their democracies to be "overdetermined."<sup>20</sup>

Likewise, up until recently, it was often assumed that successful instances of democratization represent a clear break from the authoritarian past, where the consolidation and deepening of democracy do not occur as a result of a dictatorial history, but in spite of it. For instance, to motivate their volume's case selection, Hagopian and Mainwaring assume that "[i]n many countries democratic and semidemocratic regimes have survived [...] *despite* lengthy authoritarian traditions." Accordingly,

[b]ecause the post-1978 wave [of democratization] ran counter to the expectations of some previous social science findings, and because it could not have been expected on the basis of Latin America's past, it was important to include some cases of unexpected though partial advances in democracy under especially adverse conditions.<sup>21</sup>

By the same token, to the extent that countries have undergone relatively brief authoritarian interludes, as exemplified by the postwar trajectories of Chile and Uruguay, any adverse effects of

such spells of dictatorship are readily overtaken by the concomitant breadth of their democratic experiences.<sup>22</sup>

Within the last decade or so, a quantitatively oriented research program has emerged that treats these assumptions about regime legacies as hypotheses. This study extends this body of research by articulating its implications for democracy's adversaries. For instance, whereas Mainwaring and Pérez-Liñán echo these assumptions in their study of democratization in Latin America, their argument and the quantitative empirical evidence they marshal in its support leave behind considerable room for ambiguity about the relative importance of regime legacies vis-à-vis political actors.<sup>23</sup> On the one hand, the authors conclude that an extensive, pre-Third Wave history of democracy is advantageous for subsequent democratization outcomes, and that a long authoritarian history exerts adverse effects in this respect. On the other hand, in the exposition of the mechanism that underpins this conclusion, as well as in the empirical investigations of these claims, the causal force of interest is not prior democracy, but prior democrats. That is, rather than the previous or pre-existing democratic institutions themselves, it is the normative commitment to democracy of the powerful organizations that created them that ultimately advances democratization. The adversaries of democracy that established and sustained authoritarian rule left behind obstacles in this respect.<sup>24</sup> Likewise, whereas Svobik links the democratizing impact of accumulating experiences with democracy to expanding opportunities for responsive politicians to develop their reputations, and for the electorate to monitor and weed out their authoritarian competitors, the emergence of these adversaries of democracy and their authoritarian ambitions are treated as a given.<sup>25</sup>

This also applies to another strand in this research thrust, which investigates the lasting impact of extensive experiences with dictatorship, with a particular focus upon the legacies left behind by the "totalitarian" dictatorships of the past, which encompass both fascist and longstanding, communist dictatorships.<sup>26</sup> These studies are in general agreement with Linz and Stepan, who formulate several "tasks" to be carried out for democratization to succeed in post-authoritarian environments. Depending on the type of the antecedent dictatorship, newly-emerged regimes face particular obstacles to successful democratization.<sup>27</sup> As such, these studies treat authoritarian legacies primarily as an impediment to the formation and consolidation of democracy. For instance, Bernhard and Karakoç find that the individual-level implications of the legacies of traditional and totalitarian dictatorships take the form of diminished levels of civic engagement and political participation.<sup>28</sup> In a similar vein, in a series of recent studies

Pop-Eleches and Tucker trace several attitudinal and behavioral barriers to democratization, such as ordinary people’s trust in non-democratic political parties, their general mistrust of political parties, their fragile support for democracy, and their weak ties to civic organizations, to the authoritarian past, and communism in particular.<sup>29</sup> More recently, Albertus and Menaldo shift attention to the institutional legacies of dictatorship, which take the form of constitutions designed to protect the interests of the outgoing authoritarian ruling coalition in the ensuing democracy.<sup>30</sup> I complement this scholarship by exploring the authoritarian legacies that shape the emergence and strength of collective actors, and the adversaries of democracy in particular.

Whereas this research literature informs the core tenets of my argument, the implications that I derive from them contradict the received wisdom on regime legacies. As the next section shows, this study’s basic undercurrent holds that the balance within this body of research wrongfully tilts towards the pacifying and democratizing implications of a democratic past, while overlooking the legacies of dictatorship that are beneficial in these respects.

### **3 The Argument**

Ever since the third wave of democratization reached the shores of Latin America in 1978, it has swept aside nearly every dictatorship in the region, yet without reining in the adversaries of democracy. To be sure, the Third Wave ushered in an era in which almost all of Latin America’s most senior public officials have been chosen on the basis of regularly held free and fair elections — the minimal requirement for democracy in the minimalist, electoralist sense of the term.<sup>31</sup> As the twentieth century drew to a close, however, it became increasingly apparent that several of the region’s most potent political actors had nonetheless harbored violent and authoritarian inclinations. Throughout the post-1977 era, these adversaries of democracy have posed numerous threats to its emergence, functioning and survival. Inside political institutions, these threats take the form of opposition groups embarking upon the electoral and parliamentary routes to dictatorship. The rise to power of Fujimori in Peru, Chávez in Venezuela, Morales in Bolivia and Correa in Ecuador in the 1990s and 2000s exemplifies the efficacy of such endeavors, where radical political parties and their leaders exploit democratic institutions before subverting them. More recently, the election in Brazil in 2018 of the openly authoritarian presidential candidate Bolsonaro raises the prospect of additional authoritarian backsliding.

Outside political institutions, within the realm of political contention, domestic opposition

groups have often undertaken violent activities to achieve their political objectives.<sup>32</sup> For instance, in Peru rebels of the Shining Path mounted a violent insurgency against the government that lasted throughout the 1980s and mid-1990s. Similarly, on the eve of the 2014 presidential elections in Colombia, the Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias de Colombia (FARC) had waged a violent struggle against the state for decades.<sup>33</sup> On the supply side of contentious politics, Latin American governments have often intervened with severe levels of repression to confront these and other challengers.<sup>34</sup>

Nevertheless, democracy's adversaries have not surfaced and flourished everywhere. Whereas Chávez' successor Maduro and Fujimori ended up ruling through outright dictatorship, the competitive regimes that were in place in El Salvador in the 1980s and in Paraguay in the 1990s have become less authoritarian, while Chile and Uruguay retained their expansive democratic institutions. Yet perhaps more puzzling than these divergent democratization outcomes is the sharp contrast between the Third Wave era and the more distant political past. This contrast is particularly pronounced within countries. For instance, by the time that the Third Wave reached its crest in Latin America in the late 1990s, Colombia and Venezuela had been continuously governed through competitive elections for more than four decades, whereas Chile and Uruguay had by that time each suffered through more than a decade of authoritarian rule. But it is the former pair of countries that are still making international headlines about rampant political violence and faltering democratic institutions, while the latter two countries have been held up as the poster children for successful democratization in the region.<sup>35</sup> Indeed, democracy's endurance amidst the undermining activities of its adversaries in Latin America more generally fits the same pattern of extensive democratic experiences coupled with the persistence of violent and authoritarian political actors. Nevertheless, there are plentiful cases that mitigate this contrast. For example, by the time that Bolsonaro assumed the presidency in 2019, Brazil had accumulated nearly five decades of democracy, but had also undergone a brutal military dictatorship (1964-1985).

By these accounts, the Latin American experience thus begs two vexing questions. First, what accounts for the rise and resilience of powerful adversaries of democracy in many of Latin America's now longstanding democracies? Second, insofar as these violent and authoritarian political actors have not emerged and thrived everywhere, did they fail to do so in spite of Latin America's authoritarian past, or as a result of it? I address these questions by developing and testing a theory about *regime legacies*, which refer to the lasting impact of particular political



regime types. My argument revolves around two such legacies. The first concerns the impact of the historically accumulated ‘stock’ of all prior instances of democracy, which Gerring, Bond and Barndt refer to as the *stock of democracy*.<sup>36</sup> *Democracy* is understood as a responsive form of government, which takes the form of a combination of competitive elections and executive constraints.<sup>37</sup> Likewise, I theorize about the legacies left behind by previous instances of dictatorship, which amount to what I term the *stock of dictatorship*. *Dictatorship* operates in the absence of competitive elections and executive constraints. It is important to note that these two regime types and their distinct legacies imply at least one additional form of government that entails ‘hybrid’ combinations of competitive elections and executive constraints (e.g., reasonably competitive elections and unconstrained executive authority). I refer to these regime types as *hybrid regimes*, but do not incorporate their legacies into my theory.

### 3.1 Proliferation and Empowerment

My argument rests on two sets of claims. The first of these holds that the stock of democracy creates and empowers non-state political actors, whereas the stock of dictatorship eliminates and disempowers them. *Political actors* refer to politically motivated and autonomous groups and individuals that have at their disposal considerable amounts of important political and organizational resources, such as popular legitimacy, manpower and weaponry. They may include democracy’s adversaries, but also its advocates. Political actors encompass both leaders and their followers, but are internally united and politically cohesive enough to operate and be treated as unitary actors. Examples include governments, political parties, guerrilla organizations, the military, the Catholic Church, business associations, labor unions, social movements, and powerful individuals.<sup>38</sup> Political actors possess political power by virtue of their capacity to pool large amounts of resources and leverage them by initiating, coordinating and sustaining highly organized political activities, such as mass arrests, military coups, electoral campaigns, strikes, mass demonstrations, and guerrilla warfare. My theory applies to non-state political actors (i.e., political actors other than the government and the military), to which I refer to as *societal actors*. It is important to note that these involve both domestic opposition groups and allies of the government.

By contrast, in and of themselves, *ordinary people* lack political power because they are bereft of any impactful organizational capacity. Instead, in political terms, they merely serve as an exploitable resource for political actors. Such resources enhance the organizational capacity

of political actors and may come in the form of votes, public opinion, physical labor, skills, knowledge, experience, and social ties, among other things. To be sure, individual citizens can each leverage their own resources and exert pressure upon their political adversaries. Yet because of their dispersed nature, the impact of such activities is marginal. A handful of isolated workers may initiate a scattering of strikes and boycotts, but to no avail. It is only when ordinary citizens pool their resources, coordinate their activities and overcome other collective action problems that they acquire the capacity to build and sustain a mass movement of resistance against their opponents, and hence wield political power.<sup>39</sup> Yet as soon as such challenges are overcome, the individuals who are directly involved in effect cease to be “ordinary”, and create or become a new societal actor, thus validating the initial distinction between ordinary citizens and political actors.

Extensive exposure to democracy offers ordinary people and societal actors institutional access to the power and resources of the state.<sup>40</sup> Such assets come in the form of expansive political rights, civil liberties and financial resources that sanction and encourage the formation and maintenance of politically autonomous organizations, such as political parties, labor unions, and voluntary associations.<sup>41</sup> Ordinary people can use these institutions, such as the right to establish a political party and run for office, and the freedoms of assembly and association, to create political organizations. Likewise, societal actors can harness these institutional resources to expand the scope of their activities, broaden their membership base, and acquire additional organizational resources, such as membership fees, professional staff, expertise, buildings, supplies and means of communication. They can ultimately expend the resulting organizational resources to initiate and sustain highly organized political activities, which amounts to political power.<sup>42</sup>

Under democracy, organizations such as political parties and labor unions proliferate, survive and thrive, yet this does not occur overnight.<sup>43</sup> This is because it takes time for ordinary people and the organizations they create to specialize in the exploitation of particular institutions.<sup>44</sup> Even under democracy, several barriers to collective action need to be overcome to gain control over the state. That is, whereas democratic institutions minimize the costs of establishing political parties, running electoral campaigns, and coordinating legislative activities, such costs remain far from nonnegligible. Furthermore, in the face of powerful competitors, and the authoritarian old guard in particular, these activities do not guarantee success, and may require further organizational improvements. It may take several electoral cycles for ordinary people and the organizations they create to overcome these obstacles. Likewise, once societal actors have

secured their hard-won control of the state apparatus, they may expand the institutional access to the power and resources of the state even further (e.g., by introducing more civil liberties), thereby facilitating the emergence of additional, powerful collective actors. As a result, rather than appearing instantaneously, the number of societal actors operating under democracy as well as their organizational resources gradually expand over time.<sup>45</sup> This impact of democracy is therefore best understood as a cumulative effect, where the historically accumulated stock of democratic experiences widens the range of powerful organized interests.

For example, for more than four decades (1932-1973), democracy in Chile offered political parties continued institutional access to the state apparatus. With the partial exception of the Communist Party, which was outlawed during the presidency of González Videla (1946-1952), political parties were able to expand their membership and develop competitive electoral campaigns, which widened their institutional access to the machinery of government even further. In addition, whereas labor unions were at times repressed during this period, over time they acquired more rights that protected their leaders and helped increase their membership. During Pinochet's military dictatorship (1973-1990), labor unions and political parties that were opposed to it subsequently harnessed the organizational capacity built up under democracy to launch and sustain a mass movement of resistance and pressure the government into reintroducing democracy.<sup>46</sup>

By the same token, for most societal actors and citizens extensive experiences with dictatorship means sustained blockage of institutional access to the power and resources of the state. This takes the form of continued exposure to state repression, understood as state-imposed costs upon the collective action of political opponents.<sup>47</sup> These costs involve the physical elimination of dissidents; restrictions that limit the range of permissible organizational activities, such as bans, curfews and censorship laws; sanctions for transgressing these rules, such as asset seizures, leadership imprisonment, and intimidation of rank-and-file members; and policies that channel resources away from opposition groups to regime elites and their supporters, such as arbitrary tax measures and the exclusion from career opportunities in the bureaucracy and state-backed businesses.

Through these coercive interventions, dictatorship suppresses the emergence of new societal actors, deprives existing ones of their organizational resources, and ultimately eliminates them. But as is the case with the impact of democracy, these effects are best understood as a function of the duration of the authoritarian experience.<sup>48</sup> This is because dictators and their repressive

agents can only accomplish so much in a limited amount of time. Longer spells in office expand the range of opportunities for authoritarian rulers to repress their opponents and society at large, such that over time, as the stock of dictatorship accumulates, they succeed in eliminating and disempowering more and more organized interests in an increasing number of ways. An important exception to these legacy effects involves members of the authoritarian ruling coalition, such as the ruling party, co-opted business associations, and regime-sanctioned paramilitary groups. As allies of the authoritarian government, these societal actors benefit from direct access to the state apparatus (and are often created by it), and hence grow stronger over the course of the dictatorship.<sup>49</sup>

For instance, for more than a decade Pinochet's dictatorship banned political parties, labor unions and other civic organizations, and jailed, tortured and murdered thousands of their leaders and activists. Yet the regime's repressive measures did not reach its victims all at once. Instead, over time more and more segments of the population had carried the costs of repression in an increasing number of ways. As the exposure of opposition groups to the authoritarian regime increased, it diminished their organizational resources and hence their capacity to challenge the government.<sup>50</sup> Nevertheless, this history of repression and exclusion was not extensive enough to prevent contenders from mounting a protest campaign against the government in 1983. By contrast, as of yet no such degree of organized resistance has emerged in Cuba and Haiti, where the stock of dictatorship in the twentieth century alone amounts to about sixty and ninety years, respectively, of authoritarian rule – much longer than is the case in Chile. As a result, by the time that Raúl Castro assumed the reigns of power in Cuba in 2008, the Catholic Church was the sole autonomous societal organization of any political significance, while not even one such organization existed in Haiti at the start of Préval's presidency in 2006.<sup>51</sup>

It is important to note that societal actors can 'transfer' their organizational resources across regime transitions. That is, in the wake of a transition to authoritarian rule, the organizational capabilities that they built up under years of democracy do not suddenly disappear, but remain a source of political power until the stock of the newly emerged dictatorship depletes them.<sup>52</sup> The waves of protests launched against Pinochet's dictatorship in 1983 are illustrative here as well. While for the most part banned, societal actors such as political parties and labor unions harnessed the organizational resources acquired under the preceding decades of democracy to initiate a series of disruptive activities that helped oust the authoritarian government. Likewise, as societal actors enter a nascent democratic era, those that were weakened under the preceding,

longstanding dictatorship, or were never exposed to democracy, do not suddenly accumulate the resources necessary to pose a serious threat to their political opponents. For example, from its founding in 1989 until the start of Mexico's prolonged transition to democracy in the mid-1990s, the Partido de la Revolución Democrática (PRD), which had split from the ruling party (the Partido Revolucionario Institucional (PRI)), had been denied institutional access to the state. This gradually changed as stronger executive constraints, particularly in the form of an autonomous and resourceful election monitoring body, ensured the fairness of the competitive elections that followed its establishment in 1994. As a result, the PRD was able to secure electoral victories in several gubernatorial races throughout the late 1990s. Whereas it failed to secure the presidency in the 2000 elections, which marked the completion of Mexico's democratic transition, subsequent experiences with democracy allowed the PRD to grow stronger and launch a protest campaign in 2006 to contest the outcome of that year's presidential elections.

Taken together, over longer stretches of time democracy and dictatorship exert greater legacy effects, with respect to both the emergence and elimination of societal actors, as well as the accumulation and depletion of their organizational resources. I therefore expect to observe the following:

**Hypothesis 1** *A greater stock of democracy (dictatorship) proliferates (eliminates) and empowers (disempowers) societal actors.*

## 3.2 Radicalization

In and of themselves, the proliferation and empowerment of societal actors do not pose a threat to democracy. For such threats to materialize, existing societal actors should also radicalize. The regime legacies discussed above carry implications for this as well, and inform my second set of claims. By creating and strengthening societal actors, the stock of democracy fuels their radicalization, whereas the disempowering and destructive impact of the stock of dictatorship deradicalizes them. Following Mainwaring and Pérez-Liñán, I define *radicalism* as the degree to which political actors are intransigent and/ or unwilling to accept short-term policy losses. Accordingly, *radical political actors* are unwilling to compromise and offer short-term policy concessions, and reject any policies that deviate from their preferred alternatives. They harbor little or no commitment to democracy, and tend to be hostile to it, as democratic institutions preclude the immediate enactment of policies preferred by a narrow range of like-minded political actors. Radical political actors are therefore likely to transgress democratic norms and embrace

or at least accept authoritarian forms of government and political violence as a means to eliminate their political opponents and obtain their ideal policies. For these reasons, I treat radical political actors as the adversaries of democracy. By contrast, *moderation* reflects a conciliatory approach to political conflict, understood as a willingness to compromise ideal policy positions even if this involves short-term policy losses and the attainment of preferred policy goals in the long-term. *Moderate political actors* are therefore more inclined than their radical counterparts to prefer peaceful and democratic methods of political influence, as this involves the toleration of their opponents and their policies.<sup>53</sup>

By proliferating and empowering societal actors, the stock of democracy augments the stakes and intensity of political conflict. As societal actors grow in number and strength, they create an environment in which multiple organized interests with competing policy objectives will continuously play a formidable role in the struggle for political power. By the same token, by thinning out the field of powerful collective actors the stock of dictatorship attenuates the competition among the political groups that survived its onslaught. These changes spur the radicalization and deradicalization of societal actors through two causal pathways.

First, faced by permanent opposition from powerful competitors, any given societal actor's adoption of a conciliatory approach towards political conflict incurs perpetual policy losses, because any compromise struck in these competitive environments inevitably shifts outcomes in favor of its most formidable adversaries and their divergent policy preferences. Instead, by magnifying the threats posed by and to societal actors with opposing political objectives, their proliferation and empowerment enhance the appeal of radicalism, which at the very least offers the mere prospect of curbing the policy advances of their opponents. For instance, by the time that Allende's presidency (1970-1973) in Chile came to an abrupt end, both the socialist party supporting the government, the Partido Socialista de Chile (PS), and (as of 1972) the two main opposition parties, the centrist Partido Demócrata Cristiano (PDC), and the conservative Partido Nacional (PN), had been exposed to more than four decades of democracy (1932-1973). The same applies to the left-wing urban guerrilla organization Movimiento de Izquierda Revolucionaria (MIR) and the worker and student movements from which it emerged. During this spell of democracy, these competing organizations were able to accumulate considerable organizational resources. By the early 1970s, the era of heightened competition that emerged from it had instilled in each of these political actors the expectation that their opponents would remain forces to be reckoned with, and that a radical approach to political conflict would better safeguard them

against sustained policy losses.<sup>54</sup>

The stock of dictatorship exerts the opposite effects. By eliminating societal actors and exhausting their organizational resources, long stretches of authoritarian rule mitigate the stakes and intensity of the competition for political power, which in turn diminishes the need for radicalism. For instance, by the time that the Stroessner dictatorship (1954-1989) collapsed in Paraguay, its subjects had experienced an uninterrupted spell of dictatorship that extends back to at least the start of the twentieth century. Only two non-state organizations survived this extensive history of authoritarianism without losing their political significance. One of these is the Colorado party, the ruling party, which was not subject to Stroessner's repressive grip on society. Its sole antagonist was the Partido Liberal Radical Auténtico (PLRA) party, the remaining societal actor of any relevance. To be sure, the Catholic Church, organized labor, and several movements representing women, peasants and indigenous communities all benefited from the political openings of 1989, but decades of authoritarian rule had hampered their ability to offer meaningful resistance to the Colorado party and its entrenched interests. With its enemies kept in check, the Colorado party had little to fear and hence abandoned radicalism as its political mode of operation.<sup>55</sup>

Second, as empowered societal actors pose greater threats to their embattled opponents, moderation ceases to be a requirement for their success, and may even stand in its way. Through sustained exposure to democracy, the organizational resources of societal actors accumulate, such that over time, the achievement of their policy objectives becomes less dependent upon cooperating and pooling their scarce resources with like-minded, yet competing groups. Without the need to join forces with collective actors that harbor similar policy preferences, powerful organized interests do not face any encouragement to moderate their approach to political conflict. As such, the stock of democracy empowers erstwhile moderate societal actors to the point where they are able to obtain their preferred policies in full, but only if they also abandon any concerns for the political objectives of rival groups. The overall result is a greater prevalence of radicalism. For example, before the urban guerrilla movement Tupamaros started its wave of terrorist attacks in Uruguay in 1963, its organizational predecessors had experienced more than three decades of democracy (1919-1933; and, with the exception of 1942, 1939 onwards).<sup>56</sup> The organizational resources accumulated during these two spells of democracy convinced the Tupamaros leadership that a conciliatory approach towards other left-wing groups, such as the more moderate Partido Colorado and the Convención Nacional de Trabajadores (CNT) labor union, was no longer nec-

essary to achieve its policy objectives. Furthermore, the organizational strength of one of their conservative opponents, the Partido Nacional, which had grown stronger under democracy as well, bolstered the appeal of radicalism. Under these competitive circumstances, the Tupamaros deemed radicalism to be both a feasible and efficacious method of political influence. Accordingly, they embraced a revolutionary approach to politics that involved the physical elimination of their opponents, and embarked upon a decade-long bombing campaign (1963-1972).

By the same token, by weakening societal actors, the stock of dictatorship increases the need for cooperation and hence moderation among rival political organizations. This was evident, for example, during Zedillo's presidency in Mexico (1994-2000), which coincided with its protracted transition to democracy. Through the sustained repression and exclusion of societal actors, the longstanding PRI dictatorship (1910-1988) that preceded it had suppressed the emergence and survival of all but one viable challenger to its rule. Apart from the ruling PRI party itself, the Partido Acción Nacional (PAN), a conservative political party opposed to, but tolerated by the PRI regime, was the only significant societal actor that survived this authoritarian history. Unable to develop into a potent force for change under the PRI dictatorship, and in the absence of full democracy throughout the 1990s, the PAN remained too weak to pressure the PRI government into ceding power on its own. To overcome this structural barrier, in the late 1990s the PAN forged an alliance with the left-wing PRD.<sup>57</sup> As part of their agreement, both opposition parties committed to introduce democracy, which serves as another indication of their willingness to compromise and dilute their respective policy positions.<sup>58</sup> As such, by curbing the organizational strength of contenders, the authoritarian legacy of the PRI's lengthy hold on power also took the form of the moderation of one of its primary opponents.

Taken together, I expect to observe the following:

**Hypothesis 2** *A greater stock of democracy (dictatorship) radicalizes (deradicalizes) societal actors.*

## 4 The Evidence

### 4.1 Latin America

Latin America serves as a fertile testing ground for my theory that enables me to strike an acceptable balance between internal and external validity. On the one hand, Latin America's relative linguistic homogeneity strengthens the internal validity of my findings by facilitating the



identification of politically relevant societal actors in each country’s historiography, as well as the assessment of their radicalism, which is language-related and ultimately non-behavioral. On the other hand, no other world region displays as much variation in regime history as Latin America. Costa Rica has maintained uninterrupted democratic rule since at least 1952, whereas Cuba’s communist dictatorship survived the Third Wave and has remained in force since it was established in 1959. Peru suffered a series of frequent regime changes, including one from democracy to dictatorship in the early 1990s, whereas Chile and Brazil showed modest levels of regime instability, and have remained democratic since their Third Wave transitions to democracy. Venezuela and Paraguay underwent decades-long stretches of democracy and dictatorship, respectively, before they transitioned to semi-democracy and continued to move in opposition directions — to democracy in Paraguay (1993), and to dictatorship in Venezuela (2016). Such stark differences in regime history offer the empirical leverage to unravel the relationships between prior regime experiences and the proliferation, strength and radicalization of societal actors with a considerable degree of precision. To be sure, the variation in regime history and the external validity of the resulting findings can be further enhanced by including additional countries into the empirical analysis. Yet what is lost in external validity is here offset by gains in internal validity. For these reasons, to scrutinize my hypotheses I mostly rely on evidence drawn from Latin America.

## 4.2 Measuring the Properties of Societal Actors

To measure the proliferation, empowerment and radicalism of societal actors, I draw upon the political actor dataset developed by Mainwaring and Pérez-Liñán.<sup>59</sup> This dataset covers twenty Latin American countries and, with some prewar exceptions, the years 1944-2010.<sup>60</sup> The unit of analysis is the political actor, observed per presidential administration. The dataset encompasses 343 of such administrations, most of which (almost 90%) last less than seven years.<sup>61</sup> For each administration, the dataset lists all powerful political actors (1,460 in total), and includes governments (presidents), (factions within) the military, paramilitary groups, political parties, business associations, labor unions, the Catholic Church, powerful individuals, social movements, and guerrilla organizations, among others. The coders based their decisions upon primary and secondary historical sources, which are documented and annotated in (individual) country reports.<sup>62</sup>

I measure the proliferation of societal actors as the number of political actors other than the government and the military that are listed per administration.<sup>63</sup> The dataset includes a total

of 952 administration-specific observations of such political actors. Furthermore, as a coding rule, “[t]he historiography for each administration serves as the best guide to determine who the main actors were. Main actors consistently appear in the main works.” As such, individuals, organizations and movements that are considered for inclusion each need to amass a baseline amount of political resources and wield sufficient power or influence to appear in historical sources. Those that fail to meet or exceed these thresholds are in effect excluded from the dataset.<sup>64</sup> For these reasons, the number of societal actors also serves as my measure of their overall empowerment.

I also use this dataset’s measure of the radicalism (and moderation) of societal actors. For each political actor that is listed for a particular administration, this dataset indicates the degree of radicalism it harbors, and labels it as either “radical”, “limited/ somewhat radical” or “moderate”. The codebook lists two necessary criteria for inclusion into the radical category: political actors should exhibit (1) “policy preferences toward a pole of the policy spectrum”, and (2) “impatience or intransigence to achieve their policy goals”. Political parties that are “fairly consistently centrist or amorphous on policy issues” are assigned to the moderate category, irrespective of their degree of impatience/ intransigence. The “limited/ somewhat radical” label is reserved for political actors that display “ambiguous or fluctuating positions” in all these respects. For the current task at hand, it is important to note that a willingness to subvert democracy to advance leftist or rightist policies counts as a manifestation of radicalism. The same holds for the use of violence, unless it involves a centrist societal actor that is otherwise unable to bring down a dictatorship.<sup>65</sup>

### 4.3 Measuring the Stock of Regime Experiences

The hypotheses are phrased in terms of the two *regime stock variables*: the stock of democracy and the stock of dictatorship. To construct these independent variables, I count the total number of years that each country-year in the sample (1944-2010) had experienced each of the two political regime types since (but excluding) 1899, and up until but not including the observed year. In line with my argument, the hypotheses do not specify the functional relationships between the regime stock variables and the outcomes of interest other than in terms of the presence and direction of the effects. For instance, my theory is agnostic as to whether each additional year of democracy exerts an equally strong effect across both limited and large stocks of democracy, or that this effect weakens as the overall stock of democracy accumulates. Likewise,

whether recent authoritarian experiences exert a greater impact than more distant episodes of dictatorship is theoretically indeterminate as far as my argument goes. To explore these functional relationships in greater depth, I operationalize the regime stock variables in three distinct ways.

The first operationalization leaves the regime stock variables unchanged. By counting the ‘raw’ number of regime years, it treats the effects of all regime experiences as equally lasting. Whether it occurred recently or in the distant past, and whether it came on top of long stretches of similar experiences or bucked an historical trend, if measured this way each regime year contributes the same amount of experiences to the overall stock. Under the second operationalization, the regime stock variables equal the natural log of the raw number of regime years (after adding 1). As such, it discounts additional regime experiences to the extent that the country of interest has undergone similar experiences before, and hence treats the effects of regime experiences as equally lasting, but also increasingly marginal. The third set of measures differentiate between regime experiences according to their temporal distance to the current year by applying an annual depreciation rate of 5% to the accumulated count of regime years. Under this operationalization, each additional regime year adds 0.95 to the current year’s stock,  $0.95 \times 0.95$  to the stock of the year that follows,  $0.95 \times 0.95 \times 0.95$  to the stock in the year after that, and so on. Because my theory is indeterminate as to the preferred operationalization, I treat this issue primarily as an exploratory matter to be adjudicated by specification searches and considerations of model fit.

To distinguish between regime experiences, I employ two different measures of the political regime type. Both measures set apart three political regime types: democracy, hybrid regimes, and dictatorship. For the first measure, which I label the “V-Dem” measure, I rely on several democracy indicators of the Varieties of Democracy (V-Dem) dataset (Version 7).<sup>66</sup> Its global reach and broad temporal scope (1900-2016) enhances the external validity of the resulting measure. Given the categorical level of measurement and the underlying uncertainty and variability in the data, I use the Latent Class Analysis (LCA) scaling technique to explore the multidimensionality among several country-year indicators of the freedom and fairness of elections, and the autonomy of judicial, legislative and bureaucratic institutions vis-à-vis the executive.<sup>67</sup> As I describe in detail in Appendix A (Section A.1.1), the LCA estimates validate the proposed conceptual distinction between competitive elections and executive constraints as two separate dimensions of the political regime type, but also indicate that country-year observations move

along these dimensions ‘in tandem’, albeit at different ‘speeds’. That is, whereas countries that hold relatively competitive elections also display relatively strong executive constraints, each empirically distinguishable regime category is generally more democratic with respect to the former than the latter. An important implication of these findings is that the hybrid regime category does not encompass a combination of strong executive constraints and unfree or non-existing elections. Instead, it captures the electoral authoritarian regime type (which combines reasonably or somewhat competitive elections with unconstrained executive power). If four permissible regime categories are specified, the two categories ‘in the middle’ distinguish between its two subtypes (competitive authoritarian and hegemonic party regimes).<sup>68</sup>

For the second measure, which I refer to as the Latin America, or “LA”, measure, I use LCA to enhance the internal validity of the first by combining it with the democracy indicators from two Latin America-specific political regime type datasets.<sup>69</sup> I discuss these indicators and the LCA estimates in detail in Appendix A (Section A.1.2). The principle difference between this operationalization and the first concerns the thresholds for inclusion into the democratic and authoritarian categories, which are ‘higher’ in the V-Dem measure than in the LA measure. That is, for country-years to be considered democratic in the V-Dem measure, they should display higher levels of democracy as observed with the LA measure. By the same token, whereas the authoritarian category is reserved for the most egregious instance of non-democratic rule in the case of the V-Dem measure, its broader range in the LA measure is such that it includes observations that belong in the V-Dem measure’s hybrid regime category.

The implication of this difference extends to the political experiences captured by the regime stock variables. Depending on the measure, they capture regime experiences that differ in ‘intensity’ and ‘mildness’. That is, if the V-Dem measure lies at their origin, they distinguish between observations based upon experiences that, by global comparisons, are extremely democratic or authoritarian. The regime stock variables that stem from the LA measure include but are not limited to such experiences, as they also encompass less but, by Latin American comparisons, nonetheless sufficiently democratic and authoritarian regime experiences. Rather than preferring one measure over the other, and prioritizing internal over external validity (or vice versa), I leverage the advantages of using multiple operationalizations given what is known about their substantive differences. By doing so, I am able to assign interpretations to differences in estimated effects that may help to modify or further specify my original argument. Most notably, the inclusion of multiple regime (stock) variables enables me to determine how ‘intense’ and

‘mild’ democratic and authoritarian regime histories should be to yield particular effects.

Finally, since the outcomes of interest are observed per presidential administration, the values for the regime stock variables that I assign to each observation are the averages across all country-years included in the presidential administration.

#### 4.4 Estimating Proliferation and Empowerment

The first outcome of interest that I model is the number of societal actors that are listed for each presidential administration. Depending on the level of measurement that I assign to this metric, this dependent variable serves as the measure for either their proliferation or empowerment. To be sure, this variable can readily be understood as a count variable that measures the number of non-state organizations, movements and individuals that are deemed powerful enough to be included in the dataset. The absence in the coding rules of an explicitly prescribed maximum count that imposes a cap upon this number corroborates this interpretation. Since this variable’s mean is greater than its variance, a Poisson regression model offers the appropriate estimation technique to model this outcome.

Yet the coding rules are also rife with instructions to restrict the number of political actors, already defined as such, to the “main” or “most important” ones, so as to meet the “need [of] a parsimonious set of actors (in our experience, usually 3 to 7 per administration)”. In light of these instructions, the data generation process ‘begins’ with a set of political actors from which coders select a limited number to include in the dataset. This selection excludes political actors that are not among the most powerful ones, and/ or those individuals, organizations and movements that, because of their weakness, cannot be considered political actors in the first place. The next steps in this process are subject to additional coding rules and considerable coder discretion. At high counts (say, above seven), the coders can apply a downward bias and restrict the total number of political actors to the “usual” maximum of seven. As a result, a total coded count of seven political actors in effect “usually” involves *at least* seven political actors. At low counts (say, below three), the permitted coder-induced bias is upward, where coders may seek to lower the power/ influence threshold above which political actors can be considered as such, and add political actors to meet the “usual” minimum of three. The suggestions in the codebook that “[i]n democratic regimes, the president and the largest parties are usually the most important actors” and that “[i]n authoritarian regimes, the most important actors [...] often include a hegemonic party (if there is one and if it is reasonably independent with respect to the president) [and]

the main opposition party” offer coders additional reasons to do so.<sup>70</sup> The result is an effective number of three *or less* political actors when the coded total count is three. Understood this way, the level of measurement of this variable is ordinal rather than ratio (i.e., counts), in which case the appropriate modeling strategy involves an ordered logistic regression.

This ‘ordinal’ interpretation also carries a substantive implication. At one extreme, a low count may signal the wholesale absence of organizations and movements, no matter their weakness. That is, because coders can lower the power/ influence threshold, this variable in effect measures the number of potential political actors, i.e., those individuals, organizations and movements that merit an assessment of how powerful and influential they are. As a result, a low count may indicate that there are few such organizations and movements to begin with. Modeled as an ordinal variable, this variable thus traces the rise and decline of political actors in part through the emergence and disappearance of organizations and movements. This trait can thus serve the purpose of examining whether democratic legacies help create new organizations and movements, and whether authoritarian legacies are instrumental in their elimination.

Understood as a count variable, however, it reflects the strength and weakness of these potential political actors. The more individuals, organizations and movements pass the fixed power/ influence threshold, the higher the coded count. Even low counts do not include any political actors that are too weak in this respect. Accordingly, in models that treat this outcome as a count variable, the estimated effects in part capture the extent to which democratic and authoritarian regime histories strengthen and weaken existing individuals, organizations and movements.

Rather than preferring one level of measurement over the other, I leverage the distinction between these two interpretations, so as to separately examine the regime legacy effects (1) upon the creation and elimination of (potential) societal actors, and (2) upon their organizational strength and weakness. As I explain in detail in Appendix B, to incorporate the sectional and temporal structure of the data, I model these two outcomes as follows. Understood as an ordinal variable, I model the number of societal actors through an ordered logistic Multilevel Mixed Effects (MLM) regression model, specified with random intercepts at the level of countries; robust, country-clustered standard errors; and a cubic polynomial of the mere passage of time (measured as the administration-average number of years since 1899). Treated as a count variable, I model this dependent variable through a Population-Averaged Panel-Data (PAPD) model, specified with a Poisson distribution for the outcome variable; the country as the panel variable; and robust, country-clustered standard errors.

As such, I model the number of societal actors through at least twelve different sets of model specifications: one for each of (1) the two levels of measurement of the outcome variable (ordinal and count); (2) the two measures of the political regime type (the LA and V-Dem measures) that I use to construct the regime stock variables; and (3) the three specifications of the regime stock variables (regular, logged and depreciated). Among non-nested MLM models, I adjudicate between these alternatives on the basis of model fit, as indicated by the information criteria. The preferred specification of the PAPD model is the one that minimizes the appropriate information criterion across all estimated models. I estimate additional models if this initial stage of model selection suggests that alternative combinations of regime stock variables are preferred.

The full models include the following control variables: the political regime type, the scope of state repression, population size, life expectancy, urbanization, economic growth, economic development, and US foreign policy towards democracy. In Appendix B (Section B.1), I describe these variables in detail, and motivate their inclusion.

## 4.5 Estimating Radicalism

To estimate the radicalism of societal actors, I rely on ordered logistic regression MLM models. I do so for the reasons I describe in Appendix B. The unit of analysis is the societal actor, observed per presidential administration. Multiple actors may thus be nested in the same country-administration. As such, the multilevel structure of the data consists of two levels: countries and administrations. The MLM models incorporate the unobserved cross-sectional heterogeneity that operates at these two levels. I further include robust, country-clustered standard errors and a cubic polynomial of time (measured as the administration-wide average year since 1899). The full model includes the following control variables: the political regime type, the scope of state repression, economic development, and economic growth. I discuss these variables in detail, as well as the reasons for their inclusion in Appendix B (Section B.3).

To test the proposed mechanism that links regime experiences to radicalism, I unpack the causal relationships under scrutiny here in terms of a variable that is endogenous to the previous component of my argument. I contend that the radicalization of societal actors is in part driven by their regime stock-induced empowerment and proliferation. I explore this claim by including the number of societal actors as a covariate in an additional set of models. To the extent that the inclusion of this mediator variable weakens the effects of the regime stock variables, and yields a mediator effect in the expected direction, the evidence validates the proposed mechanism. In

Appendix B (Section B.3), I discuss two additional mediator variables, which account for two alternative mechanisms (dictatorial traumas and executive governing capacity) linking the stock of dictatorship to deradicalization.

## 5 The Results

Below I discuss the empirical results of the preferred models, i.e., the models that best test my argument, but forgo any discussions of the estimates for the control variables (other than the political regime type). I present the corresponding tables and figures in Section 7. Unless stated otherwise, (1) the estimated effects that are discussed only apply if all included control variables are held constant; (2) references to statistical significance involve the 5% significance level applied to two-tailed tests; (3) post-estimation estimates of mean predicted probabilities are estimated while holding the included control variables constant at observed values; and (4) confidence intervals that accompany these predictions involve a 95% confidence level. Finally, some comments about software applications and replicability are in order. All models are estimated using Stata (Version 15). In addition, at the post-estimation stage of the analysis, I utilize wrappers for Stata's `margins` command included in the `SPost13` package developed by Long and Freese.<sup>71</sup> For replicability purposes, each table and figure is accompanied by a note indicating the filename of the Stata do-file that produced the output shown.

### 5.1 Proliferation

I first estimate several ordered logistic regression models that treat the observed count of societal actors as categories of an ordinal variable (hence I refer to these categories as “count categories”). The ultimate outcome that they model is the probability of a higher (or lower) count category of societal actors, and encompasses nine categories (0-8 societal actors). Table 7.1 displays the results of the models that do so through the inclusion of the LA measure of the political regime type and the depreciated operationalization of the regime stock variables. In the model that includes all control variables (Model 6), this specification optimizes model fit to the data and is therefore preferred. Its results partly support Hypothesis 1. Whereas the stock of democracy fails to exert any effects, as expected the stock of dictatorship decreases the probability of a higher count category. The depreciated, LA operationalization of the stock of dictatorship indicates that this involves recent episodes of both mild and intense authoritarian rule. By contrast,



contemporaneous hybrid and authoritarian institutions neither increase nor decrease the count of societal actors relative to democracy. It is only through sustained episodes of authoritarian rule that dictatorship succeeds in achieving its destructive potential in this respect, creating an effect that dissipates over time.

To illustrate the magnitude of this effect, Figure 7.2 plots the mean predicted probabilities of one of the middle count categories, which corresponds to four societal actors, against the depreciated stock of dictatorship. Over its entire within-sample range, which runs from 6 to 102 ‘raw’ authoritarian years, these probabilities decline by about .20. By contrast, the probabilities of the count categories “0” and “1” (not displayed) increase over this range.

## 5.2 Empowerment

Next, I estimate several PAPD models, which treat the number of societal actors as a count variable, and which yield estimates that only apply to the average country in the sample. Table 7.2 presents the results of the models that combine the LA measure of the political regime type with the logged and depreciated operationalizations of the stock of democracy and the stock of dictatorship, respectively. The preferred model is Model 3, one of the more parsimonious models, because it minimizes the QIC statistic. Its results offer partial support for Hypothesis 1, and call for an important modification of my argument. In an average country, greater democratic experiences expand the number of powerful societal actors. This supports my assertion that increases in the stock of democracy boost their organizational strength. The minimization of the QIC through the inclusion of the LA measure of the political regime type suggests that this does not only involve intense democratic experiences, but mild ones as well. Furthermore, the preference for the logged operationalization of the stock of democracy indicates that, as this stock accumulates, its empowering effect weakens off. This suggests that the stock of democracy predominantly strengthens societal that have existed since each country’s first couple of decades of democracy. To the extent that these ‘early risers’ survive the march of history, they crowd out the field of powerful political actors by outcompeting ‘late risers’, or exhausting the resources that democracy could otherwise make available to these latecomers. As such, this democratic legacy effect cannot overcome the limits of political pluralism, where organized interests are many, but not infinite.

Figure 7.3 visualizes the functional form and magnitude of this effect. Over the entire within-sample range of the stock of democracy, which runs from 0 to 69.5 years of democratic rule, the

mean predicted count of societal actors in an average country increases by more than one unit, from slightly less than 2.5 to about 3.5 counts.

The stock of dictatorship fails to exert any effect in this respect. Whereas this null finding contradicts Hypothesis 1, it echoes existing studies that suggest that an extensive history of dictatorship may strengthen members of the authoritarian ruling coalition to the extent that it counteracts the overall hypothesized effect under scrutiny here. For instance, a one-party dictatorship may leave behind a resourceful political party capable of ‘hitting the ground running’ under the ensuing democracy.<sup>72</sup>

Finally, viewed in combination with the findings discussed in Section 5.1, the results for the political regime type indicate that contemporaneous dictatorship (as opposed to democracy) weakens, but does not eliminate, societal actors. As such, dictatorship in the immediate sense deprives societal actors of what a democratic legacy replaces.

### 5.3 Radicalism

To explore the regime legacy effects upon the radicalism of societal actors, I estimate several ordered logistic regression models. Table 7.3 presents the results of a series of models that optimize model fit to the data through the inclusion of the original, ‘raw year’ measures of the regime stock variables and the LA measure of the political regime type. This operationalization incorporates both mild and intensive democratic and authoritarian experiences into the regime stock variables. The results of the preferred model (Model 9), which includes all the control variables, partly support Hypothesis 2. On the one hand, the stock of democracy exerts a positive, significant effect upon the radicalism of societal actors, as expected. Each additional year of democracy increases the odds of a more radical approach to political conflict by about 4%. On the other hand, no significant effect is registered for the stock of dictatorship. The presence of a non-democratic political regime (as opposed to democracy) fails to exert any significant effects either.

Table 7.3 also depicts the results of the model that includes the number of societal actors as a mediator variable (Model 3). As expected, the inclusion of this covariate ‘strips away’ the significance of the stock of democracy’s radicalizing effect registered in Model 9, while also yielding a significant effect in the expected, positive direction for this mediator variable. In line with my argument and in light of the findings discussed in Section 5.2, this suggests that the radicalizing effect of the stock of democracy is induced by its empowerment of societal actors

and the resulting augmentation of the stakes and intensity of political conflict.

The preference for the ‘raw’ measure of the stock of democracy merits attention here as well. Whereas the analysis of Section 5.2 validated my assertion that the stock of democracy expands the number of powerful societal actors, the sample will invariably involve environments that combine an extensive history of democracy with a small number of societal actors. In these contexts, there is still enough ‘room’ for the stock of democracy to widen the range of competing organizations. Accordingly, its ‘raw’ measure yields a better model fit in such a context, since it does not discount additional years of democracy when its stock is already considerable.

To visualize the magnitude of the main effect registered in Model 9, Figure 7.4 plots the mean predicted probabilities of the three outcome categories of radicalism. Its effect size is considerable. Over the entire within-sample range of the stock of democracy, which runs from 0 to 72 years, the mean predicted probability of harboring a radical approach to political conflict increases from about .25 to almost .75. After slightly less than three decades of democracy, the average societal actor is more likely to be radical than moderate.

I also direct attention to a second set of models (presented in Table 7.4), which include the V-Dem measure of the political regime type and the ‘raw’ measure of the regime stock variables. Whereas this specification fails to offer as good of a fit to the data as the model discussed above, it is useful for developing claims that link particular regime experiences, understood (and operationalized) in terms that extend beyond the binary democratic-authoritarian distinction, to particular legacy effects. So far, the models that failed to offer the best fit have typically yielded insignificant effects. The results of the models registered in Table 7.4 deviate somewhat from this pattern. At the preferred (highest) level of model complexity (Model 9), this specification offers a suboptimal level of fit, but also an effect is substantively different from the one I discussed above. The results partly support Hypothesis 2. The stock of dictatorship exerts a significant effect in the expected, negative direction. Every additional year of dictatorship that is added to a country’s stock of authoritarian experiences reduces the odds of a more radical approach to political conflict by about 2.5%. Since I used the V-Dem measure of the political regime type, this effect involves experiences with only the most severe instances of dictatorship. Neither the stock of democracy, nor the presence of non-democratic institutions (as opposed to democracy) exerts a significant effect.

Furthermore, the stock of dictatorship’s deradicalizing effect ‘loses’ its significance in Model 3, which includes the number of societal actors as an additional covariate. In line with my

theory, and in light of the destructive authoritarian legacy effects (discussed in Section 5.1), this finding suggests that the deradicalizing effect of the stock of dictatorship is induced by its elimination of organized interests. That is, by thinning out the field of powerful political actors and hence reducing the stakes and intensity of the competition for political power, the stock of dictatorship creates an environment that amplifies the need for moderation among opposition groups and lessens the need for radicalism among allies of the government. By contrast, as I show in Appendix B.3, dictatorial traumas and executive governing capacity fail to mediate the stock of dictatorship's deradicalizing effect.

This destructive impact of the stock of dictatorship also serves as a selection effect that accounts for the significant effect of the 'raw', V-Dem operationalization of the stock of dictatorship. First, to the extent that only recent episodes of dictatorship contract the range of societal actors, those that survive this onslaught will invariably encompass societal actors that operate against the backdrop of an extensive history of authoritarian rule. Since the stock of dictatorship can only subject surviving societal actors to its deradicalizing impact, instantiations of this effect therefore involve authoritarian histories that include, but also extend beyond the recently accumulated stock of dictatorship. As a result, the measure that captures this combination of authoritarian experiences yields a significant effect. Second, the elimination of societal actors selects out observations with recent experiences with particular dictatorships. The V-Dem operationalization of the stock of dictatorship yields a significant effect in this context, because it measures the most severe, and hence a more limited set of authoritarian experiences.

To visualize the magnitude of the authoritarian legacy effect registered in Model 9, Figure 7.5 plots the mean predicted probabilities of the three outcome categories against the stock of dictatorship. The changes are considerable. Across the entire within-sample range of the stock of dictatorship, which runs from 0 to 89 years of authoritarianism, the mean predicted probability of harboring a moderate approach to political conflict increases by more than .40 (from about .40 to more than .80), while the concomitant decline of the average risk of the most radical category across this range is approximately .35 (from about .45 to about .10).

## 6 Discussion and Conclusion

This study has uncovered two regime legacies that run counter to the received wisdom about the sources driving the democratic and peaceful resolution of domestic political conflict. The first

links the historically accumulated stock of mild and intense experiences with democracy to the predominance of its authoritarian and violent adversaries. By empowering societal actors, these experiences elevate the stakes and intensity of the struggle for political power, which in turn elicits a radical approach to political conflict among competing collective actors. The second regime legacy involves recent experiences with both mild and severe instances of dictatorship. By decimating organized interests, these episodes of authoritarian rule attenuate the competition for political power, which in turn fosters moderation among the societal actors that survived this onslaught. The result is a narrow range of political actors that are inclined to adopt democratic and peaceful methods of political influence.

To the extent that the first legacy effect holds in democratic contexts, one of its key implications is that democracies sow the seeds of their own destruction. I investigate this conditional legacy effect by estimating models that include the interaction terms between the political regime type and the regime stock variables. Table 7.3 displays the results of the version of this model (Model 10) that yields the best fit to the data. These results indicate that the radicalizing effect of the stock of democracy registered previously only holds in democratic political contexts, where each additional year of democracy increases the odds of a higher degree of radicalism by about 4%. This conditional effect may reflect the relative importance of organizational resources for augmenting the stakes and intensity of political conflict. Democratic institutions lower the threshold above which these resources heighten the degree of political competition. With the same amount of resources, any given societal actor can achieve more under democracy than is the case under dictatorship. This holds true both inside and outside political institutions. Inside institutions, democracy enhances the cost-effectiveness of electoral campaigns, which are by definition unhindered in these contexts by state repression, an uneven level playing field vis-à-vis the government, or political insignificance (i.e., elections exist and matter for obtaining real governing power). Outside institutions, democracy does so for the disruptive activities of challengers, because it is less likely than dictatorship to subject them to state repression. As societal actors grow stronger, these features of democracy spur upward changes in the stakes and intensity of the struggle for political power. Because societal actors operating in a democracy can expend less resources to achieve the same degree of success as under dictatorship, even small advances in their empowerment alter the political environment in a more competitive direction, radicalizing societal actors along with it. By contrast, by diminishing the cost-effectiveness of opposition activities, non-democratic regimes render the degrees of moderation and radicalism

of the societal actors that operate in them less susceptible to changes in their empowerment. As a result, dictatorship and hybrid regimes mute the radicalizing effect of the stock of democracy.

Similarly, insofar as the deradicalizing legacy of authoritarianism holds in non-democratic contexts, dictatorships lay the groundwork for their own demise and the (re)emergence of democracy. To explore these conditional legacy effects, I estimate a model that adds the interaction terms between the political regime type and the regime stock variables to the models that yield a significant effect for the stock of dictatorship. Table 7.4 presents the results of this model (Model 10). The deradicalizing legacy of dictatorship is only distinguishable in non-democratic political contexts, where every additional year of dictatorship reduces the odds of a more radical approach to political conflict by about 3%. The previous discussion of the relative cost-effectiveness of organizational resources may explain these conditional effects as well. In hybrid regimes and dictatorships, opposition groups face an uneven level playing field vis-à-vis the government and its allies, and therefore need a broader coalition to defeat their opponents than is the case under democracy. The overall degree of political competition in these environments is therefore more susceptible to a contraction in the range of collective actors. By contrast, for societal actors operating under democracy the decimation of opposition groups might not be enough to reduce the stakes and intensity of political competition below critical levels, leaving unchanged the degree of radicalism. Together, these features explain why democracy mutes the deradicalizing effect of the stock of dictatorship, whereas hybrid regimes and dictatorship amplify it.

In sum, the expansion of the field of powerful adversaries of democracy does not occur in spite of a lengthy democratic history and the presence of democratic institutions, but as their consequence, whereas the social forces that harm the prospects of democratization and civil peace do not wane despite the dictatorships of the recent past and the absence of democracy, but because of them.

## Notes

<sup>1</sup>Hagopian 2005; Mainwaring and Hagopian 2005.

<sup>2</sup>Mainwaring and Pérez-Liñán 2013c; Pérez-Liñán and Mainwaring 2013; Svobik 2013.

<sup>3</sup>Tilly and Tarrow 2006; McAdam, Tarrow, and Tilly 2009; Chenoweth and Stephan 2011; Håvard Hegre 2014.

<sup>4</sup>Linz and Stepan 1996; Albertus and Menaldo 2018.

<sup>5</sup>Gerring, Bond, Barndt, and Moreno 2005; Gerring, Thacker, and Alfaro 2012; Flores and Nooruddin 2016.

<sup>6</sup>Mainwaring and Pérez-Liñán 2013c.

<sup>7</sup>Schatzman 2005; Smith and Ziegler 2008; Pérez-Liñán and Mainwaring 2013.

- <sup>8</sup>Hagopian and Mainwaring 2005.
- <sup>9</sup>O'Donnell 1994; Collier and Levitsky 1997; Diamond 1999.
- <sup>10</sup>Hagopian and Mainwaring 2005; Mainwaring and Pérez-Liñán 2013c; Smith and Sells 2017.
- <sup>11</sup>Muller and Weede 1990; Håvard Hegre, Ellingsen, N. P. Gleditsch, and Gates 2001; Sambanis 2001; Regan and Henderson 2002.
- <sup>12</sup>Schatzman 2005.
- <sup>13</sup>Smith and Ziegler 2008.
- <sup>14</sup>Pérez-Liñán and Mainwaring 2013.
- <sup>15</sup>Schatzman 2005.
- <sup>16</sup>Smith and Ziegler 2008.
- <sup>17</sup>Pérez-Liñán and Mainwaring 2013.
- <sup>18</sup>Schatzman 2005.
- <sup>19</sup>Håvard Hegre, Ellingsen, N. P. Gleditsch, and Gates 2001; Cederman, K. S. Gleditsch, and Hug 2013; Cook and Savun 2016.
- <sup>20</sup>Mainwaring and Hagopian 2005, 1, 9.
- <sup>21</sup>Mainwaring and Hagopian 2005, 1, 9; *my italics*.
- <sup>22</sup>Mainwaring and Hagopian 2005, 9.
- <sup>23</sup>Pérez-Liñán and Mainwaring 2013; Mainwaring and Pérez-Liñán 2013c.
- <sup>24</sup>Mainwaring and Pérez-Liñán 2013c, 250-1, 256.
- <sup>25</sup>Svolik 2013.
- <sup>26</sup>Simpser, Slater, and Wittenberg 2018.
- <sup>27</sup>Linz and Stepan 1996, 55-65.
- <sup>28</sup>Bernhard and Karakoç 2007.
- <sup>29</sup>Pop-Eleches and Tucker 2011; Pop-Eleches and Tucker 2013; Pop-Eleches and Tucker 2014; Pop-Eleches and Tucker 2017.
- <sup>30</sup>Albertus and Menaldo 2018.
- <sup>31</sup>Huntington 1991; Mainwaring and Hagopian 2005; Mainwaring and Pérez-Liñán 2013c; Smith and Sells 2017.
- <sup>32</sup>Schatzman 2005.
- <sup>33</sup>Chenoweth 2011.
- <sup>34</sup>Smith and Ziegler 2008.
- <sup>35</sup>Carroll 2011; Bejarano 2011.
- <sup>36</sup>Gerring, Bond, Barndt, and Moreno 2005.
- <sup>37</sup>Dahl 1973; Gates, Håvard Hegre, Jones, and Strand 2006; Davenport 2007; Lijphart 2012; Svulik 2012; Knutsen and Nygard 2015.
- <sup>38</sup>Mainwaring and Pérez-Liñán 2013c, 10-1; 31, 76, 12, 43.
- <sup>39</sup>Haggard and Kaufman 2016; Albertus and Menaldo 2018.
- <sup>40</sup>Almeida 2008.
- <sup>41</sup>Bernhard and Karakoç 2007; Almeida 2008.
- <sup>42</sup>Almeida 2008; Haggard and Kaufman 2016; Sullivan 2016; Albertus and Menaldo 2018.
- <sup>43</sup>Olson 1982, 75.

<sup>44</sup>North 1990.

<sup>45</sup>Acemoglu and Robinson 2006, 359.

<sup>46</sup>Mainwaring and Pérez-Liñán 2013a.

<sup>47</sup>Tilly 1978, 55.

<sup>48</sup>Bernhard and Karakoç 2007; Pop-Eleches and Tucker 2017.

<sup>49</sup>Caraway 2012; Frantz and Geddes 2016; Loxton 2016.

<sup>50</sup>Bernhard and Karakoç 2007; Roberts 2016.

<sup>51</sup>Mainwaring and Pérez-Liñán 2013a.

<sup>52</sup>Almeida 2008.

<sup>53</sup>Mainwaring and Pérez-Liñán 2013c, 14-5; 36-9.

<sup>54</sup>Mainwaring and Pérez-Liñán 2013a.

<sup>55</sup>Mainwaring and Pérez-Liñán 2013a.

<sup>56</sup>Chenoweth 2011.

<sup>57</sup>Magaloni 2006.

<sup>58</sup>Mainwaring and Pérez-Liñán 2013a.

<sup>59</sup>Mainwaring and Pérez-Liñán 2013b.

<sup>60</sup>This concerns the following countries: Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica, Cuba, the Dominican Republic, Ecuador, El Salvador, Guatemala, Haiti, Honduras, Mexico, Nicaragua, Panama, Paraguay, Peru, Uruguay, and Venezuela.

<sup>61</sup>For administrations governing through dictatorship, this is in part due to the splitting up of otherwise intact administrations into smaller temporal units, so as to track changes among political actors over the course of the administration. See Mainwaring and Pérez-Liñán 2011, 3. As a result, the authors measure the traits of political actors at 343 time periods, even though there are only 290 distinct presidential administrations. For the sake of simplicity, I nonetheless refer to these 343 temporal units as (presidential) administrations.

<sup>62</sup>Mainwaring and Pérez-Liñán 2011; Mainwaring and Pérez-Liñán 2013a.

<sup>63</sup>In several instances, the assigned beginning and end years of administrations overlap. To meet the assumption of independent observations, I remove this trait by replacing the end year of each administration with the year prior to the start year of the subsequent observation (if any), except in cases where single-year administrations would ‘disappear’. In these cases, I preserve their original start/ end years, and move the start year of the subsequent administration one year ahead.

<sup>64</sup>Mainwaring and Pérez-Liñán 2011, 3.

<sup>65</sup>Mainwaring and Pérez-Liñán 2011, 17-8.

<sup>66</sup>Coppedge, Gerring, Lindberg, Skaaning, Teorell, Altman, Bernhard, Fish, Glynn, and Hicken 2017.

<sup>67</sup>Treier and Jackman 2008; Pemstein, Meserve, and Melton 2010; Fariss 2014.

<sup>68</sup>Diamond 2002; Schedler 2002; Brownlee 2007; Levitsky and Way 2010.

<sup>69</sup>Smith and Sells 2017; Mainwaring and Pérez-Liñán 2013d.

<sup>70</sup>Mainwaring and Pérez-Liñán 2011, 3-8.

<sup>71</sup>Long and Freese 2014a; Long and Freese 2014b.

<sup>72</sup>Loxton 2016; Albertus and Menaldo 2018, 65-6.



## 7 Tables and Figures

	(2)		(3)		(4)		(5)		(6)		(7-Dem)		(7-Hyb)		(7-Dic)	
	e $\beta$	SE	e $\beta$	SE	e $\beta$	SE	e $\beta$	SE	e $\beta$	SE	e $\beta$	SE	e $\beta$	SE	e $\beta$	SE
The Stock of Democracy (5%)	0.94	(0.07)	0.93	(0.07)	0.92	(0.07)	0.91	(0.06)	0.92	(0.06)	1.01	(0.09)	0.76**	(0.09)	0.96	(0.12)
The Stock of Dictatorship (5%)	0.89	(0.07)	0.87*	(0.06)	0.88**	(0.06)	0.88*	(0.06)	0.87**	(0.06)	0.98	(0.11)	0.81***	(0.05)	0.86*	(0.07)
Political Regime Type (LA)																
Democracy	1.06	(0.40)	0.59	(0.24)	0.57	(0.26)	0.58	(0.25)	0.61	(0.26)	7.36***	(5.09)	0.14***	(0.09)	0.39	(0.52)
Hybrid Regime	0.97	(0.38)	0.50	(0.26)	0.47	(0.25)	0.47	(0.24)	0.49	(0.25)	2.56	(3.37)	0.35	(0.44)	2.88	(3.66)
Dictatorship																
Interaction Terms																
The Stock of Dem. (5%) $\times$ Dem.											0.77***	(0.06)	1.30***	(0.11)	1.06	(0.12)
The Stock of Dem. (5%) $\times$ Hyb.											0.95	(0.11)	1.23	(0.17)	0.81	(0.11)
The Stock of Dem. (5%) $\times$ Dict.											0.83**	(0.06)	1.20**	(0.09)	1.15	(0.12)
The Stock of Dict. (5%) $\times$ Dem.											0.87	(0.09)	1.05	(0.07)	0.95	(0.07)
The Stock of Dict. (5%) $\times$ Hyb.																
The Stock of Dict. (5%) $\times$ Dict.																
State Regression Slope (Base: Limited*)																
Intermedate																
Broad			3.74***	(1.38)	3.85**	(1.39)	3.73***	(1.35)	3.88***	(1.38)	4.36***	(1.60)	4.36***	(1.60)	4.36***	(1.60)
Population Size (ln)			3.01*	(1.71)	3.12**	(1.78)	3.04*	(1.76)	3.20**	(1.90)	3.35***	(2.02)	3.33**	(2.02)	3.33**	(2.02)
Life Expectancy					1.03	(0.20)	1.04	(0.19)	1.06	(0.20)	1.10	(0.24)	1.10	(0.24)	1.10	(0.24)
Urban Population (%)					0.97	(0.04)	0.97	(0.04)	0.97	(0.04)	0.98	(0.04)	0.98	(0.04)	0.98	(0.04)
Growth in GDP per Capita					1.03	(0.03)	1.03	(0.04)	1.03	(0.04)	1.03	(0.04)	1.03	(0.04)	1.03	(0.04)
Real GDP per Capita (ln)					0.07	(0.26)	0.07	(0.26)	0.03	(0.16)	0.03	(0.14)	0.03	(0.14)	0.03	(0.14)
US Foreign Policy towards Democracy					0.90	(0.49)	0.90	(0.49)	0.91	(0.50)	0.85	(0.46)	0.85	(0.46)	0.85	(0.46)
Time (Years since 1899)							0.59**	(0.13)	1.38	(0.81)	1.23	(0.75)	1.23	(0.75)	1.23	(0.75)
Time <sup>2</sup>	0.63***	(0.10)	0.58***	(0.10)	0.58***	(0.12)	0.59**	(0.13)	0.60*	(0.16)	0.60*	(0.17)	0.60*	(0.17)	0.60*	(0.17)
Time <sup>3</sup>	1.01***	(0.00)	1.01***	(0.00)	1.01***	(0.00)	1.01***	(0.00)	1.01**	(0.00)	1.01**	(0.00)	1.01**	(0.00)	1.01**	(0.00)
Time <sup>4</sup>	1.00***	(0.00)	1.00***	(0.00)	1.00***	(0.00)	1.00***	(0.00)	1.00**	(0.00)	1.00**	(0.00)	1.00**	(0.00)	1.00**	(0.00)
Var(Country Intercept)	2.52**	(0.96)	2.57**	(0.95)	2.17**	(0.82)	2.18**	(0.86)	2.17*	(0.92)	2.32*	(1.04)	2.32*	(1.04)	2.32*	(1.04)
Wald $\chi^2$	17.36		36.37		55.70		114.39		247.51		1472.34		1472.34		1472.34	
Prob. > Wald $\chi^2$	0.015		0.000		0.000		0.000		0.000		0.000		0.000		0.000	
AIC	1132.51		1123.33		1121.26		1118.70		1107.29		1095.99		1095.99		1095.99	
BIC	1193.91		1192.41		1194.17		1191.56		1183.69		1168.57		1168.57		1168.57	
Countries	20		20		20		20		20		20		20		20	
Administrations per Country (Average)	17.1		17.1		17.1		17.1		16.9		16.9		16.9		16.9	
Observations	343		343		343		342		337		337		337		337	

Source: -DR-LA-30-28-Estimation-Coercive-Capacity-MLM-OL-5p-v02 do  
Note: The unit of analysis is the presidential administration. The ultimate outcome that was modeled was the probability of a higher (lower) count category of societal actors. For the interaction model (Model 7), three different sets of estimates are displayed, one for each reference category of the current political regime type, which concerns the "LA" measure. The models are specified with random intercepts at the level of countries; and robust, country-clustered standard errors. The regime stock variables are subject to an annual depreciation rate of 5%.  
\* p < 0.10, \*\* p < 0.05, \*\*\* p < 0.01. Standard errors in parentheses.

**Table 7.1 Ordered Multilevel Mixed Effects Regression Models for the Count Category of Societal Actors, Depreciated Regime Stock Variables, "LA" Measure of Democracy (Latin America, 1944-2010)**

	(2)		(3)		(4)		(5)		(6)		(7-Dem)		(7-Hyb)		(7-Dic)	
	e $\beta$	SE	e $\beta$	SE	e $\beta$	SE	e $\beta$	SE	e $\beta$	SE	e $\beta$	SE	e $\beta$	SE	e $\beta$	SE
The Stock of Democracy (ln)	1.09**	(0.05)	1.10**	(0.04)	1.04	(0.08)	1.06	(0.08)	1.07	(0.07)	1.03	(0.07)	1.03	(0.08)	1.14**	(0.07)
The Stock of Dictatorship (5%)	1.00	(0.01)	1.00	(0.01)	1.00	(0.01)	1.00	(0.01)	1.01	(0.02)	0.99	(0.02)	0.99	(0.01)	1.00	(0.02)
<i>Political Regime Type (LA)</i>																
Democracy	1.11	(0.12)	0.94	(0.09)	0.93	(0.10)	0.95	(0.09)	0.93	(0.33)	0.89	(0.33)	0.89	(0.26)	1.25	(0.52)
Hybrid Regime	0.99	(0.09)	0.76**	(0.09)	0.77**	(0.08)	0.79**	(0.08)	0.80	(0.33)	0.71	(0.28)	0.71	(0.28)	1.40	(0.55)
Dictatorship																
<i>Interaction Terms</i>																
The Stock of Dem. (ln) $\times$ Dem.																
The Stock of Dem. (ln) $\times$ Hyb.																
The Stock of Dem. (ln) $\times$ Dict.																
The Stock of Dict. (5%) $\times$ Dem.																
The Stock of Dict. (5%) $\times$ Hyb.																
The Stock of Dict. (5%) $\times$ Dict.																
<i>State Regression Scope (Base: 'Limited')</i>																
Intermediate			1.31***	(0.11)	1.31***	(0.10)	1.35***	(0.11)	1.30***	(0.12)	1.30***	(0.12)	1.30***	(0.12)	1.30***	(0.12)
Broad			1.49***	(0.20)	1.52***	(0.24)	1.56***	(0.26)	1.51***	(0.23)	1.47***	(0.21)	1.47***	(0.21)	1.47***	(0.21)
Population Size (ln)																
Life Expectancy																
Urban Population																
Growth in GDP per Capita																
Real GDP per Capita (ln)																
US Policy towards Democracy																
Baseline Incidence Rate	2.29***	(0.45)	2.11***	(0.37)	1.32	(0.97)	1.22	(0.92)	1.31	(0.92)	2.13**	(0.63)	2.40***	(0.50)	1.71	(0.60)
Wald $\chi^2$	9.14		29.34		45.29		108.97		95.68		32.94		32.94		32.94	
Prob. > Wald $\chi^2$	0.058		0.000		0.000		0.000		0.000		0.000		0.000		0.000	
QIC	218.579		211.418		224.490		222.540		225.778		216.514		216.514		216.514	
Countries	20		20		20		20		20		20		20		20	
Administrations per Country (Average)	17.1		17.1		17.1		16.9		17.1		16.9		16.9		16.9	
Observations	343		343		343		337		342		343		343		343	

Source: -DR-LA-30-19-Estimation-Coercive-Capacity-PAPD-Best-v02.do  
Note: The unit of analysis is the presidential administration. The dependent variable is the count of societal actors. For the interaction model (Model 7), three different sets of estimates are displayed, one for each reference category of the current political regime type, which concerns the "LA" measure. The country serves as the panel variable. The model estimated an independent within-country correlation structure. Standard errors are clustered at the level of countries. Regime stock variables that include "(5%)" in their label are subject to an annual depreciation rate of 5%.  
\* p < 0.10, \*\* p < 0.05, \*\*\* p < 0.01. Standard errors in parentheses.

**Table 7.2** Population-Averaged Panel-Data Poisson Regression Models for the Count of Societal Actors, Regime Stock Variables with Best Fit, "LA" Measure of Democracy (Latin America, 1944-2010)

	(3)		(4)		(5)		(8)		(9)		(10-Dem)		(10-Hyb)		(10-Dic)	
	e $\beta$	SE	e $\beta$	SE	e $\beta$	SE	e $\beta$	SE	e $\beta$	SE	e $\beta$	SE	e $\beta$	SE	e $\beta$	SE
The Stock of Democracy	1.03*	(0.02)	1.03	(0.03)	1.04**	(0.02)	1.04**	(0.02)	1.04**	(0.02)	1.04**	(0.02)	1.05	(0.04)	0.99	(0.03)
The Stock of Dictatorship	1.00	(0.02)	0.99	(0.02)	1.00	(0.02)	1.00	(0.02)	1.00	(0.02)	1.00	(0.02)	0.99	(0.01)	0.99	(0.02)
<i>Political Regime Type (LA)</i>																
Democracy	1.45	(0.70)	1.55	(0.55)	1.28	(0.58)	1.24	(0.54)	1.31	(0.59)	1.73	(2.08)	0.58	(0.70)	0.51	(0.68)
Dictatorship	1.01	(0.41)	1.09	(0.42)	0.87	(0.34)	0.86	(0.32)	0.89	(0.35)	1.95	(2.58)	1.13	(0.51)	0.89	(0.40)
<i>Interaction Terms</i>																
The Stock of Dem. $\times$ Dem.																
The Stock of Dem. $\times$ Hyb.																
The Stock of Dem. $\times$ Dict.																
The Stock of Dict. $\times$ Dem.																
The Stock of Dict. $\times$ Hyb.																
The Stock of Dict. $\times$ Dict.																
<i>Mediator Variables</i>																
Number of Societal Actors	1.30***	(0.11)														
Normative Preference for Democracy																
Duration of Administration																
<i>State Regression Scope (Base: 'Unlimited')</i>																
Intermediate																
Broad	1.61	(0.81)	1.07	(0.45)	1.95	(0.98)	2.04	(1.01)	1.95	(0.97)	2.05	(0.92)	2.05	(0.92)	2.05	(0.92)
Growth in GDP per Capita	1.46	(0.80)	0.65	(0.30)	1.77	(0.93)	1.77	(0.91)	1.66	(0.86)	1.82	(0.92)	1.82	(0.92)	1.82	(0.92)
Real GDP per Capita (ln)	0.02	(0.06)	0.00***	(0.00)	0.04	(0.12)	0.04	(0.12)	0.02	(0.06)	0.03	(0.07)	0.03	(0.07)	0.03	(0.07)
Time (Years Since 1899)	1.09	(0.13)	1.00	(0.22)	0.46***	(0.14)	0.44**	(0.14)	0.46**	(0.14)	0.48**	(0.14)	0.48**	(0.14)	0.48**	(0.14)
Time 2	1.00	(0.00)	1.00	(0.12)	0.96	(0.09)	0.97	(0.10)	0.99	(0.10)	0.94	(0.10)	0.94	(0.10)	0.94	(0.10)
Time 3	1.00	(0.00)	1.00	(0.00)	1.00	(0.00)	1.00	(0.00)	1.00	(0.00)	1.00	(0.00)	1.00	(0.00)	1.00	(0.00)
Var(Country Intercept)	2.62**	(1.12)	3.96**	(2.74)	2.94***	(1.17)	3.15***	(1.30)	3.09***	(1.23)	2.56***	(0.74)	2.56***	(0.74)	2.56***	(0.74)
Var(Administration Intercept)	1.34	(0.26)	1.20	(0.36)	1.36	(0.28)	1.37	(0.29)	1.36	(0.28)	1.31	(0.26)	1.31	(0.26)	1.31	(0.26)
Wald $\chi^2$	78.04		522.50		50.14		47.72		47.95		88.87		88.87		88.87	
Prob. > Wald $\chi^2$	0.000		0.000		0.000		0.000		0.000		0.000		0.000		0.000	
AIC	1645.80		1242.01		1657.88		1658.01		1657.95		1659.32		1659.32		1659.32	
BIC	1723.51		1319.71		1735.58		1726.00		1730.80		1751.60		1751.60		1751.60	
Administrations	333		333		333		333		333		333		333		333	
Societal Actors per Admin. (Average)	2.9		2.9		2.9		2.9		2.9		2.9		2.9		2.9	
Countries	20		20		20		20		20		20		20		20	
Societal Actors per Country (Average)	47.5		47.5		47.5		47.5		47.5		47.5		47.5		47.5	
Observations	950		950		950		950		950		950		950		950	

Source: -DR-LA-40-10-Estimation-Radicalism-MLM-v02.do

Note: The unit of analysis is the administration-societal actor. The ultimate outcome that was modeled was the probability of a higher (lower) category of radicalism. For the interaction model (Model 10), three different sets of estimates are displayed, one for each reference category of the current political regime type, which concerns the "LA" measure. The models are specified with random intercepts at the level of presidential administrations and countries; and robust, country-clustered standard errors.


\* p < 0.10, \*\* p < 0.05, \*\*\* p < 0.01. Standard errors in parentheses.

**Table 7.3** Ordered Logistic Multilevel Mixed Effects Regression Models for the Radicalism of Societal Actors, "LA" Measure of Democracy (Latin America, 1944-2010)

	(3)		(4)		(5)		(8)		(9)		(10-Dem)		(10-Hyb)		(10-Dic)	
	e $\beta$	SE	e $\beta$	SE	e $\beta$	SE	e $\beta$	SE	e $\beta$	SE	e $\beta$	SE	e $\beta$	SE	e $\beta$	SE
The Stock of Democracy	1.00	(0.02)	1.00	(0.02)	1.00	(0.02)	1.00	(0.02)	1.00	(0.02)	1.00	(0.02)	1.00	(0.03)	0.96	(0.03)
The Stock of Dictatorship	0.98*	(0.01)	0.98**	(0.01)	0.98**	(0.01)	0.98*	(0.01)	0.98**	(0.01)	0.98	(0.01)	0.97**	(0.01)	0.97**	(0.01)
Political Regime Type (V-Dem)																
Democracy	0.88	(0.51)	0.83	(0.33)	0.78	(0.43)	0.74	(0.39)	0.78	(0.43)	1.06	(0.88)	0.94	(0.78)	0.55	(0.41)
Dictatorship	1.19	(0.63)	1.10	(0.63)	1.11	(0.57)	1.01	(0.49)	1.06	(0.54)	1.81	(1.35)	1.71	(1.07)	0.59	(0.37)
Interaction Terms																
The Stock of Dem. $\times$ Dem.															1.04*	(0.02)
The Stock of Dem. $\times$ Hyb.															1.07**	(0.04)
The Stock of Dem. $\times$ Dict.															1.01	(0.02)
The Stock of Dict. $\times$ Dem.															1.00	(0.01)
The Stock of Dict. $\times$ Hyb.																
The Stock of Dict. $\times$ Dict.																
Mediator Variables																
Number of Societal Actors	1.31***	(0.11)														
Normative Preference for Democracy																
Duration of Administration			0.21***	(0.03)												
State Repression Scope (Base: 'Limited')					0.94	(0.03)										
Intermediate																
Broad	1.61	(0.83)	1.16	(0.43)	1.86	(0.94)	1.98	(1.01)	1.90	(0.97)	1.87	(0.97)	1.87	(0.97)	1.87	(0.97)
Growth in GDP per Capita	1.22	(0.68)	0.59	(0.33)	1.32	(0.70)	1.39	(0.74)	1.31	(0.71)	1.29	(0.68)	1.29	(0.68)	1.29	(0.68)
Real GDP per Capita (ln)	0.02	(0.08)	0.00**	(0.00)	0.05	(0.16)	0.33***	(0.12)	0.02	(0.07)	0.01	(0.04)	0.01	(0.04)	0.01	(0.04)
Time (Years Since 1899)	0.35***	(0.12)	0.53*	(0.19)	0.34***	(0.12)	0.97	(0.11)	0.34***	(0.12)	0.37***	(0.13)	0.37***	(0.13)	0.37***	(0.13)
Time 2	1.08	(0.14)	0.99	(0.14)	0.96	(0.10)	0.97	(0.11)	0.98	(0.11)	0.92	(0.10)	0.92	(0.10)	0.92	(0.10)
Time 3	1.00	(0.00)	1.00	(0.00)	1.00	(0.00)	1.00	(0.00)	1.00	(0.00)	1.00	(0.00)	1.00	(0.00)	1.00	(0.00)
Var(Country Intercept)	1.00	(0.00)	1.00	(0.00)	1.00	(0.00)	1.00	(0.00)	1.00	(0.00)	1.00	(0.00)	1.00	(0.00)	1.00	(0.00)
Var(Administration Intercept)	2.53**	(1.17)	3.94**	(2.30)	2.97**	(1.27)	3.27***	(1.46)	3.17***	(1.37)	2.66***	(0.99)	2.66***	(0.99)	2.66***	(0.99)
	1.41	(0.34)	1.35	(0.64)	1.44	(0.36)	1.45	(0.37)	1.44	(0.36)	1.37	(0.33)	1.37	(0.33)	1.37	(0.33)
Wald $\chi^2$	92.39		330.10		50.92		31.51		44.94		253.60		253.60		253.60	
Prob. > Wald $\chi^2$	0.00		0.00		0.00		0.00		0.00		0.00		0.00		0.00	
AIC	1646.91		1242.84		1659.27		1659.48		1659.61		1657.77		1657.77		1657.77	
BIC	1724.61		1320.55		1736.97		1727.47		1732.46		1750.04		1750.04		1750.04	
Administrations	333		333		333		333		333		333		333		333	
Societal Actors per Admin. (Average)	2.9		2.9		2.9		2.9		2.9		2.9		2.9		2.9	
Countries	20		20		20		20		20		20		20		20	
Societal Actors per Country (Average)	47.5		47.5		47.5		47.5		47.5		47.5		47.5		47.5	
Observations	950		950		950		950		950		950		950		950	


Source: -DR-LA-40-20-Estimation-Radicalism-MLM-vdem7-v02.do  
Note: The unit of analysis is the administration-societal actor. The ultimate outcome that was modeled was the probability of a higher (lower) category of radicalism. For the interaction model (Model 10), three different sets of estimates are displayed, one for each reference category of the current political regime type, which concerns the "V-Dem" measure. The models are specified with random intercepts at the level of presidential administrations and countries; and robust, country-clustered standard errors.  
\* p < 0.10, \*\* p < 0.05, \*\*\* p < 0.01. Standard errors in parentheses.

**Table 7.4** Ordered Logistic Multilevel Mixed Effects Regression Models for the Radicalism of Societal Actors, "V-Dem" Measure of Democracy (Latin America, 1944-2010)




**Figure 7.1** Path Diagram of Specified Causal Relationships

*Notes:* (In)dependent variables are circled. Rectangles indicate mediator variables. Arrows denote the presence and direction of specified causal relationships. Plus and minus signs next to arrows indicate the direction of the corresponding effects.




*Source:* -DR-LA-30-26-Graphs-Coercive-Capacity-MLM-OL-5p-v02.do  
*Note:* N = 337. Fitted Ordinal Logistic Multilevel Mixed Effects Regression Model (Model 6, presented in Table 7.1). The ultimate outcome that is modeled is the probability of a count category of societal actors of “4”. The “LA” measure of the political regime type is used.

**Figure 7.2** Mean Predicted Probabilities of Count Category “4” of Societal Actors for the Depreciated Stock of Dictatorship




Source: -DR-LA-30-16-Graphs-Coercive-Capacity-PAPD-v02.do  
 Note: N = 343. Fitted Population-Averaged Panel-Data Poisson Regression Model (Model 3, presented in Table 7.2). The ultimate outcome that is modeled is the count of societal actors. The “LA” measure of the political regime type is used. The independent variable of interest that is included in the model is the natural log of the stock of democracy, but to facilitate substantive interpretation, the predicted counts are plotted against the original, nonlogged values of the stock of democracy.

**Figure 7.3** Mean Predicted Counts of Societal Actors for the Stock of Democracy (Natural Log)



Source: -DR-LA-40-16-Graphs-Radicalism-MLM-v02.do  
 Note: N = 950. Fitted Ordinal Logistic Multilevel Mixed Effects Regression Model (Model 9, presented in Table 7.3). The ultimate outcome that is modeled is the probability of a higher category of radicalism of the societal actor. The “LA” measure of the political regime type is used.

**Figure 7.4** Mean Predicted Probabilities of Radicalism Categories of Societal Actors for the Stock of Democracy



Source: -DR-LA-40-26-Graphs-Radicalism-MLM-vdem7-v02.do

Note: N = 950. Fitted Ordinal Logistic Multilevel Mixed Effects Regression Model (Model 9, presented in Table 7.4). The ultimate outcome that is modeled is the probability of a higher category of radicalism of the societal actor. The “V-Dem” measure of the political regime type is used.

**Figure 7.5** Mean Predicted Probabilities of Radicalism Categories of Societal Actors for the Stock of Dictatorship



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# Supplementary Material

## Appendix A Measurement Models

Below I present my operationalizations of the political regime type (Section A.1) and state repression (Section A.2), and discusses the empirical results that reflect the validity of the resulting measures. Some general comments apply. I develop two measures of the political regime type. The first draws upon a global sample of country-years (Section A.1.1), whereas the second stems from a sample of Latin American country-years (Section A.1.2). I use multiple indicators and political regime type data from the Varieties of Democracy (V-Dem) (Version 7) dataset, and the datasets developed by Mainwaring and Pérez-Liñán, and Smith and Sells.<sup>73</sup> By doing so, I exclude non-state political violence from the measure of democracy, a problem that plagues operationalizations using the Polity IV data.<sup>74</sup> Rather than adding up indicators or taking their average, and to account for the varying degrees of variability and error across the indicators, I consider scaling techniques that are grounded in probability theory.<sup>75</sup> Because the data are measured at the categorical level, latent class analysis (LCA) offers the appropriate scaling method.<sup>76</sup> LCA insulates me from the need to impose arbitrary thresholds at indicator-specific levels of democracy and state repression, impose any rank-ordering among these indicators in the first place, or exclude observations with missing values on one or more indicators (as the missing value can be treated as a separate response category). Instead, LCA estimates inform the researcher how strongly each response category of each indicator is empirically associated with the indirectly observed, latent “classes” (i.e., categories) of the concept of interest, which I can then interpret accordingly. As such, LCA allows me to determine whether the proposed conceptual dimensions of democracy and state repression are empirically distinguishable in the first place. Finally, all models are estimated using Stata (Version 15) and the LCA Stata Plugin developed by Lanza, Dziak, Huang, Wagner and Collins.<sup>77</sup>

### A.1 Latent Class Analysis of Democracy

#### A.1.1 Global Sample (1900-2016)

In Section 3, I defined democracy in terms of its two institutional manifestations: competitive elections and executive constraints. *Competitive elections* (also referred to as *free elections*) encompass the right to stand for office and form a political party, as well as the right to vote in secret. Democracy requires that such elections be regularly held, subject to universal suffrage and applied to the most politically significant public offices, most notably the chief executive, so that the most senior public officials are selected among those who are most representative of ordinary citizens and through politically autonomous organizations, so that their policy proposals reflect popular demands, and so that these elections are meaningful and consequential for public policy. For the same reasons, an additional democratic requirement is the delegation of at least considerable policy-making competences to all such elected officials, including members of the legislature. The responsiveness of political institutions is further enhanced through *executive constraints*, imposed upon the government by an independent, politically autonomous judiciary and legislature. These executive constraints should curb the government’s ability to tilt the electoral process in its favor, so that competitive elections are also fair. *Fair elections* are devoid of electoral fraud and operate in an equal level playing field. To protect electoral minorities against majority rule and empower parliamentary opposition groups, executive constraints should also check the government’s dominance in the legislative process. Finally, executive constraints should also constrain unlawful government behavior, so that democratically sanctioned laws and policies are fully enforced, and so that governments are held accountable accordingly.

Together, and for these reasons, competitive elections and executive constraints are the political institutions that render the form of government responsive to the demands of ordinary citizens, and are hence the institutional manifestations of modern mass democracy.<sup>78</sup> I oper-

ationalize democracy accordingly by exploring the empirical associations among fourteen indicators of competitive elections and executive constraints included in the V-Dem dataset. The categorical indicators among these all have the same number of response categories (six, including one for missing values), which is required for estimating LCA models. For the content of the response categories, I refer the reader to the relevant V-Dem codebook.<sup>79</sup> Five of the fourteen indicators serve as indicators of competitive elections, as they measure the extent of (1) political party bans (*v2psparban\_ord*), (2) barriers to political parties (*v2psbars\_ord*), (3) political autonomy of opposition political parties (*v2psoppaut\_ord*), (4) universal suffrage (*v2elsuffrage*, a continuous (percentage) variable that I recode into six categories), and (5) the selection of the chief executive and legislature on the basis of popular elections (*v2x\_elec*, a continuous variable that I recode into six categories). These indicators encompass most aspects of competitive elections outlined above.<sup>80</sup> The remaining nine indicators reflect the strength of executive constraints. Most of these measures involve executive constraints delimited by the constitution or imposed by the judicial branch of government, as they measure the extent of the executive’s compliance with (1) the constitution (*v2exrescon\_ord*), (2) the judiciary (*v2jucomp\_ord*), and (3) the high court in particular (*v2juhccomp\_ord*); as well as the extent of political independence of (1) the high court (*v2juhcind\_ord*) and (2) the lower courts (*v2juncind\_ord*). Two measures indicate the extent of investigative executive oversight conducted by (1) the legislature (*v2lginvstp\_ord*) and (2) bureaucratic agencies (*v2lgotovst\_ord*). Finally, to incorporate the notion that executive constraints also operate within the realm of electoral politics by determining the fairness of elections (irrespective of the degree of electoral competitiveness), I include indicators that measure (1) the political autonomy (*v2elembaut\_ord*) and (2) the professional and organizational capacity (*v2elembcap\_ord*) of each country’s Election Management Body (EMB).

The theoretical claims of Section 3 rest upon a three-type or four-type political regime typology that distinguishes between unique combinations of competitive elections and executive constraints (democracy, dictatorship, and (two types of) hybrid regimes). The inferential task at hand is to determine whether at least three regime types can be discerned in the data, and whether each of these discernible categories can be uniquely linked to one of the preconceived regime types. To that effect, I estimate eight LCA models. All models draw upon the entire V-Dem sample, which encompasses both independent countries and colonial/ occupied polities (together referred to as “governing units”), and covers the 1900-2016 period.<sup>81</sup> *Ex ante*, the models differ in their specification of the number of latent classes (i.e., the number of regime types that each model should uncover in the indicator data), which ranges from two to ten classes.

Selecting the appropriate LCA model involves striking an acceptable balance in several connected trade-offs. The model diagnostics (not displayed) reveal one such trade-off: that between, on the one hand, fit to the data, and, on the other hand, parsimony and minimizing measurement error.<sup>82</sup> That is, sacrificing parsimony by specifying a higher number of latent classes corresponds to a better fit to the data (as indicated by lower AIC and BIC scores), but also a generally higher rate of misclassifying observations to one of the latent classes through the modal class assignment method (as indicated by lower scaled entropy scores). Second, the more parsimonious models better align with my conceptual distinctions. This is in part by design, since by default a three-class model offers a better match to a three-type regime classification than higher-class models. Also, *post hoc*, the conditional probabilities of the three-class model (i.e., the probabilities that a particular observation would be characterized by a particular item-specific response category if it would truly belong to a given latent class) presented in Table A.1 suggest that the three latent classes can be interpreted in line with the proposed regime typology. The first class represents democracy, as it displays the strongest empirical associations with the indicator values that reflect the most democratic levels for competitive elections, and the two most democratic levels for executive constraints. The second class best corresponds to hybrid regimes, since belonging to this class maximizes the probabilities of being characterized by almost all second and third most democratic levels of electoral competitiveness, as well as by most intermediate and several intermediate-weak levels of executive constraints. This class can best be interpreted as the competitive authoritarian hybrid regime type, since it indicates



hybrid regimes that conduct elections that are almost as competitive as they are in democracies, whereas the strength of their executive constraints is somewhat more intermediate than it is (weakly) authoritarian. The third class corresponds to dictatorship, because among the three classes it is associated the strongest with most of the least democratic indicator values of competitive elections and executive constraints. The conditional probabilities of the four-class LCA model (not displayed) reflect a similar pattern.<sup>83</sup> Two of its classes clearly indicate democracy and dictatorship. The two remaining classes correspond to the two electoral authoritarian regime types identified earlier (competitive authoritarian and hegemonic party regimes). Whereas both classes are relatively more democratic with respect to competitive elections than with respect to executive constraints, one is more similar to democracy and more dissimilar from dictatorship (competitive authoritarianism) than the other (hegemonic party regime). It is important to note that, by implication, the combination of reasonably strong executive constraints in the absence of competitive elections is not among the two empirically distinguishable hybrid regime types.

Taken together, these results suggest that democracy is indeed a two-dimensional phenomenon, with competitive elections and executive constraints as its two interdependent dimensions. That is, observations ‘move’ along these two dimensions in the same direction, yet at different ‘speeds’, in that elections become more existent or competitive than executive constraints become stronger as the political regime type changes from dictatorship, via hybrid regimes, to democracy. Since the three-class LCA model substantively best fits the three-type regime typology incorporated by my theory and hypotheses both *ex ante* and *post-hoc*, and since it involves one of the lower misclassification rates among the eight estimated measurement models it serves as this study’s model of choice for drawing descriptive inferences about the political regime type. To assign a political regime type to each country-year observation, for each combination of latent class and country-year, I estimate the (posterior) probability that each observation belongs to the latent class under consideration. Each observation is then assigned to the latent class with the highest such observation-specific posterior probability (modal class assignment).

### A.1.2 Latin American Sample (1900-2016)

I include five indicators of democracy in the Latin America-specific LCA models of the political regime type, which together cover a sample of twenty countries in the region.<sup>84</sup> Each of these indicators encompasses three response categories (excluding a category for missing data) that denote the degree of democracy (which I label “low”, “intermediate” and “high”). The first concerns the measure of the political regime type presented in Section A.1.1, which I refer to as the “V-Dem” indicator of democracy. This measure spans the years 1900-2016. The second concerns a re-coding of the Latin America-specific political regime type data associated with Smith and Sells.<sup>85</sup> Its original regime typology, which covers the years 1900-2015 and excludes Cuba, distinguishes between (1) “democracy” (observed “when national leaders acquired or held office as a result of free and fair elections – that is, when there was open competition for support among a substantial portion of the adult population”), (2) “semi-democracy” (operating “under leaders who came to power through elections that were free but not fair – when only one candidate had any reasonable prospect of winning, or when elected leaders were obliged to share effective power with or cede it to nonelected groups (such as landowners or the military)”), (3) “oligarchy” (observed “when electoral competition was essentially fair but not free – with candidates from dominant elites and suffrage restricted to a very small percentage of the adult population”), and (4) “non-democracy” (indicating “at all other times, or during years of military coups”).<sup>86</sup> To estimate the LCA models, I collapse the semi-democratic and oligarchic regime categories, so as to limit the number of response categories to three, i.e., the same number as with the remaining indicators. The decision to collapse these two particular categories is substantively the most valid option, because both political regime types exhibit a mix of democratic and authoritarian institutions, thereby approximating the proposed hybrid regime type. The remaining three indicators come from the dataset of Mainwaring and Pérez-Liñán dataset, which covers the years 1900-2010 and the twenty Latin American countries of interest.<sup>87</sup> Each of these items involve

three response categories that measure whether the aspect of democracy under consideration is subject to “no violations”, “partial violations” or “major violations.” The three measured aspects of democracy are the extent of (1) free and fair elections ( $e$ ), (2) inclusive voter franchise ( $f$ ), and (3) civilian governing power ( $p$ ).<sup>88</sup> The inclusion of the latter indicator offers a particular advantage to this study, because the real governing power of public officials selected on the basis of free and fair elections is the only explicated institutional manifestation of democracy that I did not incorporate in the V-Dem measure presented in the previous section.<sup>89</sup> In the original dataset, the values for the items  $f$  and  $p$  are coded as missing whenever free and fair elections suffer from major violations, which reflects the assumption that the complete absence of free and fair elections entirely strips the political regime from its democratic character.<sup>90</sup> To minimize missing data, I recode these missing values to the value of the least democratic response category.

I estimate eight LCA models specified with up to nine latent classes. Unlike in the previous LCA models, I do not treat missing values as a separate response category, because the bulk of missing values is the result of samples that do not entirely overlap in spatial and temporal terms. As a result, incorporating missing values as a substantive response category will in effect ‘taint’ the substantive interpretation of the latent classes with researcher-induced sample coverage decisions. Instead, I treat the missing values as “system missing.” By default, any such missing item(s) are excluded from the estimation of the corresponding observation’s contribution to the likelihood. As was the case previously, the model diagnostics (not displayed) reflect a trade-off between parsimony and measurement error, and model fit.<sup>91</sup> Whereas the six-class LCA model offers the best fit to the data, the least complex, two-class specification involves the highest entropy score. In this instance, I opt for the three-class measure, because it closely matches the proposed three-type regime typology. In addition, the high entropy score of the three-class LCA model indicates that the modal assignment of the latent classes to actual observations is fraught with minimum measurement error. Finally, the three-class operationalization of the political regime type facilitates comparisons with models estimated with the earlier, V-Dem measure of democracy. Indeed, as I discuss below, important differences with the previous measure remain.

The conditional probabilities presented in Table A.2 indicate that, relatively speaking, the three latent classes each correspond to one of the three political regime types, as the classes can be straightforwardly ranked along the democratic-authoritarian spectrum. This also holds in absolute terms, albeit with some reservations. For all but one indicator (the V-Dem measure), the conditional probabilities of the highest category of democracy approximate 1 (and, by implication, 0 in the case of the “low” and “intermediate” categories). In a similar vein, conditional upon membership of the dictatorial latent class, the probabilities of the least democratic category approximate 1. The latent class associated with the hybrid regime type, however, does not (always) involve conditional probabilities that are close to 1 or even the highest for the intermediate-level categories of democracies. Instead, with respect to electoral suffrage and civilian governing power, the conditional probabilities indicate that the hybrid regime category is rather democratic in absolute terms. On the one hand, this finding echoes the substantive profile of the hybrid regime category of the V-Dem measure presented in Section A.1.1, in that both are more democratic than authoritarian. On the other hand, the way in which the hybrid regime types of these two classifications accord to this trait is different. In the case of the previous measure, hybrid regimes are observed when reasonably, almost democratically competitive (free) elections co-exist with weak executive constraints. Under the current classification, the freedom and fairness of elections in hybrid regimes hover around intermediate levels of democracy (other than in terms of electoral suffrage and civilian governing power, which I conceptually link to free/ competitive elections). In part, this is so by design. First, in the case of the V-Dem indicator, the “intermediate” category corresponds to the hybrid regime type of the previous measure of democracy, thereby ‘downplaying’ its level of democracy. Second, in the case of the indicator drawn from Smith and Sells’ dataset, it corresponds to the combined categories of semi-democracy and oligarchy, i.e., regimes that govern through free and unfree elections, respectively, thereby ‘canceling out’ the extent of each other’s electoral freedom and fairness.<sup>92</sup>

The classificatory implications of these coding decisions and other specification differences

extend beyond the substantive interpretation of the hybrid regime latent class. A comparison of the class membership probabilities of Table A.1 with those of Table A.2 reveals a considerable difference in the distributions of regime types. In the case of the V-Dem measure (which involves a global sample), the hybrid regime type amounts to about 33% of observations (i.e., if the latent classes would have been observed). This percentage shrinks to about 18% under the current classification (which is limited to Latin America). Following modal class assignment, and restricting the comparison to the Latin America sample, the difference is even larger (45% vs. 19%; not displayed).<sup>93</sup> The more limited differences in the class membership probabilities in the case of democracy (23% vs. 31%) and dictatorship (44% vs. 51%) suggest that the hybrid regime category of the V-Dem measure ‘owes’ its broad size to the inclusion of observation that belong to the democratic or authoritarian classes (i.e., rather than from predominantly one of these) under the Latin America-specific classification. This is borne out by the regime type distributions after model class assignment, where almost two-thirds of hybrid regime observations under the V-Dem measure are assigned to the democratic (22%) and authoritarian (44%) latent classes as measured under the Latin America-specific specification. In addition to distinct indicator-level coding decisions, this distributional difference may partly reflect distinct samples and the implied range of the comparison. Since the V-Dem measure sets apart regime categories that are empirically distinguishable at a global level, its classification scheme might appear ‘stacked’ towards one of the categories at the regional level if that category happens to predominate in that particular world region. This is the case with hybrid regimes, which, following modal class assignment, characterize 33% of cases on a worldwide scale, but 45% of country-years in the Latin American sample.<sup>94</sup> Likewise, what counts as relatively democratic or authoritarian in the restricted, Latin American context, may often be closer to the center of the regime spectrum when the comparison is global. As such, the underlying trade-off between internal and external validity that sets apart the two measures translates into different category thresholds.

In other words, the bar for ‘entry’ into the democratic and authoritarian classes is considerably lower under the current specification than is the case with the V-Dem measure presented in Section A.1.1. This is also evident from the conditional probabilities of the V-Dem indicator displayed in Table A.2. For countries to be considered democratic under the region-specific operationalization of the political regime type, they should display elections that, in terms of the V-Dem measure, are at least as competitive and fair as in hybrid regimes. Likewise, the authoritarian latent class encompasses observations that are considered hybrid regimes as measured by the V-Dem measure (and semi-democratic/ oligarchic as measured in the dataset of Smith and Sells).<sup>95</sup> In sum, the democracies (dictatorships) of the V-Dem measure are overall more democratic (authoritarian) than those of the Latin America-specific measure. This has important implications for the interpretation of the regime stock variables. The regime stock measures that are computed using the V-Dem measure of the political regime type tap into the most democratic and authoritarian regime histories. When using the region-specific measure, the measured regime histories carry less such ‘intensity’, in that they also encompass ‘mild’ experiences with democracy and dictatorship. In testing my hypotheses, this distinction informs the interpretation of differences in the estimated effects between model specifications that employ different regime stock variables. In addition, and related to this, it assists in determining how democratic or authoritarian regime experiences should be to yield particular legacy effects.

## A.2 Latent Class Analysis of State Repression

In Section 3, I defined state repression as state-imposed costs upon the collective action of challengers. I refer to the amount of such costs as the *scope* of state repression, which takes the form of the extent of the population’s exposure to the state coercive measures. The greater the intrusion of the state’s repressive interventions in the daily life of ordinary people, and the greater the share of the population that is subjected to these costs, the greater the scope of state repression. I estimate several LCA models to determine whether this dimension of state repression is empirically distinguishable. Several of the indicators used in my operationalization of

democracy presented in Section A.1 involve state-imposed costs upon collective action necessary for conducting competitive elections and implementing executive constraints, such as bans placed upon political parties. Whereas these democracy indicators thus also measure manifestations of state repression, I exclude them from my LCA models of state repression, so as to minimize any predetermined empirical overlap between the state repression and democracy measures.

The V-Dem indicators included in my LCA models of state repression are all measured on a six-point scale (including a category for missing values), which is suitable for estimating LCA models. For the specific content of each item’s response categories, I refer the reader to the relevant V-Dem codebook.<sup>96</sup> Four of these indicators measure violent state repression, as they reflect the extent of state-sponsored (1) torture (*v2cltort\_ord*), (2) political killings (*v2clkill\_ord*), (3) violent repression of civil society organizations (*v2csreprss\_ord*, where only the three most extreme categories involve violence), and (4) violent harassment of journalists (*v2meharjrn\_ord*). The remaining state repression indicators concern nonviolent restrictions of personal autonomy. Most of these constrain the personal autonomy of individuals directly, as measured by the extent of freedom of (1) academic and cultural expression (*v2clacfree\_ord*), (2) religion (*v2clrelig\_ord*), (3) foreign movement (*v2clfmve\_ord*), (4) domestic movement for men (*v2cldmovem\_ord*), (5) domestic movement for women (*v2cldmovew\_ord*), (6) discussion for men (*v2cldiscm\_ord*), and (7) discussion for women (*v2cldiscw\_ord*). The remaining restrictions of personal autonomy incorporated in my LCA models directly constrain organizations, and reflect the extent of (1) government control over the political activities of civil society organizations (*v2cseeorgs\_ord*), (2) barriers to women’s participation in civil society organizations (*v2csgender\_ord*, which may also involve barriers imposed by non-state actors), (3) state repression of religious organizations (*v2csrlgrelp\_ord*, where only the most repressive response category involves state violence), and (4) government censorship of the media (*v2mecenefm\_ord*).

I estimate seven LCA models to explore the dimensionality among the fifteen repression indicators. The model diagnostics (not displayed) indicate that one trade-off in the model selection is between, on the one hand, parsimony, and, on the other hand, the misclassification rate and model fit to the data, as higher-class LCA models roughly correspond to lower AIC and BIC scores, but also lower scaled entropy scores.<sup>97</sup> A comparison between the conditional probabilities of the LCA model with the highest number (8) of classes (not displayed) and those of the three-class LCA model (presented in Table A.3) reveals that there is no trade-off between model parsimony and measurement validity. In the three-class model, the latent classes indicate the scope of state repression, as they distinguish between low, intermediate and high levels of state repression scope. The indicators for restrictions and state violence ‘behave’ similarly. The difference concerns the items that denote the second least repressive categories. In general, for the indicators of restrictions, these categories correspond most strongly with the intermediate class of state repression scope, whereas for the indicators of state violence, they correspond the most to the latent class reflecting the most limited scope of state repression (in other words, a limited scope of state repression is characterized somewhat more by state violence than by restrictions).

Expanding the number of specified classes to eight does not alter this general pattern. In the eight-class LCA model, too, the ‘behaviour’ of the indicators for state violence and restrictions is decidedly similar. Generally speaking, latent classes that indicate a greater degree of restrictions also indicate a greater degree of state violence. In addition, and related to this, restrictions and state violence ‘move’ at roughly the same ‘speed’ along the dimension of state repression scope. As the scope of state repression expands, the scope of restrictions increases about as much as the scope of state violence. This pattern is similar in lower-class LCA models (not displayed). In other words, unlike the scope of state repression, its ‘pacification’ is, at least in the V-Dem dataset, empirically indistinguishable. As governments expand the scope of their repressive activities, they do not prioritize violent over nonviolent methods of coercion. Instead, they use restrictions and state violence in roughly equal measure. To measure the scope of state repression, I utilize the three-class LCA model for several reasons. Its parsimony does not diminish its validity. In addition, it allows me to distinguish an “intermediate” scope of state repression. Finally, its misclassification rate is the second lowest among the nine estimated LCA models.

	3-Class Model		
	Competitive Elections		
	Democracy	Hybrid Regime	Dictatorship
Class Membership Probabilities	0.234	0.327	0.439
<i>Democracy Low</i>			
Political Party Bans	0.000	0.007	0.417
Barriers to Political Parties	0.000	0.008	0.413
Opposition Political Party Autonomy	0.000	0.016	0.373
Electoral Suffrage	0.000	0.023	0.405
Selection through Popular Elections	0.025	0.374	0.761
<i>Democracy Intermediate-Low</i>			
Political Party Bans	0.000	0.017	0.164
Barriers to Political Parties	0.000	0.038	0.337
Opposition Political Party Autonomy	0.000	0.038	0.250
Electoral Suffrage	0.036	0.258	0.099
Selection through Popular Elections	0.000	0.001	0.001
<i>Democracy Intermediate</i>			
Political Party Bans	0.000	0.040	0.202
Barriers to Political Parties	0.000	0.127	0.200
Opposition Political Party Autonomy	0.000	0.249	0.181
Electoral Suffrage	0.050	0.126	0.058
Selection through Popular Elections	0.011	0.047	0.018
<i>Democracy Intermediate-High</i>			
Political Party Bans	0.023	0.333	0.173
Barriers to Political Parties	0.016	0.468	0.044
Opposition Political Party Autonomy	0.068	0.497	0.092
Electoral Suffrage	0.050	0.032	0.030
Selection through Popular Elections	0.056	0.060	0.026
<i>Democracy High</i>			
Political Party Bans	0.977	0.604	0.037
Barriers to Political Parties	0.984	0.360	0.000
Opposition Political Party Autonomy	0.932	0.200	0.002
Electoral Suffrage	0.864	0.550	0.377
Selection through Popular Elections	0.907	0.517	0.192
<i>Missing Data</i>			
Political Party Bans	0.000	0.000	0.006
Barriers to Political Parties	0.000	0.000	0.006
Opposition Political Party Autonomy	0.000	0.000	0.101
Electoral Suffrage	0.000	0.012	0.029
Selection through Popular Elections	0.000	0.000	0.002
Observations	17604		

Source: -DR-Global-07-01-Measurement-Democracy-LCA-03-Class-Model-v01.do

**Table A.1** Latent Class Analysis of Democracy of Preferred Model (Governing Units, 1900-2016)

	3-Class Model		
	Executive Constraints		
	Democracy	Hybrid Regime	Dictatorship
Class Membership Probabilities	0.234	0.327	0.439
<i>Democracy Low</i>			
Respect for Constitution	0.000	0.019	0.236
Compliance with Judiciary	0.000	0.008	0.135
Compliance with High Court	0.000	0.009	0.131
Independence of High Court	0.000	0.062	0.273
Independence of Lower Courts	0.000	0.015	0.178
Executive Oversight by Bureaucracy	0.002	0.176	0.283
Legislative Investigatory Oversight	0.000	0.119	0.325
Election Management Body Autonomy	0.001	0.283	0.866
Election Management Body Capacity	0.000	0.149	0.547
<i>Democracy Intermediate-Low</i>			
Respect for Constitution	0.000	0.173	0.302
Compliance with Judiciary	0.001	0.236	0.384
Compliance with High Court	0.000	0.167	0.332
Independence of High Court	0.033	0.434	0.440
Independence of Lower Courts	0.020	0.399	0.489
Executive Oversight by Bureaucracy	0.020	0.311	0.110
Legislative Investigatory Oversight	0.013	0.314	0.112
Election Management Body Autonomy	0.014	0.287	0.071
Election Management Body Capacity	0.000	0.217	0.147
<i>Democracy Intermediate</i>			
Respect for Constitution	0.087	0.500	0.290
Compliance with Judiciary	0.024	0.267	0.201
Compliance with High Court	0.001	0.156	0.169
Independence of High Court	0.056	0.219	0.149
Independence of Lower Courts	0.050	0.252	0.152
Executive Oversight by Bureaucracy	0.139	0.234	0.064
Legislative Investigatory Oversight	0.166	0.278	0.027
Election Management Body Autonomy	0.056	0.250	0.033
Election Management Body Capacity	0.065	0.287	0.087
<i>Democracy Intermediate-High</i>			
Respect for Constitution	0.660	0.297	0.147
Compliance with Judiciary	0.717	0.477	0.266
Compliance with High Court	0.582	0.617	0.337
Independence of High Court	0.633	0.272	0.134
Independence of Lower Courts	0.714	0.321	0.173
Executive Oversight by Bureaucracy	0.675	0.170	0.016
Legislative Investigatory Oversight	0.617	0.180	0.009
Election Management Body Autonomy	0.466	0.174	0.009
Election Management Body Capacity	0.335	0.295	0.163
<i>Democracy High</i>			
Respect for Constitution	0.253	0.011	0.010
Compliance with Judiciary	0.258	0.001	0.000
Compliance with High Court	0.417	0.040	0.017
Independence of High Court	0.279	0.002	0.003
Independence of Lower Courts	0.217	0.002	0.007
Executive Oversight by Bureaucracy	0.161	0.000	0.000
Legislative Investigatory Oversight	0.200	0.002	0.000
Election Management Body Autonomy	0.463	0.005	0.000
Election Management Body Capacity	0.600	0.052	0.041
<i>Missing Data</i>			
Respect for Constitution	0.000	0.000	0.014
Compliance with Judiciary	0.000	0.010	0.013
Compliance with High Court	0.000	0.010	0.013
Independence of High Court	0.000	0.010	0.001
Independence of Lower Courts	0.000	0.010	0.001
Executive Oversight by Bureaucracy	0.003	0.108	0.527
Legislative Investigatory Oversight	0.003	0.108	0.527
Election Management Body Autonomy	0.000	0.000	0.022
Election Management Body Capacity	0.000	0.001	0.015
Observations		17604	

Source: -DR-Global-07-01-Measurement-Democracy-LCA-03-Class-Model-v01.do

Table A.1 (Continued)

Class Membership Probabilities	3-Class Model		
	The Level of Democracy		
	Democracy	Hybrid Regime	Dictatorship
<i>Democracy Low</i>	0.306	0.182	0.513
V-Dem	0.000	0.150	0.615
S&S	0.000	0.164	0.759
M&P: Free and Fair Elections	0.000	0.000	1.000
M&P: Electoral Suffrage	0.000	0.044	1.000
M&P: Governing Power	0.001	0.041	1.000
<i>Democracy Intermediate</i>			
V-Dem	0.338	0.809	0.383
S&S	0.026	0.703	0.227
M&P: Free and Fair Elections	0.023	0.784	0.000
M&P: Electoral Suffrage	0.000	0.196	0.000
M&P: Governing Power	0.008	0.354	0.000
<i>Democracy High</i>			
V-Dem	0.661	0.042	0.002
S&S	0.974	0.133	0.013
M&P: Free and Fair Elections	0.976	0.216	0.000
M&P: Electoral Suffrage	1.000	0.760	0.000
M&P: Governing Power	0.991	0.605	0.000
Observations	2340		

Source: -DR-LA-11-10-Measurement-Democracy-LCA-03-Class-Model-v01.do

Note: Key: V-Dem: Varieties of Democracy Project (Version 7) (Coppedge, Gerring, Lindberg, Skaaning, Teorell, Altman, Bernhard, Fish, Glynn, and Hicken (2017)); S&S: Smith and Sells (2017); M&P: Mainwaring and Pérez-Liñán (2013b).

**Table A.2** Latent Class Analysis of Democracy of Preferred Model (Latin America, 1900-2016)

Class Membership Probabilities	3-Class Model		
	The Scope of State Violence		
	Limited	Intermediate	Broad
<i>Scope Broad</i>	0.274	0.360	0.365
Torture	0.000	0.068	0.459
Political Killings	0.000	0.032	0.300
CSO Repression	0.000	0.001	0.229
Harassment of Journalists	0.004	0.069	0.494
<i>Scope Intermediate-Broad</i>			
Torture	0.014	0.351	0.413
Political Killings	0.003	0.200	0.387
CSO Repression	0.001	0.163	0.549
Harassment of Journalists	0.005	0.348	0.413
<i>Scope Intermediate</i>			
Torture	0.086	0.309	0.091
Political Killings	0.037	0.284	0.186
CSO Repression	0.004	0.469	0.186
Harassment of Journalists	0.296	0.521	0.053
<i>Scope Intermediate-Limited</i>			
Torture	0.555	0.252	0.037
Political Killings	0.248	0.387	0.122
CSO Repression	0.244	0.323	0.036
Harassment of Journalists	0.531	0.058	0.023
<i>Scope Limited</i>			
Torture	0.345	0.019	0.000
Political Killings	0.712	0.097	0.006
CSO Repression	0.750	0.035	0.000
Harassment of Journalists	0.163	0.003	0.000
<i>Missing Data</i>			
Torture	0.000	0.001	0.000
Political Killings	0.000	0.001	0.000
CSO Repression	0.001	0.011	0.000
Harassment of Journalists	0.001	0.001	0.016
Observations	17604		

Source: -DR-Global-21-05-Measurement-Repression-Onset-Scope-LCA-03-Class-Model-v01.do

Note: CSO = Civil Society Organization(s).

**Table A.3** Latent Class Analysis of State Repression of Preferred Model (Governing Units, 1900-2016)

Class Membership Probabilities	3-Class Model		
	The Scope of Restrictions		
	Limited	Intermediate	Broad
	0.274	0.360	0.365
<i>Scope Broad</i>			
Academic and Cultural Expression	0.000	0.036	0.524
Religion	0.001	0.002	0.063
Foreign Movement	0.000	0.001	0.168
Domestic Movement (Men)	0.000	0.000	0.035
Domestic Movement (Women)	0.000	0.000	0.041
Discussion (Men)	0.000	0.007	0.388
Discussion (Women)	0.000	0.022	0.373
CSO Entry and Exit	0.000	0.057	0.652
CSO Women's Participation	0.000	0.052	0.181
Religious Organizations	0.000	0.000	0.067
Media Censorship	0.001	0.238	0.767
<i>Scope Intermediate-Broad</i>			
Academic and Cultural Expression	0.000	0.261	0.358
Religion	0.002	0.035	0.318
Foreign Movement	0.001	0.026	0.408
Domestic Movement (Men)	0.000	0.002	0.189
Domestic Movement (Women)	0.000	0.057	0.341
Discussion (Men)	0.000	0.219	0.529
Discussion (Women)	0.006	0.193	0.527
CSO Entry and Exit	0.001	0.369	0.303
CSO Women's Participation	0.010	0.135	0.314
Religious Organizations	0.001	0.047	0.259
Media Censorship	0.071	0.350	0.060
<i>Scope Intermediate</i>			
Academic and Cultural Expression	0.034	0.454	0.100
Religion	0.006	0.168	0.342
Foreign Movement	0.000	0.229	0.256
Domestic Movement (Men)	0.007	0.147	0.360
Domestic Movement (Women)	0.008	0.208	0.359
Discussion (Men)	0.004	0.466	0.082
Discussion (Women)	0.006	0.519	0.096
CSO Entry and Exit	0.037	0.408	0.039
CSO Women's Participation	0.031	0.191	0.163
Religious Organizations	0.001	0.144	0.341
Media Censorship	0.524	0.193	0.025
<i>Scope Intermediate-Limited</i>			
Academic and Cultural Expression	0.549	0.243	0.017
Religion	0.155	0.508	0.245
Foreign Movement	0.081	0.412	0.123
Domestic Movement (Men)	0.031	0.292	0.298
Domestic Movement (Women)	0.115	0.359	0.211
Discussion (Men)	0.290	0.289	0.001
Discussion (Women)	0.410	0.256	0.005
CSO Entry and Exit	0.367	0.148	0.005
CSO Women's Participation	0.237	0.376	0.221
Religious Organizations	0.038	0.422	0.301
Media Censorship	0.392	0.003	0.000
<i>Scope Limited</i>			
Academic and Cultural Expression	0.416	0.005	0.000
Religion	0.837	0.286	0.032
Foreign Movement	0.917	0.331	0.046
Domestic Movement (Men)	0.962	0.558	0.119
Domestic Movement (Women)	0.876	0.375	0.048
Discussion (Men)	0.706	0.018	0.000
Discussion (Women)	0.577	0.010	0.000
CSO Entry and Exit	0.595	0.007	0.000
CSO Women's Participation	0.722	0.235	0.121
Religious Organizations	0.959	0.386	0.033
Media Censorship	0.001	0.001	0.014
<i>Missing Data</i>			
Academic and Cultural Expression	0.000	0.001	0.000
Religion	0.000	0.001	0.000
Foreign Movement	0.000	0.001	0.000
Domestic Movement (Men)	0.000	0.001	0.000
Domestic Movement (Women)	0.000	0.001	0.000
Discussion (Men)	0.000	0.001	0.000
Discussion (Women)	0.000	0.001	0.000
CSO Entry and Exit	0.000	0.011	0.000
CSO Women's Participation	0.001	0.011	0.000
Religious Organizations	0.001	0.001	0.000
Media Censorship	0.011	0.215	0.133
Observations	17604		

Source: -DR-Global-21-05-Measurement-Regression-Onset-Scope-LCA-03-Class-Model-v01.do  
Note: CSO = Civil Society Organization(s).

Table A.3 (Continued)



## Appendix B Estimation Techniques, Specification Searches and Robustness Checks

### B.1 The Proliferation of Societal Actors

I estimate several ordered logistic regression models that treat the observed count of societal actors as categories of an ordinal variable (hence I refer to these categories as “count categories”). The ultimate outcome that they model is the probability of a higher (or lower) count category of societal actors, and encompasses nine categories (0-8 societal actors). I present the full results of the preferred model among these in Table 7.1.<sup>98</sup> Together with the time-serial, cross-sectional structure of the data, an ordinal dependent variable dictates modeling requirements that only a limited set of estimation techniques and specifications can meet, yet there remains considerable room for discretion. Within the range of acceptable modeling strategies, the preferred estimation technique is an ordered logistic Multilevel Mixed Effects (MLM) regression model (also referred to as a Hierarchical (Linear) model (HLM)), specified with random intercepts at the level of countries, country-clustered standard errors, and a cubic polynomial of the mere passage of time.<sup>99</sup> The MLM estimation method offers several advantages in this respect. First, the multilevel specification of unobserved cross-sectional heterogeneity insulates the researcher from the need to assume and attain nil omitted variable bias for the purpose of accounting for this latent cross-country variation via the random effects estimator in the more conventional, ‘pooled’ model.<sup>100</sup> For the current task at hand, ‘waiving’ this requirement through multilevel modelling is a convenient aspect of this estimation technique.

Second, unlike fixed effects specifications, MLM shares with the pooled random effects model the advantage of allowing for the inclusion of time-invariant or slowly changing predictors, which encompass the regime stock variables in at least some regions of the data space. That is, (political) institutions are resistant to change.<sup>101</sup> Accordingly, several countries fail to accumulate any (additional) democratic or authoritarian regime experiences over long stretches of time. The inclusion of country-fixed effects to account for latent cross-sectional variation would therefore deprive the regime stock variables from much of their explanatory power, and as a result confine inferences about their causal impact to a substantively narrow range in the data. Rendering country-fixed effects unnecessary is thus a useful advantage of MLM.

Third, and related to this, the time-dependent structure of the data in conjunction with the predetermined collinearity between the passage of time and the regime stock variables, which is considerable by design (i.e., over time, any increase in the stock of democracy or dictatorship necessarily implies a simultaneous increase in time), presents a peculiar trade-off, which MLM is best able to attenuate. Temporal dependence in categorical outcome models calls for specifications that go beyond the inclusion of a lagged dependent variable and the clustering of standard errors.<sup>102</sup> One such solution is to get rid of the serial data structure altogether by incorporating time itself in the left-hand side of the regression equation, and defining the outcome of interest in terms of time accordingly. Several types of duration models (also referred to as event history models) exemplify this approach.<sup>103</sup> Applied to the current task at hand, the transition to a higher (or lower) count category would serve as the event of interest. A serious drawback of empirical applications of these models is the incompatibility between clustering standard errors and estimating shared frailties, which would otherwise account for unobserved heterogeneity in event history analysis. Alternatively, temporal dependence can be directly modeled by specifying the effect of time in some form in the right-hand side of logistic regression models. Such specifications may take the form of a cubic polynomial of time, time dummy variables, or splines.<sup>104</sup> Unlike duration models, these solutions do allow for the simultaneous estimation of the effects of latent heterogeneity and standard errors that are appropriate for cross-sectional time-series data. However, given the collinearity between time and the regime stock variables, the inclusion of time variables of some form diminishes the precision of the estimated empirical association between the regime stock variables and the outcome of interest.

Taken together, the third issue presents a trade-off between the specification of unobserved

cross-sectional variation (MLM) and substantively relevant precision (event history analysis). MLM strikes the best balance in this trade-off. First, it is important to note that multicollinearity is not a problem in principle, as it does not produce bias of any form, and that increasing the sample size attenuates collinearity-induced empirical imprecision.<sup>105</sup> Second, empirical imprecision takes the form of unduly inflated standard errors. If anything, this places a higher bar for achieving statistical significance and hence creates more demanding empirical tests for my theoretical claims. From the standpoint of falsifiability, this serves as a blessing in disguise. At the very least, significant findings should be interpreted as even stronger empirical evidence in support of my theory. For these reasons, I model the count category of societal actors through hierarchical modeling (the country being the only level here), robust standard errors clustered within countries, and a cubic polynomial of time (measured as the average year since 1899 per presidential administration). I increase the complexity of these models in a successive fashion. Finally, the AIC and BIC statistics inform my model selection.

The full model includes the following control variables, and for the following reasons (which also applies to the models that estimate the empowerment of societal actors discussed in Section B.2). First, I control for the political regime type, using either the V-Dem or LA measure. By definition, democratic governments do not repress political parties, thereby safeguarding a minimal set of societal actors. Furthermore, democracy offers most collective actors institutional access to the power of the state, which enhances the viability of political actors even further. By contrast, authoritarian regimes tend to weaken and destroy societal actors. For similar reasons, I also include the scope of state repression as a control variable, which I measure using several violent and nonviolent state repression indicators included in the Varieties of Democracy (V-Dem) (Version 7) dataset. The data is measured at the level of country-years. I use the Latent Class Analysis (LCA) scaling technique to explore the substantively relevant multidimensionality among these indicators, and construct a three-level scale that distinguishes between a limited, intermediate and broad scope of state repression. Appendix A (Section A.2) describes the indicators and the empirical results that justify this operationalization in detail. In the original datasets, these two variables are measured per country-year. Here, I take the modal political regime type and state repression scope of each presidential administration. In the case of multiple modi, I assign the ‘middle’ categories (“hybrid regime” and “intermediate state repression scope”) to that observation. To further test the robustness of my argument, I also include interaction terms between the regime stock variables and the political regime type (in the PAPD models, I do so for one of the more parsimonious specifications; adding them to more complex models would further increase the QIC statistic and stand in the way of model selection).

In the original datasets, the remaining control variables are measured per country-year as well. Here, I take their average over each presidential administration. The first three are from the V-Dem dataset (Version 7). I include the natural log of the population size (in millions, natural logarithm) ( $e\_mipopula$ ), because a greater pool of potential activists and supporters reduces the barriers to amass a baseline, absolute amount of organizational resources. This is also why I control for life expectancy ( $e\_pelifeex$ ). Yet a greater population size also exacerbates the collective action problems that impede the pooling of these resources among the masses. I therefore include urbanization (urban population as a percentage of the total population, using  $e\_miurbpop$  and  $e\_mipopula$ ) as a control variable, arguing that a higher population density and greater urban areas in particular foster the social capital necessary for overcoming these obstacles. The remaining controls are from the dataset developed by Mainwaring and Pérez-Liñán.<sup>106</sup> Two of these account for the available material resources in society, which can be harnessed to create and sustain collective actors. These are the natural log of the per capita GDP variable in the dataset ( $pgdp$ ), and growth in per capita GDP ( $gpgdp$ ). Both variables also appear in the V-Dem dataset, but yield more missing values there. Finally, I control for US foreign policy towards democracy in Latin America ( $us\_t$ ), measured as an index that ranges from zero (least favorable to democracy) to one (most favorable towards democracy). Foreign policy interventions in support of democracy may take the form of policies promoting political pluralism, where foreign governments assist domestic opposition groups in their struggle against

authoritarian rule, or help them to remain active once democracy is established. Either way, such policy interventions spur the creation and boost the organizational strength of societal actors.

To further test the robustness of my argument, I estimate models that include interaction terms between the regime stock variables and the political regime type. In this model, I measure the political regime type and the regime stock variables on the basis of the V-Dem measure of democracy. This operationalization captures the most intense democratic and authoritarian regime experiences. This model also includes the natural log specification of the regime stock variables. The results (not displayed) indicate that the negative effect of the stock of dictatorship registered in the preferred model discussed in Section 5.1 (Model 6 in Table 7.1) is only present in hybrid regimes, and that the magnitude of this conditional effect diminishes as the stock of dictatorship increases.<sup>107</sup> The estimates for the contemporaneous political regime type helps account for these findings. These estimates indicate that when democratic and authoritarian experiences are at their minima, the presence of a hybrid regime significantly increases the count category of societal actors relative to dictatorship. This may be the result of splits from the ruling coalition in hybrid regimes, where its members deem political institutions insufficiently authoritarian. In turn, the corresponding increase in the number of societal actors in hybrid regimes creates enough ‘room’ for the observed negative effect of an authoritarian legacy. An additional explanation involves authoritarian ruling coalitions of longstanding dictatorships that insulate their members from repression, and ensure their survival, to the extent that this protection dampens the otherwise significant authoritarian legacy effect.

## B.2 The Empowerment of Societal Actors

The second set of empirical results that I present below are derived from models that treat the number of societal actors as a count variable. I estimate these results through Population-Averaged Panel-Data (PAPD) models. I present the full results of these models in Table 7.2.<sup>108</sup> The control variables and the reasons for their inclusion are the same as the ones discussed in Section B.1. The PAPD estimation technique uses the generalized estimating equation (GEE), which is an extension of the generalized linear model (GLM).<sup>109</sup> It restricts the estimation to effects that only apply to, as its name suggests, the average ‘panel unit’, as defined by the panel variable, in this case the average country. By contrast, in ‘conventional’ regression models, the estimated effects apply to every conceivable observation, holding all other variables constant. Depending on the research context, this may offer an inferential disadvantage, in that average countries may not display substantively meaningful variation in the independent variable of interest. Yet this is not the case in the current application, as the average country may in fact exhibit considerable variation in the accumulated stock of democratic and authoritarian experiences. This is because such regime experiences often accumulate over time within the same (average) country; with the passage of time, and unless it concerns a hybrid regime, any given country gains a greater stock of democratic or authoritarian experiences. Given such a sample, conceiving of an average country that displays variation in the stock of democracy and the stock of dictatorship therefore carries internal validity.

PAPD models offer several advantages for the task at hand. First, the Poisson and negative binomial distributions are among the distributions that can be specified for the dependent variable. Since the variance of the dependent variable is not greater than the mean (indicating a lack of overdispersion), I use the Poisson distribution. Second, this estimation technique can fully incorporate the serial and cross-sectional structure of the data. In this case, the unit of analysis is the presidential administration. Each of the twenty Latin American countries includes several successive administrations. By designating the country as the panel variable, the PAPD model accounts for the unobserved cross-country heterogeneity by assuming that this latent heterogeneity is averaged out. Accordingly, the estimated ‘constant’ in the PAPD poisson regression models represents a baseline incidence rate that is conditional upon zero random effects. I also include country-clustered standard errors. Whereas these options are available in Multilevel Mixed Effects (MLM) models as well, the PAPD specification also allows for temporal dynamics

that keep intact the substantive research goal. That is, MLM count models restrict the choice to the inclusion of a lagged dependent variable. In count models, this amounts to modeling the growth rate of the number of non-state political actors, which is not of interest in this research context. The Poisson Exponentially Weighted Moving Average (PEWMA) estimation technique offers a useful alternative in this respect, but the available software package cannot account for the multilevel structure of the data.<sup>110</sup> In PAPD models, however, several within-group (i.e., within-country) correlation structures can be specified.

The imposition of an unstructured correlation structure prevented model convergence, whereas the stationary, nonstationary and autoregressive specifications of temporal dependence are in conflict with the unequal ‘spacing’ between successive presidential administrations, which do not begin nor end at fixed temporal intervals. This narrowed down the choice to the following two specifications of serial dependence: exchangeable and independent correlation structures. Following Cui, I adjudicate between these PAPD alternatives by selecting the specification that yields the smallest Quasi-likelihood under the Independence Model Criterion (QIC) among the most complex models, which include all control variables and the interaction terms.<sup>111</sup> I do so for each set of models that incorporate one particular specification of the regime stock variables. In all cases, the independent correlation structure yields the smallest QIC. Since the autoregressive specification makes substantive sense in light of my theory (in that I expect societal actors to build on their acquired strengths), I also estimate the QIC for a first-order autoregressive process, yet for all cases it yields a bigger QIC than that of an independent correlation structure. I use the same approach for selecting the operationalization of the regime stock variables, the remaining covariates (other than the interaction terms) and the extent of model complexity. This QIC selection criterion is not confined to comparisons of the QIC statistics among non-nested models. Instead, what matters is minimizing the QIC statistic across all estimated models.

Following the approach of the previous section, I conduct a robustness check that involves interaction effects. Table 7.2 presents the results of the preferred versions of Model 7, which includes the interaction terms between the regime stock variables (logged for the stock of democracy and depreciated for the stock of dictatorship) and the political regime type. The results indicate that the positive effect of the stock of democracy registered in Model 3 (and discussed in Section 5.2) only holds in authoritarian political contexts. The use of the LA measure of the political regime type again indicates that this also involves both intense and mild democratic experiences. Dictatorship’s inherent repressive environment, in which opposition political parties are repressed, helps account for this conditional effect. By weakening these political actors to the extent that they can only become stronger, contemporaneous dictatorship creates enough ‘room’ for a positive impact of the stock of democracy. As such, dictatorship in the immediate sense deprives opposition groups of what a democratic legacy replaces. The negative effect of contemporaneous authoritarian institutions, revealed by Model 3, corroborates this interpretation.

### B.3 The Radicalism of Societal Actors

The final outcome of interest is the radicalism of societal actors, which I measure using an ordinal variable that consists of three categories (moderate, intermediate, radical). For the same reasons I describe in Section B.1, I model this dependent variable through an MLM regression model. I specify these models with robust, country-clustered standard errors, random intercepts at the levels of countries and presidential administrations, and a cubic polynomial of time (measured as the administration-wide average year since 1899). The full results of the preferred models among these are presented in Tables 7.3 and 7.4.<sup>112</sup> The full model includes the following control variables, and for the following reasons. First, I control for the political regime type (the modal type across the administration, or hybrid regimes when there are multiple modi), and include interaction terms between this variable and the regime stock variables. On the one hand, authoritarian institutions amplify the implications of being in or out of power, in that those who are left out of the authoritarian ruling coalition lose out on the benefits of direct access to the government, or even suffer great losses. By the same token, regime insiders have more to

lose under dictatorship, and therefore try to cling on to office more intensely than is the case under democracy. As the stakes of the competition for access to and control of the executive increases, so does radicalism. By contrast, democracy reassures major opposition groups that their time in government will come, while its inherent executive constraints protect the interests of former authoritarian regime elites and their allies against significant policy reversals.<sup>113</sup> The result is moderation on the part of these political actors. On the other hand, to the extent that challengers that champion drastic changes to the distribution of political and economic power are more at risk of being targeted by state repression, the political regime may exert a countervailing effect.<sup>114</sup> That is, the presence of an authoritarian government may encourage opposition groups to adopt moderation as a way to appease their opponents in government. Democratic institutions minimize or at least attenuate this risk, especially if opposition groups pursue these radical policy objectives through electoral and legislative institutions. To further scrutinize my argument, I also include interaction terms between the political regime type and the regime stock variables.

For similar reasons, I also control for the scope of state repression (measured as the modal value in the administration, or set to “intermediate” in the case of multiple modi), which also serves as a proxy for the coercive capacity of the government and the state it controls. On the one hand, a repressive environment narrows down the opportunities available to opposition groups to advance their agendas. To offset the adverse implications of these diminished opportunities, opposition groups are encouraged to demand more at any given opportunity “before it is too late”, which takes the form of radicalism. But where governments tolerate opposition groups, more such occasions arise, and moderation suffices as a result. In these contexts, opposition groups can allow themselves to limit their demands, as they enjoy the prospect of multiple opportunities to pursue their objectives. On the other hand, opposition groups that face a potent, repressive government are less willing to tread on it for fear of repressive repercussions, and adopt a moderate approach to political conflict as a way to attenuate the threats they pose. Allies of such a government are more likely to deradicalize as well, because a powerful government is in a stronger position to safeguard their interests. By the same token, where the repressive capacity of the government is limited, radicalism carries less risks for opposition groups, whereas moderation is a more risky approach for allies of the government.

At low levels of economic development, prevailing in the struggle for power carries severe implications for the organizational survival of political actors and the well-being of their activists, supporters and constituents. Accordingly, as wealth increases, the stakes of political conflict, and hence the need for radicalism, decreases. This is why I also control for material wealth, measured as GDP per capita (logged), and growth in GDP, both averaged over the presidential administration, for which I use the dataset developed by Mainwaring and Pérez-Liñán.<sup>115</sup>

I explore two alternative mechanisms that link the stock of dictatorship to radicalism by incorporating two additional mediator variables. One of these involves the normative preferences for democracy of societal actors. Authoritarian legacies may take the form of dictatorial traumas that induce societal actors that suffered under dictatorship to assign an intrinsic value to democracy.<sup>116</sup> In their efforts to create and sustain democracy as a bulwark of human rights and a safeguard against political violence, these societal actors adopt moderation as a way to assuage fears among their authoritarian opponents that their interests are seriously at stake under democracy.<sup>117</sup> To scrutinize this proposition, I include a variable measuring normative regime preferences in the preferred models estimating radicalism. This is a variable that combines two separate measures: normative preferences for democracy (*ProDem*) and normative preferences for dictatorship (*ProDict*), which are included in the political actor dataset of Mainwaring and Pérez-Liñán.<sup>118</sup> Both consist of three ordered categories, and collapse ambivalence and hostility towards the regime of interest into a single category. I recode and combine these six categories to create a five-category ordinal variable that distinguishes between “strong” (“1”) and “intermediate” (“2”) support for dictatorship; regime indifference (“3”); and “intermediate” (“4”) and “strong” (“5”) support for democracy. If controlling for this covariate diminishes the effect of the stock of dictatorship upon the radicalism of societal actors, the evidence validates this rival mechanism. I use the same empirical strategy to examine an alternative mechanism that links the

stock of dictatorship to the radicalism of erstwhile members of the authoritarian ruling coalition. This involves the executive's governing capacity. Extensive spells in power may put authoritarian governments and their allies in a position to 'lock in' their preferred policies, even to the extent that, once out of power, their interests remain safe, particularly under democracy.<sup>119</sup> This lessens the need for radicalism. To test this claim, I operationalize this aspect of the stakes of political conflict as the length of the current presidential administration. Shorter terms in office reflect narrow opportunities for any given incumbent government to steer entrenched policies in a different direction, or its institutional and organizational weakness more generally. This may come in the form of term limits, fixed terms, and executive constraints that empower the legislature, the judiciary or the military to oust or impeach the government. Some of these features overlap with my operationalization of democracy, whereas others, such as those involving military prerogatives, are manifestations of authoritarianism. For former authoritarian elites and their allies, these features attenuate the adverse implications of being out of power. By contrast, longer presidential administrations reflect ample opportunities for governments to undo the policies of the past. To the extent that the inclusion of this variable overwhelms the deradicalizing impact of the stock of dictatorship, the evidence validates this particular theoretical mechanism.

Table 7.3 depicts the results for the preferred set of models discussed in Section 5.3, which employ the LA measure of the political regime type. Models 3-5 each control for a particular mediator variable. The results suggest that only the first two mediators play a role in inducing the effect of the stock of democracy. To be sure, the models that control for the intensity of political competition (Model 3), democratic norms (Model 4), and executive governing capacity (Model 5) all yield a nominally weaker effect for the stock of democracy than is the case in the model that excludes any of the corresponding mediator variables (Model 9). But it is only in the first two models that include a mediator variable that the stock of democracy's effect ceases to be significant. The results offer partial support for the two alternative mechanisms. On the one hand, the results of Model 5 suggest that the duration of presidential administrations is not instrumental in driving the stock of democracy's radicalizing effect, which accords to the logic behind this alternative mechanism. On the other hand, the results for the remaining mediator variable (democratic norms), recorded in Model 4, call for a modification and extension of the original mechanisms. In light of my empirical strategy, the theoretical implication of the results of Model 4 is that the stock of democracy radicalizes societal actors through weakening their normative preferences for democracy (and against authoritarianism). My initial argument helps account for this unexpected finding. By expanding the field of powerful societal actors, the stock of democracy exposes any given political actor to adversaries that are able to not only survive, but also thrive in the midst of an increasingly competitive political environment. This link may be strong enough to encourage any given societal actor to externalize this adverse byproduct of democracy to democracy itself, resulting in weaker democratic norms, and hence more radicalism. This may also help explain why the stock of democracy's radicalizing effect only materializes in democratic political contexts (discussed in Section 6). Insofar as the stock of democracy weakens normative preferences for democracy, it will only yield a deradicalizing effect in democracies, where such anti-democratic norms can be externalized to democratic institutions. But where democratic institutions are lacking, anti-democratic norms will not take the form of radicalism, because authoritarian goals have already been achieved.

I also explore the alternative mechanisms for the second set of models discussed in Section 5.3, which employ the V-Dem measure of the political regime type. Table 7.4 presents the full results of these models, including those that control for the mediator variables (Models 3-5). The results indicate that not all mediator variables play a role in driving the deradicalizing effect of such experiences, as it 'loses' its significance in Model 3, which includes the number of societal actors as an additional covariate, yet 'retains' it in the remaining models, which control for democratic norms (Model 4) and executive governing power (Model 5). In line with my theory, this suggests that the deradicalizing effect of the stock of dictatorship is induced by its disempowerment and decimation of collective actors. Neither democratic norms nor the duration of presidential administrations mediate this effect, which invalidates the remaining two mechanisms.

## Notes (Supplementary Material)

<sup>73</sup>Mainwaring and Pérez-Liñán 2013a; Coppedge, Gerring, Lindberg, Skaaning, Teorell, Altman, Bernhard, Fish, Glynn, and Hicken 2017; Smith and Sells 2017.

<sup>74</sup>Vreeland 2008.

<sup>75</sup>Treier and Jackman 2008; Pemstein, Meserve, and Melton 2010; Fariss 2014.

<sup>76</sup>Collins and Lanza 2010; Lanza, Dziak, Huang, Wagner, and Collins 2015b.

<sup>77</sup>Lanza, Dziak, Huang, Wagner, and Collins 2015b; Lanza, Dziak, Huang, Wagner, and Collins 2015a.

<sup>78</sup>Dahl 1973.

<sup>79</sup>Coppedge, Gerring, Lindberg, Skaaning, Teorell, Altman, Andersson, Bernhard, Fish, and Glynn 2017.

<sup>80</sup>An important exception concerns the delegation of all significant decision-making powers to public officials selected on the basis of competitive elections. The relevant V-Dem indicators for this particular aspect of competitive elections (*v2earmhgnp* and *v2exctlhg*) were available for less than half of the entire V-Dem sample, and were therefore excluded from my measurement model.

<sup>81</sup>As such, the scope of this descriptive analysis extends beyond the samples used to draw causal inferences (discussed in Section 4), which are limited to independent, Latin American countries and do not reach beyond the years 1944-2010. This broad empirical scope is necessary if not useful for producing the regime stock variables, which are in part a function of regime-induced political experiences undergone during the periods of foreign rule referred to here.

<sup>82</sup>The results are available upon request; see [REDACTED]-DR-Global-06-01-Measurement-Democracy-LCA-v01.do.

<sup>83</sup>The results are available upon request; see [REDACTED]-DR-Global-07-02-Measurement-Democracy-LCA-04-Class-Model-v01.do.

<sup>84</sup>The sample includes the following countries: Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica, Cuba, the Dominican Republic, Ecuador, El Salvador, Guatemala, Haiti, Honduras, Mexico, Nicaragua, Panama, Paraguay, Peru, Uruguay, and Venezuela.

<sup>85</sup>Smith and Sells 2017.

<sup>86</sup>Smith and Sells 2017, 8, 350.

<sup>87</sup>Mainwaring and Pérez-Liñán 2013b.

<sup>88</sup>Mainwaring and Pérez-Liñán 2013a, 298-9.

<sup>89</sup>See fn. 80 above.

<sup>90</sup>Mainwaring, Pérez-Liñán, and Brinks 2008, 26.

<sup>91</sup>The results are available upon request; see [REDACTED]-DR-LA-10-10-Measurement-Democracy-LCA-v01.do.

<sup>92</sup>Smith and Sells 2017.

<sup>93</sup>See [REDACTED]-DR-LA-Sample-Estimation-01-10-Campaign-Onset-v02.dta, which is available upon request.

<sup>94</sup>See [REDACTED]-DR-Global-Dataset-07-01-Variables-Democracy-v01.dta, which is available upon request.

<sup>95</sup>Smith and Sells 2017.

<sup>96</sup>Coppedge, Gerring, Lindberg, Skaaning, Teorell, Altman, Andersson, Bernhard, Fish, and Glynn 2017.

<sup>97</sup>The results are available upon request; see [REDACTED]-DR-Global-20-02-Measurement-Repression-Onset-Scope-LCA-v01.do.

<sup>98</sup>The results of the remaining models are available upon request.

<sup>99</sup>Haggard and Kaufman 2016.

<sup>100</sup>Haggard and Kaufman 2016.

<sup>101</sup>North 1990.

<sup>102</sup>Beck, Katz, and Tucker 1998.

<sup>103</sup>Box-Steffensmeier and Jones 2004; Box-Steffensmeier, Freeman, Hitt, and Pevehouse 2014.

<sup>104</sup>Beck, Katz, and Tucker 1998; Carter and Signorino 2010.

<sup>105</sup>Wooldridge 2013.

<sup>106</sup>Mainwaring and Pérez-Liñán 2013b.

<sup>107</sup>The results are available upon request; see [REDACTED]-DR-LA-30-45-Estimation-Coercive-Capacity-MLM-OL-vdem7-LN-v02.do.

<sup>108</sup>The results of the remaining models are available upon request.

<sup>109</sup>Cui 2007.

<sup>110</sup>Brandt, Williams, Fordham, and Pollins 2000.

<sup>111</sup>Pan 2001; Cui 2007.

<sup>112</sup>The results of the remaining models are available upon request.

<sup>113</sup>Albertus and Menaldo 2018.

<sup>114</sup>Sullivan 2015.

<sup>115</sup>Mainwaring and Pérez-Liñán 2013b.

<sup>116</sup>Mainwaring and Pérez-Liñán 2013a, 32, 58; Levitsky and Ziblatt 2018, 222.

<sup>117</sup>Przeworski 1991.

<sup>118</sup>Mainwaring and Pérez-Liñán 2013a.

<sup>119</sup>Albertus and Menaldo 2018.

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