

Chapter 5

Regime Legacies and Political Actors in Latin America

This chapter carries out several of the empirical tasks formulated in Chapter 4. It does so by incorporating the properties of Latin American political actors into the empirical analysis. The purpose of these tasks is to unpack the mechanisms that drive the empirical results presented in the previous chapter about democratic and authoritarian regime legacy effects upon the outbreak of large-scale political violence. In order to do so, I draw upon several Latin America-specific datasets, thereby confining this chapter's empirical analysis to the Latin American context. I proceed as follows. In Section 5.1, I develop a measure of the political regime type that complements the previous chapter's measure by using region-specific indicators of democracy. In Section 5.2, I draw upon a region-specific dataset to present measures for the coercive capacity and radicalism of political actors. The three sections that follow investigate several proposed theoretical mechanisms at three levels of analysis. I confine the analysis mostly to estimating models that employ the original mediator variables (coercive capacity and radicalism) as the outcomes of interest. Section 5.3 investigates empirical patterns at the country-year level, and models the coercive capacity of non-state political actors as a function of the stock of democracy and dictatorship. It also models the onset of political campaigns as a function of regime stock-induced levels of non-state coercive capacity. In Section 5.4, the unit of analysis is the societal (or non-state) political actor, observed per presidential administration. The outcome of interest is their degree of radicalism, which I estimate as a function of the regime stock variables. Section 5.5 shifts the perspective to governments, and estimates the effects of the stock of democracy and the stock of dictatorship upon their degree of radicalism, again measured at each presidential administration. Finally, Section 5.6 concludes this chapter by summarizing its main substantive findings and assessing whether and how they match the inferences drawn in Chapter 4.

5.1 Measuring Democracy in Latin America

This chapter's regional focus upon Latin America is in part driven by the inferential advantage of leveraging the internal validity of region-specific datasets. Accordingly, in this section, I enhance the internal validity of the measure for the political regime type by incorporating democracy indicators that were exclusively developed

for Latin America.¹ As was the case previously, I use a scaling technique (latent class analysis) that is appropriate given the categorical level of measurement and the underlying uncertainty and variation in the data.² I use the resulting regime classification of country-years to construct variables for democracy, hybrid regime and dictatorship, and I subsequently compute the stock of democratic and authoritarian years (as well as their logged and annually depreciated versions) for each unit of analysis. In Appendix A (Section A.1.2), I present all relevant democracy indicators and discuss the empirical results that indicate the validity of this additional measure of the political regime type in detail. Here, I briefly discuss how this measure (which I label the Latin America, or “LA”, measure of democracy) differs from the political regime type measure used in Chapter 4 (referred to as the “V-Dem” measure of democracy).

Both the V-Dem and LA measures distinguish between three political regime types: democracy, hybrid regimes, and dictatorship. The principle difference between these two operationalizations concerns the thresholds to be included in the democratic and authoritarian categories. These thresholds are higher in the V-Dem measure than in the LA measure. That is, for country-years to be considered democratic in the V-Dem variable, they have to display higher levels of democracy as observed with the LA measure. By the same token, whereas the category dictatorship is reserved for the most egregious instances of authoritarian rule in the case of the V-Dem measure, its broader range in the LA measure is such that it includes observations that belong in the hybrid regime category in the V-Dem measure. As a result, the distribution of country-years over the regime categories is considerably different between the two measures. This also holds when the latent classes are assigned through modal class assignment: in the case of the V-Dem measure, hybrid regimes constitute the largest category (45%), followed by dictatorship (34), whereas democracy is the most exclusive category (21%). The LA measure significantly alters this distribution, as it assigns more than half of the observations to the authoritarian category (51%), while designating only 19% of cases as a hybrid regime, and expanding the democratic category to include 30% of country-years.

In addition to distinct indicator-level coding decisions (including mine), this distributional difference may partly reflect distinct samples and the implied range of the comparison. Since the V-Dem measure sets apart regime categories that are empirically distinguishable at a global level, its classification scheme might appear ‘stacked’ towards one of the categories at the regional level if that category happens to predominate in that particular world region. This is the case with hybrid regimes, which characterize 34% of cases on a worldwide scale, but 45% of country-years in the Latin American sample. Likewise, what counts as relatively democratic or authoritarian in the restricted, Latin American context, may often be closer to the center of the regime spectrum when the comparison is global. As such, the underlying trade-off between internal and external validity that sets apart the two measures translates into different category thresholds.

The implication of these differences extends to the political experiences captured by the regime stock variables. If the variables for the stock of democracy and the stock of dictatorship are constructed using the V-Dem measure, they differentiate between observations based upon experiences that, by global standards, are

¹Smith and Sells, 2017; Mainwaring and Pérez-Liñán, 2013b.

²Treier and Jackman, 2008; Pemstein et al., 2010; Fariss, 2014.

extremely democratic or authoritarian. The regime stock variables that stem from the LA measure include but are not limited to such experiences, as they also encompass less but, by Latin American standards, nonetheless sufficiently democratic and authoritarian regime experiences. Rather than preferring one measure over the other, and prioritizing internal over external validity (or vice versa), I leverage the advantages of using multiple operationalizations given what is known about their differences. By doing so, I am able to assign substantive interpretations to differences in estimated effects, which may help to modify or further specify my theoretical argument. Most notably, since the regime experiences as measured by the different regime stock variables differ in ‘intensity’ and ‘mildness’ depending on the particular operationalization, the inclusion of multiple regime (stock) variables enables the researcher to determine how ‘intense’ and ‘mild’ democratic and authoritarian regime histories should be to yield particular effects.

Indeed, expanding the empirical analysis to include these two measures of the political regime type complements the inclusion of the logged and depreciated operationalizations of the regime stock variables, which serves the purpose of addressing similar questions left open by my theoretical argument. As a result, I scrutinize each testable claim in at least six different ways, i.e., using the regular, logged and depreciated regime stock variables for each of the two measures of the political regime type.

5.2 Measuring the Properties of Political Actors

This section presents the variables that measure the two relevant properties of political actors in Latin America. This concerns the coercive capacity and radicalism of non-state political actors, and the radicalism of governments. In my overall theoretical argument, including the modifications discussed in Chapter 4, these traits serve as mediator variables that mediate the effects of the stock of democracy and the stock of dictatorship upon several aspects of large-scale political violence. In the empirical analyses that follow, I treat them as outcome variables to be modeled as a function of the regime stock variables. In order to measure the properties of interest, I rely upon the political actor dataset and corresponding codebook associated with Mainwaring and Pérez-Liñán (2013c).³ This dataset covers the sample of twenty Latin American countries and, with some prewar exceptions, the years 1944-2010. Its unit of analysis is the political actor, observed at each presidential administration. All coding decisions (discussed below) are based upon primary and secondary historical sources, which are fully documented and annotated in (individual) country reports.⁴ 1,460 political actors are included, and involve governments (presidents), militaries, paramilitary groups, political parties, business associations, labor unions, churches, social movements and guerrilla organizations, among others.

In several instances, the assigned beginning and end years of these presidential administrations overlap. In order to meet the assumption of independent observations, I remove this trait by replacing the end year of each administration with the year prior to the start year of the subsequent observation (if any), except in cases where single-year administrations would ‘disappear’. In these cases, I preserve their

³Mainwaring and Pérez-Liñán, 2011.

⁴Mainwaring and Pérez-Liñán, 2013a.

original start/ end year, and move the start year of the subsequent administration one year ahead. In part due to the length of electoral cycles, most presidential administrations (almost 90%) last less than seven years. For administrations governing through dictatorship, this is reinforced by the splitting up of otherwise intact administrations into smaller temporal units, so as to track changes among political actors over the course of the administration.⁵ As a result, the authors measure the traits of political actors at 343 time periods, even though there are only 290 distinct presidential administrations. For the sake of simplicity, I nonetheless refer to these 343 temporal units as (presidential) administrations.

I measure the coercive capacity of non-state political actors as the number of non-state political actors that are listed per presidential administration. The coding rules that stipulate the inclusion criteria for political actors describe them as

powerful individuals (especially the president), organizations (parties, unions, business associations, the military, NGOs, media organizations, international organizations), or movements that control political resources and therefore exercise influence in the competition for power.

As a coding rule, “[t]he historiography for each administration serves as the best guide to determine who the main actors were. Main actors consistently appear in the main works.” As such, individuals, organizations and movements that are considered for inclusion each need to amass a baseline amount of political resources and wield sufficient power or influence to appear in historical sources and hence the dataset. Those that fail to meet this threshold are excluded.⁶ I therefore consider the count of included non-state political actors per presidential administration as a manifestation of their overall coercive capacity. To be sure, the aggregate level of analysis of this measure exceeds that of individual political actors. Ideally, I would measure the coercive capacity variable at this lower level (distinguishing between strong and weak political actors, and tracing the emergence of even the weakest political actors). Yet insofar as the stock of democracy creates and strengthens individual non-state political actors, and the stock of dictatorship eliminates and weakens them, the implications of these effects should directly manifest themselves at the societal level, too. As such, the theoretical argument under scrutiny here operates at this aggregate level as well, so that observable implications can be readily formulated and tested at this level accordingly. Nevertheless, the coding rules leave open room for researcher discretion as to the interpretation of the level of measurement, an issue that I return to in Section 5.3 below.

For the purpose of measuring the radicalism (and moderation) of political actors, I again rely upon the political actor dataset associated with Mainwaring and Pérez-Liñán (2013c). For each political actor that is listed for a particular administration, this dataset indicates the degree of radicalism it harbors, and labels it as either “radical”, “limited/ somewhat radical” or “moderate”. The codebook lists two necessary criteria for inclusion into the radical category: political actors should exhibit (1) “policy preferences toward a pole of the policy spectrum”, and (2) “impatience or intransigence to achieve their policy goals”. Political parties that are “fairly consistently centrist or amorphous on policy issues” are assigned to the moderate

⁵Mainwaring and Pérez-Liñán, 2011, p. 3.

⁶Ibid., p. 3.

category, irrespective of their degree of impatience/ intransigence. The “limited/somewhat radical” label is reserved for political actors that display “ambiguous or fluctuating positions” in all these respects.

For most of the remaining operational aspects of the two radical inclusion criteria (non-centrist policy preferences and impatience/ intransigence), I refer the reader to the codebook.⁷ For now it is important to note that in the case of non-governmental political actors the use of violence may count as an indicator of radicalism (and of impatience or intransigence in particular). This does not apply to governments. For the sake of clarity, I quote the relevant passage from the codebook in full:

[The non-governmental political actor is coded as radical if t]he actor undertakes violent acts aimed at achieving or preventing significant policy change under a democratic or semi-democratic regime [...]. Violent acts against dictatorships are radical if the actor uses them to achieve policy positions toward one pole of the policy spectrum. If the actor is centrist and is using violence only because it seems to be the only way to get rid of a dictatorship, then violence does not signal radicalism.

There is an asymmetry in the coding rules between the government and nongovernmental actors: we do not count governmental violence intended to accomplish significant policy change as radical behavior. The reason for the asymmetry is that the coding rules must clearly separate radicalization (as an independent variable) from the political regime (the dependent variable). Governmental use of violence to achieve policy goals intrinsically affects the dependent variable.⁸

This particular overlap between radicalism and political violence should not warrant concerns about reaching tautological conclusions in this study’s research context. First, the outcome variable of interest here is not ‘contaminated’ with the independent variables, because I am not modeling political violence as a function of radicalism, but radicalism as a function of regime legacies. Second, even if I were to model the former, the empirical results (albeit predetermined) would not reflect a deterministic relationship, because the tautological relationship between political violence and radicalism is unidirectional, in that violence necessarily indicates radicalism, but not the other way around. Rather, radicalism merely broadens possible outcomes to include violence. That is, under this coding rule, violent political actors may only count as moderate if they are centrists trying to bring down dictatorship; in all other instances, moderation rules out violence. As such, radicalism merely increases the risk that violence is used. By treating violence as a possible manifestation of radicalism, rather than as one of its inherent components, this operationalization thus matches my theoretical (and probabilistic) argument: through radicalizing (deradicalizing) political actors, the stock of democracy (dictatorship) increases the risk of violence.

⁷Ibid., pp. 15-9.

⁸Ibid., p. 18.

5.3 The Coercive Capacity of Societal Actors

In this section, I draw causal inferences from empirical associations observed at the level of Latin American presidential administrations and country-years. Its purpose is twofold. First, at the level of presidential administrations, it takes the initial step towards unpacking the results presented in Chapter 4 by examining whether and how democratic and authoritarian regime histories affect the coercive capacity of non-state political actors. Second, at the level of country-years, it determines the extent to which this coercive capacity accounts for the regime legacy effects upon the onset of political campaigns.

I measure the first outcome of interest as the number of non-state political actors that are listed for each presidential administration. The modeling implications of the coding rules that indicate the level of measurement of this dependent variable are ambiguous, and merit some discussion first. At first sight, this variable can readily be understood as a count variable that measures the number of non-state organizations, movements and individuals that are deemed powerful enough to be included in the dataset. The absence of an explicitly prescribed maximum count that imposes a cap upon this number corroborates this interpretation. Depending on its variance and mean, either Poisson or negative binomial regression models would offer the appropriate estimation technique to model this outcome.

Yet the coding rules are rife with instructions to restrict the number of political actors, already defined as such, to the “main” or “most important” ones, so as to meet the “need [of] a parsimonious set of actors (in our experience, usually 3 to 7 per administration)”.⁹ In light of these instructions, the data generation process ‘begins’ with a set of political actors. Among these, coders select a limited number to include in the dataset. This selection excludes political actors that are not among the most powerful ones, and/ or those individuals, organizations and movements that, because of their weakness, cannot be considered political actors in the first place. The next steps in this process are subject to additional coding rules and considerable coder discretion. At high counts (say, above seven), the coders can apply a downward bias and restrict the total number of political actors to the “usual” maximum of seven. As a result, a total coded count of seven political actors in effect “usually” involves seven or more political actors. At low counts (say, below three), the permitted coder-induced bias is upward, where coders may seek to lower the power/ influence threshold above which political actors can be considered as such, and add political actors to meet the “usual” minimum of three. The suggestions in the codebook that “[i]n democratic regimes, the president and the largest parties are usually the most important actors” and that “[i]n authoritarian regimes, the most important actors [...] often include a hegemonic party (if there is one and if it is reasonably independent with respect to the president) [and] the main opposition party” offer coders additional reasons to do so. The result is an effective number of three or less political actors when the coded total count is three. Understood this way, the level of measurement of this variable is ordinal rather than ratio (i.e., counts), in which case the appropriate modeling strategy involves an ordered logistic regression.

This ‘ordinal’ interpretation also carries a substantive implication. At one extreme, a low count may signal the wholesale absence of organizations and movements, no matter their weakness. That is, because coders can lower the power/

⁹Mainwaring and Pérez-Liñán, 2011, pp. 3-8.

influence threshold, this variable in effect measures the number of potential political actors, i.e., those individuals, organizations and movements that merit an assessment of how powerful and influential they are. As a result, a low count may indicate that there are few such organizations and movements in the first place. Modeled as an ordinal variable, this variable thus traces the rise and decline of political actors in part through the emergence and disappearance of organizations and movements. This trait can thus serve the purpose of examining whether democratic legacies help create new organizations and movements, and whether authoritarian legacies are instrumental in their elimination.

Understood as a count variable, however, it partly indicates the strength and weakness of these potential political actors. The more individuals, organizations and movements pass the fixed power/ influence threshold, the higher the count. Even low counts do not include any weak counterparts of these political actors. Accordingly, in models that treat it as a count variable, the estimated effects in part capture the extent to which democratic and authoritarian regime histories strengthen and weaken existing individuals, organizations and movements.

Rather than preferring one estimation technique over the other, I leverage the distinction between these two interpretations, so as to separately examine the regime legacy effects (1) upon the creation and elimination of potential non-state political actors, and (2) upon their organizational strength and weakness. Therefore, in what follows I model the coercive capacity of non-state political actors using twelve different model specifications: one for each of (1) the two levels of measurement (count and ordinal), (2) the two measures of the political regime type (the LA and V-Dem measures), and (3) the three specifications of the regime stock variables (regular, logged and depreciated).

The first set of empirical results that I present below are derived from models that treat the outcome of interest as a count variable. I estimate these results through Population-Averaged Panel-Data (PAPD) models. This estimation technique uses the generalized estimating equation (GEE), which is an extension of the generalized linear model (GLM).¹⁰ It restricts the estimation to effects that only apply to, as its name suggests, the average ‘panel unit’, as defined by the panel variable, in this case the average country. By contrast, in ‘conventional’ regression models, the estimated effects apply to every conceivable observation, holding all other variables constant. Depending on the research context, this may offer an inferential disadvantage, in that average countries may not display substantively meaningful variation in the independent variable of interest. Yet this is not the case in the current application, as the average country may in fact exhibit considerable variation in the accumulated stock of democratic and authoritarian experiences. This is because such regime experiences often accumulate over time within the same (average) country; with the passage of time, and unless it concerns a hybrid regime, any given country gains a greater stock of democratic or authoritarian experiences. Given such a sample, conceiving of an average country that displays variation in the stock of democracy and the stock of dictatorship therefore carries internal validity.

PAPD models offer several advantages for the task at hand. First, the Poisson and negative binomial distributions are among the distributions that can be specified for the dependent variable. Since the variance of the dependent variable is not greater than the mean (indicating a lack of overdispersion), I use the Poisson

¹⁰Cui, 2007.

distribution. Second, this estimation technique can fully incorporate the serial and cross-sectional structure of the data under consideration here. More specifically, in this case, the unit of analysis is the presidential administration. Each of the twenty Latin American countries includes several successive administrations. By designating the country as the panel variable, the PAPD model accounts for the unobserved cross-country heterogeneity by assuming that this latent heterogeneity is averaged out. Accordingly, the estimated ‘constant’ in the PAPD poisson regression models represents a baseline incidence rate that is conditional upon zero random effects. I also include country-clustered standard errors. Whereas these options are available in Multilevel Mixed Effects (MLM) models as well, the PAPD specification also allows for temporal dynamics that keep intact the substantive research goal. That is, MLM count models restrict the choice to the inclusion of a lagged dependent variable. In count models, this amounts to modeling the growth rate of the number of non-state political actors, which is not of interest in this research context. The Poisson Exponentially Weighted Moving Average (PEWMA) estimation technique offers a useful alternative in this respect, but the available software package cannot account for the multilevel structure of the data.¹¹ In PAPD models, however, several within-group (i.e., within-country) correlation structures can be specified. Three of these (unstructured, stationary (first order), and nonstationary (first order) serial correlation structures) prevented model convergence. This narrowed down the choice to the following three specifications of serial dependence: exchangeable, independent and (first order) autoregressive structures. Following Cui (2007), I adjudicate between these PAPD alternatives by selecting the model with the smallest Quasi Information Criterion (QIC). I use the same approach for selecting the operationalization of the regime stock variables, the remaining covariates and the extent of model complexity. This QIC selection criterion is not confined to comparisons of the QIC statistics among non-nested models. Instead, what matters is minimizing the QIC statistic across all estimated models.

The values for the stock of democracy and the stock of dictatorship that are assigned to each observation correspond to those that I originally assigned to the country-year that marks the start year of each presidential administration. This operationalization offers the best fit with the causal sequence under consideration, where the regime experiences precede the coercive capacity of current non-state political actors. Assigning the mean values across the country-years of each administration and measuring the regime stock variables at the administration end year are the alternative operationalizations, yet they may encompass regime experiences that are accumulated after the emergence of the observed political actors.

The full model includes the following control variables. First, I control for the political regime type, using either the V-Dem or LA measure. By definition, democratic governments do not repress political parties, thereby safeguarding a minimal set of non-state political actors. Furthermore, democracy offers most collective actors institutional access to the power of the state, which enhances the viability of political actors even further. By contrast, authoritarian regimes tend to weaken and destroy non-state political actors. For similar reasons, I also include the scope of state repression as a control variable. In the original datasets, these two variables are measured per country-year. Here, I take the modal level of democracy and state repression of each presidential administration. In the case of multiple modi, I assign

¹¹Brandt et al., 2000.

the ‘middle’ categories (“hybrid regime” and “intermediate state repression scope”) to that observation. To further test the robustness of my argument, and facilitate comparisons with the results of the previous chapter, I also include interaction terms between the regime stock variables and the political regime type in one of the more parsimonious models (adding them to the most complex model would further increase the QIC statistic and stand in the way of model selection).

In the original datasets, the remaining control variables are measured per country-year as well. Here, I take their average over each presidential administration. The first three are from the V-Dem dataset (Version 7), and were also included in the models presented in the previous chapter. I include the natural log of the population size, because a greater pool of potential activists and supporters reduces the barriers to amass a baseline, absolute amount of organizational resources. This is also why I control for life expectancy. Yet a greater population size also exacerbates the collective action problems that impede the pooling of these resources among the masses. I therefore include urbanization as a control variable, arguing that a higher population density and greater urban areas in particular foster the social capital necessary for overcoming these obstacles. The remaining controls are from the Mainwaring and Pérez-Liñán (2013b) dataset. Two of these account for the available material resources in society, which can be harnessed to create and sustain collective actors. These are the natural log of the per capita GDP variable in the dataset (*pgdp*), and growth in per capita GDP (*gpgdp*). Both variables also appear in the V-Dem dataset, but yield more missing values there. Finally, I control for US foreign policy towards democracy in Latin America (*us_t*), measured as an index that ranges from zero (least favorable to democracy) to one (most favorable towards democracy). Foreign policy interventions in support of democracy may take the form of policies promoting political pluralism, where foreign governments assist domestic opposition groups in their struggle against authoritarian rule, or help them to remain active once democracy is established. Either way, such policy interventions spur the creation and boost the organizational strength of non-state political actors.

Section B.2 of Appendix B presents the full results of all estimated PAPD models. Table 5.1 presents the relevant results of the two most preferred models among these, which minimize the QIC. It is important to note that these are not the most complex models. In fact, they exclude all the control variables described above, except the political regime type and the scope of state repression. Both models share the same operationalization of the regime stock variables. First, they are formed on the basis of the LA measure of the political regime type. Second, they combine the logged number of regime years for the stock of democracy with the annually depreciated number of regime years for the stock of dictatorship. The results offer partial support for my original theoretical argument, and even more so for its modified version discussed in Chapter 4. They also call for further theoretical changes. In Model 3, the more parsimonious of the two models, increases in the stock of democracy augment the number of non-state political actors, but this effect weakens off as this stock grows. This supports my assertion that democratic experiences boost the organizational resources of non-state political actors. Furthermore, the superior fit to the data resulting from the inclusion of the LA measure of democracy, as opposed to the V-Dem alternative, suggests that this does not only involve intense democratic experiences, but mild ones as well. The stock of dictatorship

Table 5.1 Population-Averaged Panel-Data Poisson Regression Models for the Count of Non-State Political Actors, Regime Stock Variables with Best Fit (Latin America, 1944-2010)

	(3)		(7-Dem)		(7-Hyb)		(7-Dic)	
	M03 e^β	SE	M07-Dem e^β	SE	M07-Hyb e^β	SE	M07-Dic e^β	SE
The Stock of Democracy (ln)	1.09**	(0.04)	1.08	(0.06)	1.04	(0.07)	1.12**	(0.06)
The Stock of Dictatorship (5%)	1.00	(0.01)	1.03*	(0.01)	1.00	(0.01)	0.98	(0.02)
<i>Political Regime Type (LA)</i>								
Democracy					0.84	(0.22)	0.94	(0.28)
Hybrid Regime	0.93	(0.09)	1.19	(0.32)			1.13	(0.31)
Dictatorship	0.76***	(0.07)	1.06	(0.32)	0.89	(0.25)		
<i>Interaction Terms</i>								
The Stock of Dem. (ln) × Dem.					1.05	(0.09)	0.97	(0.08)
The Stock of Dem. (ln) × Hyb.			0.96	(0.08)			0.92	(0.07)
The Stock of Dem. (ln) × Dict.			1.04	(0.08)	1.08	(0.08)		
The Stock of Dict. (5%) × Dem.					1.03	(0.02)	1.04**	(0.02)
The Stock of Dict. (5%) × Hyb.			0.97	(0.02)			1.01	(0.02)
The Stock of Dict. (5%) × Dict.			0.96**	(0.02)	0.99	(0.02)		
Wald χ^2	40.50		84.29		84.29		84.29	
Prob. > Wald χ^2	0.000		0.000		0.000		0.000	
QIC	219.859		218.704		218.704		218.704	
Countries	20		20		20		20	
Administrations per Country (Average)	17		17		17		17	
Observations	343		343		343		343	

Source: wkastart-DR-LA-30-19-Estimation-Coercive-Capacity-PAPD-Best-v01.do


Note: Only substantively relevant coefficients are displayed. For the interaction model (Model 7), three different sets of estimates are displayed, one for each reference category of the current political regime type, which concerns the “LA” measure. The unit of analysis is the presidential administration. The dependent variable is the count of non-state political actors. The country serves as the panel variable. The model estimated an independent within-country correlation structure. Standard errors are clustered at the level of countries. See Appendix B (Section B.2) for the full results. Regime stock variables that include “(5%)” in their label are subject to an annual depreciation rate of 5%.

* $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$. Standard errors in parentheses.

fails to exert any effect in this respect. Whereas this null finding contradicts my theory, it echoes my earlier, empirically derived assertion that authoritarian experiences may strengthen members of the authoritarian ruling coalition to the extent that it counteracts the overall hypothesized effect under scrutiny here. For instance, a one-party dictatorship may leave behind a resourceful political party capable of ‘hitting the ground running’ under the ensuing democracy.¹² Overall, these results help explain why the stock of democracy spurs the emergence of political campaigns (i.e., by strengthening opposition groups), and why the stock of dictatorship fails to prevent it (i.e., by failing to weaken them).

In the model that includes the interaction terms (Model 7), the positive effect of the stock of democracy only holds in authoritarian political contexts. The use of the LA measure of the political regime type again indicates that this also involves both intense and mild democratic experiences. Figure 5.1 visualizes the magnitude of this conditional effect, as well as those of the remaining forms of government. Over the entire within-sample range of the stock of democracy in authoritarian contexts, which runs from 0 to 47 years of democratic rule, the mean predicted count of non-state political actors in dictatorships increases by more than one unit, from little less than 2.5 to about 3.5 counts. Dictatorship’s inherent repressive environment, in which opposition political parties are repressed, helps account for this conditional effect. By weakening these political actors to the extent that they can only become stronger, contemporaneous dictatorship creates enough ‘room’ for a positive impact of the stock of democracy. As such, dictatorship in the immediate sense deprives opposition groups of what a democratic legacy replaces. The negative effect of contemporaneous authoritarian institutions, revealed by Model 3, corroborates this interpretation. This explanation complements the one I use in Chapter 4 (Section 4.2), where I argue that, compared to democracy, dictatorship offers opposition

¹²Loxton, 2016; Albertus and Menaldo, 2018, pp. 65-6.

Figure 5.1 Mean Predicted Counts of Non-State Political Actors for the Stock of Democracy (Natural Log)

Source: wkastart-DR-LA-30-16-Graphs-Coercive-Capacity-PAPD-v01.do

Note: $N = 343$. Fitted Population-Averaged Panel-Data Poisson Regression Model (Model 7, presented in Table 5.1). The ultimate outcome that is modeled is the count of non-state political actors. The “LA” measure of the political regime type is used. The plotted mean predicted counts are estimated by holding the values for political regime type constant at each of its three values in turn. The independent variable of interest that is included in the model is the (interaction term between the political regime type and the) natural log of the stock of democracy, but to facilitate substantive interpretation, the predicted counts are plotted against the original, nonlogged values of the stock of democracy.

groups a stronger rationale to initiate a political campaign against their government.

So far I have treated the outcome of interest as a count variable. But as explained above, following through on the alternative interpretation, where the dependent variable is understood and modeled as an ordinal variable, is substantively useful as well. By doing so, I can differentiate the regime legacy effects upon the strength and weakness of political actors from their effects upon their creation and survival. To this end, I estimate several ordered logistic regression models, which treat the observed counts as categories of an ordinal variable (hence I refer to these categories as “count categories”). The ultimate outcome that they model is the probability of a higher (or lower) count category of non-state political actors. As was the case in Chapter 4, and for the same reasons, I further specify these models through hierarchical modeling (the country being the only level here), country-clustered standard errors, and a cubic polynomial of time (measured as the average year since 1899 per presidential administration). I include the same control variables as in the PAPD models discussed above, but increase their complexity in a successive fashion, and include the interaction terms in the most complex models. Finally, the AIC and BIC statistics inform my model selection.

Tables 5.2 and 5.3 display the relevant results of the three preferred models. At each level of model complexity, each of these includes the operationalizations of the political regime type and regime stock variables that optimize the model fit to the data. Models 5 and 6 presented in Table 5.2 are the more parsimonious models among these, and combine the LA measure of the political regime type with the depreciated versions of the regime stock variables. The results of both models partly support my argument. Whereas the stock of democracy fails to exert any effects, the stock of dictatorship decreases the probability of a higher count category, as expected. The operationalization of the stock of dictatorship indicates that this involves recent episodes of both mild and intense authoritarian rule. The null findings

Table 5.2 Ordered Logistic Multilevel Mixed Effects Regression Models for the Count Category of Non-State Political Actors, Depreciated Regime Stock Variables (Latin America, 1944-2010)

	(5)		(6)	
	M05 e^{β}	SE	M06 e^{β}	SE
The Stock of Democracy (5%)	0.94	(0.06)	0.94	(0.06)
The Stock of Dictatorship (5%)	0.89**	(0.05)	0.89**	(0.05)
<i>Political Regime Type (LA; base: "Democracy")</i>				
Hybrid Regime	0.78	(0.37)	0.79	(0.37)
Dictatorship	0.50	(0.29)	0.52	(0.29)
Wald χ^2	227.97		313.63	
Prob. > Wald χ^2	0.000		0.000	
AIC	1145.59		1131.45	
BIC	1222.29		1204.03	
Countries	20		20	
Administrations per Country (Average)	17		17	
Observations	342		337	

Source: wkastart-DR-LA-30-28-Estimation-Coercive-Capacity-MLM-OL-5p-v01.do

Note: Only substantively relevant coefficients are displayed. The unit of analysis is the presidential administration. The political regime type is measured using the "LA" measure. The ultimate outcome that was modeled was the probability of a higher (lower) count category of non-state political actors. Random intercepts at the level of countries. Country-clustered standard errors. See Appendix B (Section B.2) for the full results, and the results of more parsimonious models. Regime stock variables that include "(5%)" in their label are subject to an annual depreciation rate of 5%.

* p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01. Standard errors in parentheses.

for the immediately present political regime type merit attention here as well. Unlike in the poisson regression models, contemporaneous hybrid and authoritarian institutions do not lower the count of non-state political actors relative to democracy; nor do they increase it. This suggests that, in the immediate sense, dictatorship, as opposed to democracy, weakens but does not destroy non-state political actors. It is only through sustained episodes of authoritarian rule that dictatorship succeeds in achieving its destructive potential in this respect, creating an effect that dissipates over time. Nevertheless, viewed in combination with the findings presented in Chapter 4, this effect fails to 'enable' authoritarian legacies to suppress the emergence of political campaigns.

Table 5.3 present the results of the model that includes the interaction terms (Model 7). In this model, I measure the political regime type and the regime stock variables on the basis of the V-Dem measure of democracy. Recall that this operationalization captures the most intense democratic and authoritarian regime experiences. This model also includes the natural log specification of the regime stock variables. The results indicate that the negative effect of the stock of dictatorship registered in the two previous models is only present in hybrid regimes. The estimates for the contemporaneous political regime type helps account for this particular conditional effect. These estimates indicate that when democratic and authoritarian experiences are at their minima, the presence of a hybrid regime significantly increases the count category of non-state political actors relative to the two remaining political regime types. This may be the result of splits from the ruling coalition in hybrid regimes, where its members deem political institutions either insufficiently democratic or insufficiently authoritarian. In turn, the corresponding increase in the number of societal actors in hybrid regimes creates enough 'room' for the observed negative effect of an authoritarian legacy. An additional explanation involves authoritarian ruling coalitions of longstanding dictatorships that insulate their members from repression, and ensure their survival, to the extent that this protection dampens the otherwise significant authoritarian legacy effect.

In order to illustrate the magnitude of the conditional effects, Figure 5.2 plots

Table 5.3 Ordered Logistic Multilevel Mixed Effects Regression Models for the Count Category of Non-State Political Actors, Natural Log Specification (Latin America, 1944-2010)

	(7-Dem)		(7-Hyb)		(7-Dic)	
	e ^β	SE	e ^β	SE	e ^β	SE
The Stock of Democracy (ln)	0.73	(0.21)	0.73	(0.20)	1.41	(0.63)
The Stock of Dictatorship (ln)	0.59	(0.20)	0.30***	(0.12)	0.80	(0.27)
<i>Political Regime Type (V-Dem)</i>						
Democracy			0.33*	(0.20)	5.94*	(6.42)
Hybrid Regime	3.07*	(1.84)			18.23***	(15.40)
Dictatorship	0.17*	(0.18)	0.05***	(0.05)		
<i>Interaction Terms</i>						
The Stock of Dem. (ln) × Dem.			0.99	(0.20)	0.52	(0.21)
The Stock of Dem. (ln) × Hyb.	1.01	(0.20)			0.52**	(0.16)
The Stock of Dem. (ln) × Dict.	1.94	(0.80)	1.92**	(0.58)		
The Stock of Dict. (ln) × Dem.			1.95***	(0.50)	0.73	(0.21)
The Stock of Dict. (ln) × Hyb.	0.51***	(0.13)			0.38***	(0.09)
The Stock of Dict. (ln) × Dict.	1.36	(0.39)	2.66***	(0.65)		
Wald χ^2	35736.75		35733.23		35733.06	
Prob. > Wald χ^2	0.000		0.000		0.000	
AIC	1109.10		1109.10		1111.10	
BIC	1181.68		1181.68		1187.50	
Countries	20		20		20	
Administrations per Country (Average)	17		17		17	
Observations	337		337		337	

Source: wkastart-DR-LA-30-45-Estimation-Coercive-Capacity-MLM-OL-vdem7-LN-v01.do

Note: Only substantively relevant coefficients are displayed. Three different sets of estimates are displayed, one for each reference category of the current political regime type, which concerns the “V-Dem” measure. The unit of analysis is the presidential administration. The ultimate outcome that was modeled was the probability of a higher (lower) count category of non-state political actors. Random intercepts at the level of countries. Country-clustered standard errors. See Appendix B (Section B.2) for the full results, and the results of more parsimonious models.


* p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01. Standard errors in parentheses.

the mean predicted probabilities of one of the middle count categories, which corresponds to four non-state political actors, against the stock of dictatorship, and for each political regime type. Over the entire within-sample range of the stock of dictatorship, which ranges from 0 to 89 years, in hybrid regimes these probabilities decline by about .15. By contrast, the probabilities of the count categories “0” and “1” (not displayed) increase over this range.

It remains to be seen whether the regime legacy effects upon the coercive capacity of non-state political actors registered above can account for the empirical associations between the regime stock variables and the onset of political campaigns presented in Chapter 4. To explore this issue, I estimate political campaign onset, and compare the results across models that include the number of non-state political actors as a covariate, to those that do not. The empirical results support my theoretical argument to the extent that the inclusion of this mediator variable diminishes or ‘washes away’ the (conditional) effects of regime legacies, and yields a mediator effect in the expected direction. The purpose of this discussion is to determine whether this is indeed the case.

To facilitate these comparisons, I restrict all samples to the Latin American context. As was the case in Chapter 4 (Section 4.2), these estimations take the form of logistic regression MLM models, specified with country-level intercepts in the random portion of the model, country-clustered standard errors, and a cubic polynomial of time. The following control variables are the same: the counts of past violent and nonviolent political campaign onsets, life expectancy, the natural logarithm of the population size and urbanization. The economic variables (the natural log of GDP per capita, and growth in GDP) are drawn from the Mainwaring and Pérez-Liñán (2013b) dataset. From this dataset I also include US foreign policy towards democracy in the region. At both extremes (policies promoting or opposing

Figure 5.2 Mean Predicted Probabilities of Count Category “4” of Non-State Political Actors for the Stock of Dictatorship (Natural Log)



Source: wkastart-DR-LA-30-46-Graphs-Coercive-Capacity-MLM-OL-vdem7-LN-v01.do

Note: N = 337. Fitted Ordinal Logistic Multilevel Mixed Effects Regression Model (Model 7, presented in Table 5.3). The ultimate outcome that was modeled was the probability of a count category of non-state political actors of “4”. The “V-Dem” measure of the political regime type is used. The plotted mean predicted probabilities are estimated by holding the values for political regime type constant at each of its three values in turn. The independent variable of interest that was included in the model was the (interaction term between the political regime type and the) natural log of the stock of dictatorship, but to facilitate substantive interpretation, the predicted counts are plotted against the original, nonlogged values of the stock of dictatorship.

democracy), these interventions may take the form of foreign policy assistance to domestic opposition groups fighting democratic governments that do not align with US interests, or to pro-democracy movements that are resisting authoritarian rule. In both instances, political campaign onset becomes more likely.

Table 5.4 presents the relevant results of the preferred, most complex models (Models 7-8), which include the LA measure of the political regime type and the natural log specification of the regime stock variables. The results support my claims about the mediating effects of the number of non-state political actors. Model 7, which excludes this mediator variable, yields significant effects in the expected positive and negative directions for the stock of democracy (in hybrid regimes) and for the stock of dictatorship (in authoritarian regimes), respectively. But with its inclusion in Model 8, these conditional effects are insignificant. At the same time, the effect of this additional covariate is in the expected, positive direction; for each additional non-state political actor, the odds of the emergence of a political campaign increases by a third. By doing so, it overwhelms the otherwise significant effects of the regime stock variables, and therefore serves as a mediator variable in the way that my theory specified it.

5.4 The Radicalism of Societal Actors

In the following two sections, I empirically explore the sources of the radicalism of political actors, which is the second mediator variable in my overall theoretical argument. I examine the traits of non-state political actors (this section) and governments (Section 5.5) separately, so as to facilitate comparisons with the empirical results for political campaigns (Section 4.3) and state repression (Sections

Table 5.4 Binary Logistic Multilevel Mixed Effects Regression Models for Political Campaign Onset, Natural Log Specification (Latin America, 1944-2006)

	(7-Hyb)		(8-Hyb)		(7-Dic)		(8-Dic)	
	e ^β	SE	e ^β	SE	e ^β	SE	e ^β	SE
The Stock of Democracy (ln)	2.33***	(0.69)	1.87	(0.72)	0.68	(0.20)	0.53	(0.24)
The Stock of Dictatorship (ln)	1.61	(1.72)	0.77	(1.10)	0.50***	(0.13)	0.44	(0.35)
<i>Political Regime Type (LA)</i>								
Democracy	33.01	(102.60)	2.42	(8.21)	0.04	(0.12)	0.03	(0.13)
Hybrid Regime					0.00*	(0.00)	0.01	(0.07)
Dictatorship	817.25*	(3268.80)	79.93	(467.82)				
<i>Interaction Terms</i>								
The Stock of Dem. (ln) × Dem.	0.26***	(0.12)	0.27**	(0.15)	0.90	(0.41)	0.96	(0.47)
The Stock of Dem. (ln) × Hyb.					3.43***	(0.92)	3.55***	(1.29)
The Stock of Dem. (ln) × Dict.	0.29***	(0.08)	0.28***	(0.10)				
The Stock of Dict. (ln) × Dem.	0.77	(0.74)	1.49	(1.53)	2.47	(1.81)	2.59	(2.78)
The Stock of Dict. (ln) × Hyb.					3.22	(3.26)	1.73	(2.61)
The Stock of Dict. (ln) × Dict.	0.31	(0.32)	0.58	(0.87)				
<i>Mediator Variable</i>								
Number of Non-State Political Actors			1.33**	(0.18)			1.33**	(0.18)
Wald χ^2	
Prob. > Wald χ^2	
AIC	440.14		301.66		440.14		299.66	
BIC	553.45		405.69		553.45		398.49	
Countries	20		20		20		20	
Years per Country (Average)	107		67		107		67	
Observations	2,134		1,342		2,134		1,342	

Source: wkastart-DR-LA-20-15-Estimation-Campaign-Onset-MLM-LN-v01.do

Note: Only substantively relevant coefficients are displayed. For each model, two different sets of estimates are displayed, one for each reference category of the current political regime type that is of interest here (hybrid regimes and dictatorship). The unit of analysis is the independent country-year. The dependent variable is the probability of political campaign onset. Random intercepts at the level of countries. Country-clustered standard errors. The political regime type is measured using the “LA” measure. For the political regime stock variables, the natural logarithm of the original values was used. See Appendix B (Section B.2) for the full results, and the results of more parsimonious models and alternative estimation techniques.

* p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01. Standard errors in parentheses.

4.5-4.3), respectively. In addition, separating the empirical analysis along these lines offers the advantage of flexibility, where models can be specified according to the peculiarities of governments and non-state groups. For the purpose of estimating the radicalism of non-state political actors, I rely upon ordered logistic regression MLM models. The unit of analysis is the non-state political actor, observed per presidential administration. Multiple actors may thus be nested in the same country-administration. As such, the multilevel structure of the data consists of two levels: countries and administrations. Accordingly, these models incorporate the unobserved cross-sectional heterogeneity that operates at these two levels. I further include country-clustered standard errors and a cubic polynomial of time (measured as the administration-wide average year since 1899).

The full model includes the following control variables. First, I control for the counts of past violent and nonviolent political campaign onsets as of the initial year of the administration that corresponds to the administration-actor. These variables capture the historical propensity of political actors to adopt radical and moderate approaches, respectively, to political conflict. I also control for the political regime type (the modal type, or hybrid regimes when there are multiple modi), and include interaction terms between this variable and the regime stock variables. Authoritarian institutions amplify the implications of being in or out of power, in that those who are left out of the authoritarian ruling coalition lose out on the benefits of direct access to the government, or even suffer great losses.¹³ By the same token, regime insiders have more to lose under dictatorship, and therefore try to cling on to office more intensely than is the case under democracy. As the stakes of the competition for access to and control of the executive increases, so does radicalism. By contrast, democracy reassures major opposition groups that their time in government will

¹³Albertus and Menaldo, 2018.

come, while its inherent executive constraints protect the interests of former authoritarian regime elites and their allies against significant policy reversals. The result is moderation on the part of these political actors. For a similar reason, I include a variable indicating each political actor's support of the government, which is measured in the Mainwaring and Pérez-Liñán (2013c) political actors dataset through four ordered responses that distinguish between "Opposition", "Divided", "Neutral" and "Pro-Government". Political actors that operate under a government that is pursuing their policy objectives are at least somewhat ahead of their opponents in the competition for power, which attenuates the stakes of politics for the former, and intensifies it for the latter. This diminishes and increases radicalism, respectively. In a similar vein, at low levels of economic development, prevailing in the struggle for power carries severe implications for the organizational survival of political actors and the well-being of their activists, supporters and constituents. Accordingly, as wealth increases, the stakes of political conflict, and hence radicalism, decreases. This is why I also control for material wealth, measured using the Mainwaring and Pérez-Liñán (2013b) dataset as GDP per capita (logged), and growth in GDP, both averaged over the presidential administration. Finally, I include the administration-average US foreign policy support for democracy in the region as a control variable, using the Mainwaring and Pérez-Liñán (ibid.) dataset. Foreign policy assistance for democracy favors moderate over radical groups, because the former are more disposed to promoting democracy than the latter. Such policy interventions therefore encourage the adoption of moderation.

The mechanisms under scrutiny in this section can be further unpacked in terms of a variable that is already endogenous to another component of my argument, in that the (de)radicalization of (non-state) political actors is in part driven by their regime stock-induced empowerment and proliferation, as well as the heightened degree of political competition that results from it. This elevated intensity of political conflict creates an environment that punishes moderation and rewards radicalism. I can readily explore this claim on the basis of available data. Following the approach used at the end of Section 5.3, I do so by including the number of non-state political actors as a covariate in an additional set of models estimating political actor radicalism. To the extent that this covariate weakens the effects of the regime stock variables, the evidence supports this claim.

Indeed, the available data allows me to test more such links. One of these involves the normative preferences for democracy of political actors. Earlier, I posited that authoritarian legacies also take the form of dictatorial traumas that induce political actors that suffered under dictatorship to assign an intrinsic value to democracy. In their efforts to create and sustain democracy as a bulwark of human rights and a safeguard against political violence, these political actors adopt moderation as a way to assuage fears among their authoritarian opponents that their interests are seriously at stake under democracy. To scrutinize this proposition, I include a variable measuring normative regime preferences in the series of models estimating radicalism. This is a variable that combines two separate measures of the Mainwaring and Pérez-Liñán (2013c) political actor dataset: normative preferences for democracy (*ProDem*) and normative preferences for dictatorship (*ProDict*). Both consist of three ordered categories, and collapse ambivalence and hostility towards the regime of interest into a single category. I recode and combine these six categories to create a five-category ordinal variable that distinguishes between "strong"

(“1”) and “intermediate” (“2”) support for dictatorship; regime indifference (“3”); and “intermediate” (“4”) and “strong” (“5”) support for democracy. If controlling for this covariate reduces the effect of the stock of dictatorship upon the radicalism of non-state political actors, the evidence strengthens my claim.

I use the same empirical strategy to examine the mechanism that links the stock of dictatorship to the radicalism of erstwhile members of the authoritarian ruling coalition. I previously argued that extensive spells in power put authoritarian governments and their allies in a position to ‘lock in’ their preferred policies, even to the extent that, once out of power, their interests remain safe, particularly under democracy. The result is moderation. In order to test this claim, I operationalize this aspect of the stakes of political conflict as the length of the current presidential administration. This is a post-hoc measure of the executive’s governing capacity. Shorter terms in office reflect narrow opportunities for any given incumbent government to steer entrenched policies in a different direction, or its institutional and organizational weakness more generally. This may come in the form of term limits, fixed terms, and executive constraints that empower the legislature, the judiciary or the military to oust or impeach the government. Some of these features overlap with my operationalization of democracy, whereas others, such as those involving military prerogatives, are manifestations of authoritarianism. For former authoritarian elites and their allies, these features attenuate the adverse implications of being out of power. By contrast, longer presidential administrations reflect ample opportunities for governments to undo the policies of the past. To the extent that the inclusion of this variable diminishes or overwhelms the deradicalizing impact of the stock of dictatorship, the evidence validates this particular theoretical mechanism.

Table 5.5 presents the results of the model that combines the highest complexity (Model 9) with the best fit to the data through the inclusion of the original, ‘raw year’ measures of the regime stock variables, which I also operationalize using the LA measure of the political regime type. Recall that this operationalization incorporates both mild and intensive democratic and authoritarian experiences into the regime stock variables. The results partly support my argument. On the one hand, the stock of democracy exerts a positive, significant effect upon the radicalism of non-state political actors, as expected. Each additional year of democracy increases the odds of a more radical approach to political conflict by about 4.5%. On the other hand, no significant effect is registered for the stock of dictatorship. It is important to note that the current political regime type fails to exert any significant effects either.

Table 5.5 also depicts the relevant results of the three models that each include a particular mediator variable. These results suggest that the three mediator variables all play a role in inducing the (significant) effect of the stock of democracy. That is, the models that control for the intensity of political competition (Model 3), democratic norms (Model 4), and the stakes of political conflict (Model 5) all yield a nominally weaker effect for the stock of democracy than is the case in the model that excludes any of the corresponding mediator variables (Model 9). In all three models that include a mediator variable, the stock of democracy’s effect even ceases to be significant. Whereas such comparisons between the coefficients are not grounded in probability theory (unfortunately, software to conduct formal tests that detect significant differences are unavailable for this estimation technique), these losses of significance carry at least some face validity for the claim that the mediator variables

Table 5.5 Ordered Logistic Multilevel Mixed Effects Regression Models for the Radicalism of Non-State Political Actors, LA Operationalization of the Political Regime Type (Latin America, 1944-2010)

	(3)		(4)		(5)		(9)	
	M03 e^β	SE	M04 e^β	SE	M05 e^β	SE	M09 e^β	SE
The Stock of Democracy	1.035	(0.023)	1.028	(0.028)	1.038*	(0.020)	1.045**	(0.023)
The Stock of Dictatorship	0.999	(0.023)	0.996	(0.022)	0.990	(0.024)	0.999	(0.025)
<i>Mediator Variables</i>								
Number of Non-State Political Actors	1.326*** (0.114)		0.219*** (0.028)		0.931** (0.028)			
Normative Preference for Democracy								
Duration of Administration								
<i>Political Regime Type (LA; Base: "Democracy")</i>								
Hybrid Regime	1.823	(0.751)	1.627*	(0.435)	1.740	(0.690)	1.707	(0.671)
Dictatorship	1.239	(0.416)	0.920	(0.247)	1.151	(0.378)	1.121	(0.372)
Wald χ^2	236.64		430.78		76.89		76.43	
Prob. > Wald χ^2	0.000		0.000		0.000		0.000	
AIC	1709.98		1299.47		1726.01		1728.22	
BIC	1798.15		1382.75		1814.19		1811.50	
Administrations	20		20		20		20	
Non-State Political Actors per Admin. (Average)	3		3		3		3	
Countries	20		20		20		20	
Non-State Political Actors per Country (Average)	50		50		50		50	
Observations	991		991		991		991	

Source: wkastart-DR-LA-40-10-Estimation-Radicalism-MLM-v01.do

Note: Only substantively relevant coefficients are displayed. The unit of analysis is the administration-non-state political actor. The regime stock variables are measured using the "LA" measure of the political regime type. The ultimate outcome that was modeled was the probability of a higher (lower) category of radicalism. Random intercepts at the level of presidential administrations and countries. Country-clustered standard errors. See Appendix B (Section B.2) for the full results, and the results of more parsimonious models.

* $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$. Standard errors in parentheses.

each 'absorb' at least some of the stock of democracy's 'total' effect.

The results offer partial support for my substantive claims about the mechanisms that drive the stock of democracy's radicalizing effect. On the one hand, as expected, the inclusion in Model 3 of the number of non-state political actors 'strips away' its significance, while also yielding a significant effect in the expected, positive direction for this mediator variable. In line with my argument, this suggests that the radicalizing effect of the stock of democracy is induced by its empowerment and proliferation of non-state political actors and the resulting intensification of political conflict.

On the other hand, the results for the two remaining mediator variables recorded in Models 4-5 call for several extensions and modifications of my theory. First, whereas my original argument deems democratic norms (included in Model 4) only relevant for explaining the effect of the stock of dictatorship (which turns out to be insignificant), they appear to drive the effect of the stock of democracy. In light of my empirical strategy, the theoretical implication of the results of Model 4 is that the stock of democracy radicalizes societal actors through weakening their normative preferences for democracy (and against authoritarianism). The previous mechanism helps account for this unexpected finding. By expanding the field of powerful societal actors, the stock of democracy exposes any given political actor to adversaries that are able to not only survive, but also thrive in the midst of an increasingly competitive political environment. This link may be strong enough to encourage political actors to externalize this adverse byproduct of democracy to democracy itself, resulting in weaker democratic norms, and hence more radicalism. In order to validate this extension of my theory more directly, I estimate a model that includes the running (yearly) average number of non-state political actors as a covariate. Because the exposure to resourceful political opponents extends beyond the immediately present surroundings, this covariate serves as a more valid mediator variable to explore this particular mechanism than the current number of societal

actors included in Model 3 (because of data limitations, however, it only captures the post-1943 running average). Table 5.7 (Model 11) presents the relevant results. As expected, the inclusion of this mediator variable in Model 11 yields an insignificant effect for the stock of democracy, suggesting that the overall effect of the latter is in part driven by a societal actor's sustained exposure to more intense political conflict. Insofar as it associates these elevated levels of political competition with democracy, this finding thus confers validity to the proposed link between the stock of democracy and the weakening of democratic norms. Furthermore, as I discuss below, the evidence in support of these mechanisms may also help explain why the stock of democracy's radicalizing effect only materializes in democratic political contexts.

Second, contrary to my theory, the results of Model 5 suggest that the duration of presidential administrations is instrumental in driving the stock of democracy's radicalizing effect. Furthermore, this model yields the unexpected result that longer presidential administrations deradicalize societal actors. Following the empirical approach I use here, its implication is that the stock of democracy radicalizes societal actors by shortening the length of presidential administrations. One of the other theoretical mechanisms under scrutiny here account for this pattern. Insofar as the stock of democracy intensifies the competition for political power by proliferating resourceful societal actors, it also enables opposition groups to obstruct the government's efforts to pursue its policy agenda and prolong its tenure in office. In reasonably democratic settings, they may deploy this enhanced capacity to check the government inside electoral and legislative institutions, where stronger organizational resources enhance their electoral campaigns and hence their legislative representation, which in turn puts them in a stronger position to impose executive constraints and dismiss the government. Where these institutional channels of political influence are unavailable or ineffective, this is more likely to take the form of more potent political campaigns, which may shorten the rule of the government by overthrowing it.

By these alternative accounts, shorter presidential administrations reflect a heightened degree of political competition, rather than a reduction in the stakes of political conflict for former authoritarian regime elites. Indeed, for political actors on all sides, they may in fact signal an increase in the stakes of the competition for political power. To be sure, shorter administrations attenuate the importance of securing office and wielding executive power (recall that this assumption also motivates this study's conceptualization of democracy and dictatorship as stock concepts). Yet even in the midst of a series of short-lived governments, the executive retains its baseline importance in politics by virtue of offering direct access to the power of the state. As a result, as the control of the executive branch of government becomes a tangible objective for its adversaries (as indicated by shorter spells in office), the stakes of participating in the struggle to obtain it increases. Understood this way, the length of the presidential administration may serve not only as a post-hoc measure for the executive's governing capacity and hence the stakes of securing the presidency and exercising its power, but also as a post-hoc measure for both the political competition that precedes it and the stakes of this competition itself. In light of these measurement considerations, the results of Model 5 can be assigned a substantive interpretation that is in line with my original argument, but also one that mostly reflects the mechanism that was already under scrutiny in

Model 3. Viewed in combination, the results of Models 3 and 5 validate my claim that the stock of democracy radicalizes non-state political actors by elevating the stakes and intensity of the competition for political power, and of the competition for the executive in particular. As I discuss below, together with the results of Model 4, they also account for why democracy fails to leave behind a radicalizing legacy in non-democratic political contexts.

Table 5.6 displays the results of the model that includes the interaction terms between the political regime type and the regime stock variables (Model 10). These results indicate that the radicalizing effect of the stock of democracy registered previously only holds in democratic political contexts, where each additional year of democracy increases the odds of a higher degree of radicalism by about 5%. The preceding discussion of its underlying mechanisms, and the proposed extensions and modifications of my theory that this involved in particular, help explain this conditional legacy effect.

The first explanation revolves around the relative importance of organizational resources, especially those acquired under democracy, for augmenting the stakes and intensity of political conflict. Democratic institutions lower the threshold above which these resources heighten the degree of political competition. With the same amount of resources, any given political actor can achieve more under democracy than is the case under dictatorship. This holds true both inside and outside political institutions. Inside institutions, democracy enhances the cost-effectiveness of electoral campaigns; outside institutions, it does so for political campaigns. Under democracy, electoral campaigns are by definition unhindered by repression, an uneven level playing field vis-à-vis the government, or political insignificance (i.e., elections exist and matter for obtaining real governing power). Likewise, democracies are less inclined to repress political campaigns than dictatorships. These features of democracy carry an important implication for changes in the stakes and intensity of the struggle for power. Because societal actors operating in a democracy can expend less resources to achieve the same degree of success as under dictatorship, even small advances in their proliferation and empowerment alter the political environment in a more competitive direction, radicalizing political actors along with it. The greater susceptibility of the stakes and intensity of political conflict to surges in the number and strength of societal actors in democracies is reinforced when the organizational resources are acquired under democracy. This is because the accumulation of resources under democracy both requires and acquires expertise in exploiting its electoral and legislative institutions. As a result, the presence of these institutions puts political actors that have become specialized in doing so at an advantage.

The role of democratic norms discussed above offers a second explanation of democracy's conditional effect. Insofar as the stock of democracy weakens normative preferences for democracy, it will only yield a deradicalizing effect in democracies, where such anti-democratic norms can be externalized to democratic institutions. That is, political actors that are opposed to democracy and that also operate under democracy face, in their view, an adverse political environment. By adopting a radical approach to political conflict, they can bring democracy down. But where democratic institutions are lacking, anti-democratic norms will not take the form of radicalism, because authoritarian goals have already been achieved.

In order to visualize the magnitude of this conditional effect, for each political regime type Figure 5.3 plots the mean predicted probabilities of the most radical

Table 5.6 Ordered Logistic Multilevel Mixed Effects Regression Models for the Radicalism of Non-State Political Actors, Interaction Model, LA Operationalization of the Political Regime Type (Latin America, 1944-2010)

	(10-Dem)		(10-Hyb)		(10-Dic)		(11)	
	M10-Dem e^{β}	SE	M10-Hyb e^{β}	SE	M10-Dic e^{β}	SE	M11 e^{β}	SE
The Stock of Democracy	1.05**	(0.02)	1.05	(0.03)	1.01	(0.03)	1.05*	(0.02)
The Stock of Dictatorship	0.99	(0.03)	1.00	(0.02)	1.00	(0.02)	1.00	(0.03)
<i>Political Regime Type (LA)</i>								
Democracy			0.82	(1.11)	0.85	(1.13)		
Hybrid Regime	1.21	(1.64)			1.03	(0.38)	1.67	(0.63)
Dictatorship	1.17	(1.55)	0.97	(0.35)			1.13	(0.38)
<i>Interaction Terms</i>								
The Stock of Dem. × Dem.			0.99	(0.03)	1.04	(0.03)		
The Stock of Dem. × Hyb.	1.01	(0.03)			1.04	(0.03)		
The Stock of Dem. × Dict.	0.97	(0.02)	0.96	(0.03)				
The Stock of Dict. × Dem.			0.99	(0.02)	0.99	(0.02)		
The Stock of Dict. × Hyb.	1.01	(0.02)			1.00	(0.01)		
The Stock of Dict. × Dict.	1.01	(0.02)	1.00	(0.01)				
<i>Mediator Variable</i>								
Post-1943 Running Ave. # of Societal Actors							1.17	(0.30)
Wald χ^2	828.98		828.98		828.98		70.39	
Prob. > Wald χ^2	0.000		0.000		0.000		0.000	
AIC	1722.92		1722.92		1722.92		1729.22	
BIC	1815.99		1815.99		1815.99		1817.40	
Administrations	20		20		20		20	
Non-State Political Actors per Admin. (Average)	3		3		3		3	
Countries	20		20		20		20	
Non-State Political Actors per Country (Average)	50		50		50		50	
Observations	991		991		991		991	

Source: wkastart-DR-LA-40-10-Estimation-Radicalism-MLM-v01.do

Note: Only substantively relevant coefficients are displayed. Three different sets of estimates are displayed, one for each reference category of the current political regime type. The unit of analysis is the administration-non-state political actor. The regime stock variables are measured using the “LA” measure of the political regime type. The ultimate outcome that was modeled was the probability of a higher (lower) category of radicalism. Random intercepts at the level of presidential administrations and countries. Country-clustered standard errors. See Appendix B (Section B.2) for the full results, and the results of more parsimonious models.


* p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01. Standard errors in parentheses.

category against the stock of democracy. Its effect size is considerable. Over the entire within-sample range of the stock of democracy in democratic environments, which runs from 0 to 67 years, the mean predicted probability of harboring a radical approach to political conflict increases from about .20 to about .70. After about 40 years of democracy, the average non-state political actor operating under democracy is more likely to be radical than moderate.

I also direct attention to a second set of estimated models. Whereas they fail to offer as good of a fit to the data as the models discussed above, they are useful for determining how intense regime experiences should be to (de)radicalize non-state political actors. Indeed, the inclusion of alternative measures of the political regime type, resulting in different regime stock variables, serves that purpose in the first place. So far, optimal model fit has typically corresponded to significant estimates for the regime stock variable, whereas the less performing models often yielded insignificant results. But the results of the current models deviate somewhat from this pattern. At the preferred (highest) levels of model complexity, significant estimates are among the results of models that offer a suboptimal or intermediate level of fit. These are substantively different from the ones I discussed above. As such, they are instrumental in developing claims that link particular regime experiences, understood (and operationalized) in terms that extend beyond the binary democratic-authoritarian distinction, to particular legacy effects. Accordingly, I include them in the current discussion. This also involves a discussion about which regime experiences do not yield particular legacy effects. In effect, I forego model selection, and consider all models in drawing inferences about this aspect of the current research context.

The set of models that I am referring to are estimated using the V-Dem measure

Figure 5.3 Mean Predicted Probabilities of Category “Radical” of Non-State Political Actors for the Stock of Democracy



Source: wkastart-DR-LA-40-16-Graphs-Radicalism-MLM-v01.do

Note: N = 991. Fitted Ordinal Logistic Multilevel Mixed Effects Regression Model (Model 10, presented in Table 5.6). The “LA” measure of the political regime type is used. The ultimate outcome that is modeled is the probability of the “radical” category of non-state political actors. The plotted mean predicted probabilities are estimated by holding the values for the political regime type constant at each of its three values in turn. The independent variable of interest that is included in the model was the (interaction term between the political regime type and the) stock of democracy.

of the political regime type and the ‘raw’ measure of the regime experiences. Table 5.7 presents the relevant results of some of the most complex versions among these models. As was the case in the previous models, I successively include and exclude each of the three mediator variables. The model that excludes them (Model 9) only yields a significant effect for the stock of dictatorship, which is in the expected, negative direction. Every additional year of dictatorship that is added to a country’s stock of authoritarian experiences reduces the odds of a more radical approach to political conflict by about 2.7%. Recall that this involves experiences with only the most severe instances of authoritarianism. Neither the stock of democracy, nor the immediately present political regime type exert significant effects.

The results of the remaining models indicate that not all mediator variables play a role in driving the deradicalizing effect of such experiences, as it ‘loses’ its significance in Model 3, which includes the number of societal actors as an additional covariate, yet ‘retains’ it in the remaining models, which control for democratic norms (Model 4) and the length of presidential administrations (Model 5). On the one hand, and in line with my theory, this suggests that the deradicalizing effect of the stock of dictatorship is induced by its disempowerment and decimation of collective actors. That is, by thinning out the field of powerful political actors and hence reducing the stakes and intensity of the competition for political power, the stock of dictatorship creates an environment that amplifies the need for moderation among opposition groups and lessens the need for radicalism among allies of the government. On the other hand, neither normative preferences for democracy nor the duration of presidential administrations mediate this effect, which invalidates the remaining two proposed mechanisms.

Viewed in combination, these results call for a reconsideration of the interplay between my theory’s testable implications. Contrary to my initial argument, authoritarian experiences do not encourage moderation by inflicting dictatorial traumas

Table 5.7 Ordered Logistic Multilevel Mixed Effects Regression Models for the Radicalism of Non-State Political Actors, V-Dem Operationalization of the Political Regime Type (Latin America, 1944-2010)

	(3)		(4)		(5)		(9)	
	e^{β}	SE	e^{β}	SE	e^{β}	SE	e^{β}	SE
The Stock of Democracy	1.005	(0.017)	1.000	(0.018)	1.010	(0.020)	1.010	(0.020)
The Stock of Dictatorship	0.977*	(0.012)	0.979**	(0.009)	0.970**	(0.013)	0.973**	(0.013)
<i>Mediator Variables</i>								
Number of Non-State Political Actors	1.335*** (0.116)		0.215*** (0.029)		0.914** (0.033)			
Normative Preference for Democracy								
Duration of Administration								
<i>Political Regime Type (V-Dem)</i>								
Hybrid Regime	0.872	(0.452)	0.725	(0.255)	0.789	(0.392)	0.799	(0.403)
Dictatorship	1.019	(0.481)	0.614	(0.211)	0.948	(0.451)	0.888	(0.418)
Wald χ^2	333.13		463.28		140.60		153.97	
Prob. > Wald χ^2	0.000		0.000		0.000		0.000	
AIC	1716.21		1303.61		1730.01		1734.36	
BIC	1804.38		1386.89		1818.18		1817.63	
Administrations	327		327		327		327	
Non-State Political Actors per Admin. (Average)	3		3		3		3	
Countries	20		20		20		20	
Non-State Political Actors per Country (Average)	50		50		50		50	
Observations	991		991		991		991	

Source: wkastart-DR-LA-40-20-Estimation-Radicalism-MLM-vdem7-v01.do

Note: Only substantively relevant coefficients are displayed. The unit of analysis is the administration-non-state political actor. The regime stock variables are measured using the “V-Dem” measure of the political regime type. The ultimate outcome that was modeled was the probability of a higher (lower) category of radicalism. Random intercepts at the level of presidential administrations and countries. Country-clustered standard errors. See Appendix B (Section B.2) for the full results, and the results of more parsimonious models.

* $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$. Standard errors in parentheses.

(which would otherwise induce normative support for democracy) or limiting the governing capacity of the executive (which is after all empirically associated with radicalization). Nevertheless, the destructive impact of the stock of dictatorship may account for each of these ‘null-findings’. First, it is likely that the same instances of dictatorship that eliminate its victims also traumatize them. As a result, these victims of dictatorship disappear before they can become supporters of democracy and political moderates, which in turn weakens the mediating role of democratic norms. That is, to the extent that the traumatized victims of dictatorship either do not survive its onslaught or are severely weakened by it, they also ‘exit’ the dataset, and hence leave behind a truncated sample that is biased in favor of allies of long-standing dictatorships and their resilient opponents. Furthermore, this diminution of the role of democratic norms in mediating the deradicalizing effect of the stock of dictatorship is reinforced by the tendency of authoritarian governments to target radical opposition groups.¹⁴

Second, the implications of the stock of dictatorship’s destructive impact may take the form of two countervailing effects upon the government’s hold on power. On the one hand, the disempowerment and elimination of opposition groups diminish their (collective) capacity to replace the government. On the other hand, for the government and its allies the hollowing out of political resistance reduces the costs of tolerating it, which in turn facilitates regular, democratic transfers of executive power.¹⁵ By canceling each other out, these two effects diminish the mediating role of the duration of presidential administrations.

To explore these issues further and facilitate comparisons with previous findings and discussions, I estimate a model that includes interaction terms between the political regime type and the regime stock variables. Table 5.8 presents the relevant results. The deradicalizing effect of the stock of dictatorship is only dis-

¹⁴Sullivan, 2015.

¹⁵Dahl, 1973.

Table 5.8 Ordered Logistic Multilevel Mixed Effects Regression Models for the Radicalism of Non-State Political Actors, Interaction Model, V-Dem Operationalization of the Political Regime Type (Latin America, 1944-2010)

	(10-Dem)		(10-Hyb)		(10-Dic)	
	e ^β	SE	e ^β	SE	e ^β	SE
The Stock of Democracy	1.01	(0.02)	1.04	(0.03)	0.97	(0.03)
The Stock of Dictatorship	0.98	(0.02)	0.97**	(0.01)	0.97**	(0.01)
<i>Political Regime Type (V-Dem)</i>						
Democracy			1.12	(1.11)	0.79	(0.80)
Hybrid Regime	0.89	(0.89)			0.71	(0.42)
Dictatorship	1.26	(1.27)	1.41	(0.84)		
<i>Interaction Terms</i>						
The Stock of Dem. × Dem.			0.97	(0.03)	1.03*	(0.02)
The Stock of Dem. × Hyb.	1.03	(0.04)			1.07**	(0.03)
The Stock of Dem. × Dict.	0.97*	(0.02)	0.94**	(0.03)		
The Stock of Dict. × Dem.			1.01	(0.02)	1.01	(0.02)
The Stock of Dict. × Hyb.	0.99	(0.02)			1.00	(0.01)
The Stock of Dict. × Dict.	0.99	(0.02)	1.00	(0.01)		
Wald χ^2	302.08		302.08		302.08	
Prob. > Wald χ^2	0.000		0.000		0.000	
AIC	1727.68		1727.68		1727.68	
BIC	1820.75		1820.75		1820.75	
Administrations	20		20		20	
Non-State Political Actors per Admin. (Average)	3		3		3	
Countries	20		20		20	
Non-State Political Actors per Country (Average)	50		50		50	
Observations	991		991		991	


Source: wkstart-DR-LA-40-20-Estimation-Radicalism-MLM-vdem7-v01.do

Note: Only substantively relevant coefficients are displayed. Three different sets of estimates are displayed, one for each reference category of the current political regime type. The unit of analysis is the administration-non-state political actor. The regime stock variables are measured using the “V-Dem” measure of the political regime type. The ultimate outcome that was modeled was the probability of a higher (lower) category of radicalism. Random intercepts at the level of presidential administrations and countries. Country-clustered standard errors. See Appendix B (Section B.2) for the full results, and the results of more parsimonious models.

* p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01. Standard errors in parentheses.

tinguishable in non-democratic political contexts. The previous discussion of the relative cost-effectiveness of organizational resources may explain these conditional effects as well. Democracy lowers the amount of resources that is needed to successfully exploit political institutions through electoral campaigns and challenge the government through political campaigns. As a result, for societal actors operating in a democracy the depletion of these resources induced by the stock of dictatorship might not be enough to lower the stakes and intensity of political competition below critical levels, leaving unchanged the degree of radicalism. By contrast, because opposition groups in hybrid regimes and dictatorships face an uneven level playing field vis-à-vis the government and its allies, the overall degree of political competition is more susceptible to downward changes in their organizational strength. Together, these features explain why democracy mutes the deradicalizing effect of the stock of dictatorship, whereas hybrid regimes and dictatorship amplify it.

Nevertheless, the mean predicted probabilities of each of three categories of radicalism are similar across the three political regime types. Therefore, for the purpose of visualizing the magnitude of the deradicalizing effect of the stock of dictatorship, I use the results of Model 9, which excludes the interaction terms, to estimate the mean predicted probabilities. Figure 5.4 plots these probabilities against the stock of dictatorship. The changes are considerable. Across the entire within-sample range of the stock of dictatorship, which runs from 0 to 89 years of authoritarianism, the mean predicted risk of harboring the most radical approach to political conflict increases by more than .40 (from .40 to about .85), while the concomitant decline of the average probability of the moderate category across this range is almost .40.

Figure 5.4 Mean Predicted Probabilities of Radicalism Categories of Non-State Political Actors for the Stock of Dictatorship

Source: wkastart-DR-LA-40-26-Graphs-Radicalism-MLM-vdem7-v01.do

Note: N = 991. Fitted Ordinal Logistic Multilevel Mixed Effects Regression Model (Model 9, presented in Table 5.7). The ultimate outcome that was modeled was the probability of a higher category of radicalism. The “V-Dem” measure of the political regime type is used.

5.5 The Radicalism of Governments

In this section I uncover the causal forces that drive the radicalization of governments. The models I estimate for this purpose are similar to those discussed in Section 5.5, but differences remain. I once again rely upon ordered logistic regression MLM models. Since only one government is observed per presidential administrations, the only layer in the sectional data structure is the country level, at which I estimate intercepts in the random component of the model. I also cluster standard errors at this country level, and include the same cubic polynomial of time. The following control variables are the same as in the previous models, and are included for the same reasons: the count of past political campaign onsets, the political regime type, GDP per capita (logged), GDP growth, and US foreign policy towards democracy in Latin America. I also include the average support for the government among all political actors, using the variable of the previous models. The more opposition the government faces, the greater the stakes and intensity of political conflict, which in turn increases the tendency of governments to radicalize. Likewise, I control for the average radicalism of all non-governmental political actors, arguing that their radicalization exacerbates the costly implications of a change in government. To offset the costs of losing their grip on power, governments operating in such a political environment are therefore encouraged to respond in kind and radicalize as well.¹⁶

Table 5.9 displays the relevant results of Model 9, which combines model complexity with a superior fit to the data. This is achieved through the natural log specification of the regime stock variables, as well as the V-Dem operationalization of the political regime type. The results partially support my theory. As expected, a greater stock of democracy increases the odds of a more radical government. This concerns the accumulated stock of the most expansive forms of democracy. The effect of the stock of dictatorship, however, is indistinguishable from zero. The results

¹⁶Mainwaring and Pérez-Liñán, 2013c.

for the current political regime type are noteworthy as well. Its effect is not only significant, but also considerable. Ruling through a non-democratic form of government, as opposed to democracy, increases the odds of a more radical approach to political conflict by factors of more than sixty (for dictatorship) and sixteen (for hybrid regimes).

It remains to be seen whether the proposed mechanisms can account for the stock of democracy's radicalizing effect upon governments. For this reason, and following the same approach as in Section 5.4, I expand the empirical analysis to incorporate comparisons with models that include several mediator variables. These additional covariates (the number of non-state political actors, normative regime preferences, and the duration of the presidential administration) are the same as those of the previous section, and are included for the same substantive reasons. The results of the remaining three models (Models 3-5) represented in Table 5.9 each include one these mediator variables, and fail to validate any of the mechanisms that I initially proposed. Contrary to my theory, the two mediator variables that capture the stakes and intensity of political competition (the number of societal actors in Model 3, and the duration of presidential administrations in Model 5) fail to 'deprive' the stock of democracy's radicalizing effect of its significance. By contrast, the inclusion of democratic norms in Model 4 yields an insignificant effect for the stock of democracy. My initial argument does not account for this finding, since the proposed mechanisms of this effect do not assign a mediating role to normative preferences for democracy. This suggests that the radicalizing effect of the stock of democracy is induced by the erosion of democratic norms, and partly echoes the results for the radicalism of societal actors displayed in Table 5.5. But unlike the democratic norms of societal actors, the erosion of these norms among governments cannot be explained by the intensification and higher stakes of political competition, since the two corresponding mediator variables do not exert significant effects and do not perform their mediating functions in Models 3 and 5.

Following the approach I used in Section 5.4 (and in Tables 5.5 and 5.6 in particular), I investigate two possible links that connect the stock of democracy to the weakening of democratic norms among governments. The first concerns the externalization of its adverse effects for governments to democracy itself. As political actors, including governments and governments-to-be, invariably witness how their opponents emerge, survive, and thrive under democracy, they develop attitudes that cast an unfavorable light upon the political institutions that lie at the root of these heightened threats against their interests. In order to determine whether this sustained exposure of governments and governments-to-be to the proliferation and empowerment of their adversaries plays a role in eroding their democratic norms and degrees of moderation, I estimate a model that includes the post-1943 running average of societal actors as a covariate (Model 12, **not displayed**). Its results invalidate this explanation, as the stock of democracy retains its significant effect, while the additional covariate fails to exert one.

The second link I investigate stems from an extension of my theory to (existing) explanations of regime changes, and traces the radicalism of governments to the emergence of the political regimes through they rule. Insofar as the stock of democracy radicalizes societal actors in democratic contexts, it also weakens their democratic norms. By doing so, it cripples the coalition of political actors that sustain democracy, and facilitates the emergence of a broad anti-democratic coali-

Table 5.9 Ordered Logistic Multilevel Mixed Effects Regression Models for the Radicalism of Governments, V-Dem Operationalization of the Political Regime Type, Natural Log Specification (Latin America, 1944-2010)

	(3)		(4)		(5)		(9)	
	e^{β}	SE	e^{β}	SE	e^{β}	SE	e^{β}	SE
The Stock of Democracy (ln)	1.74***	(0.28)	1.40	(0.29)	1.73***	(0.26)	1.73***	(0.26)
The Stock of Dictatorship (ln)	0.98	(0.11)	0.91	(0.13)	0.93	(0.11)	0.93	(0.11)
<i>Mediator Variables</i>								
Number of Non-State Political Actors	1.17	(0.13)						
Normative Preference for Democracy			0.42***	(0.10)				
Duration of Administration					1.00	(0.05)		
<i>Political Regime Type (V-Dem; base: 'Democracy')</i>								
Hybrid Regime	16.36***	(9.67)	7.23***	(4.87)	17.89***	(10.45)	17.88***	(10.59)
Dictatorship	63.45***	(36.50)	11.37***	(7.14)	69.05***	(40.00)	69.08***	(39.80)
Wald χ^2	306.45		233.35		209.68		177.81	
Prob. > Wald χ^2	0.000		0.000		0.000		0.000	
AIC	564.07		522.31		566.67		564.68	
BIC	629.11		591.18		631.72		625.89	
Countries	20		20		20		20	
Admin. per Country (Average)	17		17		17		17	
Observations	339		339		339		339	

Source: wkstart-DR-LA-40-75-Estimation-Radicalism-MLM-Gov-vdem7-LN-v01.do

Note: Only substantively relevant coefficients are displayed. The unit of analysis is the administration-government. The regime stock variables are measured using the "V-Dem" measure of the political regime type. The ultimate outcome that was modeled was the probability of a higher (lower) category of radicalism. Random intercepts at the level of countries. Country-clustered standard errors. See Appendix B (Section B.2) for the full results, and the results of more parsimonious models.

* p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01. Standard errors in parentheses.

tion, ultimately leading to the collapse of democracy itself.¹⁷ Almost by definition, the authoritarian coalition that emerges victorious from the ensuing battle over the form of government will also spearhead the new regime. It is also likely that the political actors that will form the new authoritarian government will retain their anti-democratic orientations. As such, the stock of democracy creates authoritarian and (hence) radical governments. The implication is that any given non-democratic government is more likely to harbor radicalism to the extent that the political context in which it operates has accumulated a greater stock of democracy.

Together, these claims partly account for the mediating role of (weakening) democratic norms in establishing a positive empirical association between the stock of democracy and the radicalization of governments. I say "partly", because they leave unexplained the radicalization of democratic governments in settings with (and as a result of) long democratic histories. Indeed, these claims also imply that such governments are unlikely to be observed in the first place, in that radical governments operating under democratic institutions are expected to replace them with (more) authoritarian ones. In order to scrutinize the second explanation, I leverage the latter testable implication by estimating a model that includes the interaction terms between the political regime type and the regime stock variables. To the extent that this explanation accurately describes the data-generating process, the radicalizing effect of the stock of democracy should hold only in non-democratic settings.

Table 5.10 presents the relevant results of the best-fitting version of this model, which combines the V-Dem operationalization of the political regime type with the 'raw' measures of the regime experiences. The results lend full support to the explanation under examination here. First, the stock of democracy exerts a significant effect upon the radicalism of governments in the expected, positive direction in both non-democratic regimes. In hybrid regimes, each additional year of democracy increases the odds of a more radical approach to political conflict by about 8%. Under dictatorship, this effect amounts to a 20% increase in the odds of governmental rad-

¹⁷Mainwaring and Pérez-Liñán, 2013c.

Table 5.10 Ordered Logistic Multilevel Mixed Effects Regression Models for the Radicalism of Governments, Interaction Model, V-Dem Operationalization of the Political Regime Type (Latin America, 1944-2010)

	(10-Dem)		(10-Hyb)		(10-Dic)	
	M10-Dem e^{β}	SE	M10-Hyb e^{β}	SE	M10-Dic e^{β}	SE
The Stock of Democracy	1.00	(0.01)	1.08**	(0.04)	1.20***	(0.05)
The Stock of Dictatorship	0.96**	(0.02)	1.00	(0.01)	1.02	(0.02)
<i>Political Regime Type (V-Dem)</i>						
Democracy			0.44	(0.30)	0.24*	(0.18)
Hybrid Regime	2.26	(1.51)			0.54	(0.29)
Dictatorship	4.17*	(3.04)	1.84	(0.97)		
<i>Interaction Terms</i>						
The Stock of Dem. \times Dem.			0.92**	(0.04)	0.83***	(0.03)
The Stock of Dem. \times Hyb.	1.08**	(0.04)			0.90**	(0.04)
The Stock of Dem. \times Dict.	1.20***	(0.05)	1.11**	(0.05)		
The Stock of Dict. \times Dem.			0.97*	(0.02)	0.95**	(0.02)
The Stock of Dict. \times Hyb.	1.04*	(0.02)			0.98	(0.01)
The Stock of Dict. \times Dict.	1.05**	(0.02)	1.02	(0.01)		
Wald χ^2	7811.91		7811.91		7811.91	
Prob. > Wald χ^2	0.000		0.000		0.000	
AIC	563.11		563.11		563.11	
BIC	635.80		635.80		635.80	
Countries	20		20		20	
Admin. per Country (Average)	17		17		17	
Observations	339		339		339	

Source: wkstart-DR-LA-40-70-Estimation-Radicalism-MLM-Gov-vdem7-v01.do

Note: Only substantively relevant coefficients are displayed. Three different sets of estimates are displayed, one for each reference category of the current political regime type. The unit of analysis is the administration-government. The regime stock variables are measured using the "V-Dem" measure of the political regime type. The ultimate outcome that was modeled was the probability of a higher (lower) category of radicalism. Random intercepts at the level of countries. Country-clustered standard errors. See Appendix B (Section B.2) for the full results, and the results of more parsimonious models.

* p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01. Standard errors in parentheses.


icalization. Second, this effect is indistinguishable from zero in democracies. As such, these results fit my description of the way in which the stock of democracy brings into existence non-democratic regimes and governments.

Furthermore, the results call for a parallel version of this argument, which links the stock of dictatorship to the emergence of moderate, democratic governments. Under democracy, the stock of dictatorship exerts a significant effect upon the radicalism of governments in the expected, negative direction, such that each additional year of dictatorship reduces the odds of a more radical government by about 4%. In non-democratic political contexts, the effects of the stock of dictatorship are insignificant. These findings are consistent with a data-generating process that starts with the deradicalization of societal actors under extensive spells of authoritarian rule. As moderation becomes more prevalent among societal actors, it creates and strengthens their normative preferences for democracy, and helps them forge a broad pro-democratic coalition.¹⁸ It is likely that the democratic government that emerges from this coalition and its push towards democracy will inherit its normative commitment to it. The implication is that the prevalence of moderation among democratic governments increases to the extent that they operate against the backdrop of a greater stock of dictatorship. This pattern is not to be observed among non-democratic governments, which are unlikely to display moderation in the first place, since moderate, non-democratic governments are inclined to democratize the political institutions through they rule. Both implications are borne out by the results presented in Table 5.10.

For the purpose of illustrating the magnitude of these conditional effects, for each of the three political regime types Figures 5.5 and 5.6 plot the mean predicted probabilities of several categories of the outcome variable against the stock

¹⁸Mainwaring and Pérez-Liñán, 2013c.

Figure 5.5 Mean Predicted Probabilities of Category “Radical” of Governments for the Stock of Democracy



Source: wkastart-DR-LA-40-77-Graphs-Radicalism-MLM-Gov-vdem7-LN-v01.do


Note: N = 339. Fitted Ordinal Logistic Multilevel Mixed Effects Regression Model (Model 10, presented in Table 5.10). The “V-Dem” measure of the political regime type is used. The ultimate outcome that is modeled is the probability of the “radical” category of governments. The plotted mean predicted probabilities are estimated by holding the values for the political regime type constant at each of its three values in turn. The independent variable of interest that is included in the model was the (interaction term between the political regime type and the) stock of democracy.

of democracy and the stock of dictatorship, respectively. Figure 5.5 does so for the most radical category of the outcome of interest. In both hybrid regimes and dictatorships, the changes in its mean predictions are considerable. In the former, the average probability of a radical government increases from about .20 to about .80 over the entire within-sample range of the stock of democracy, which runs from 0 to about forty years for hybrid regimes. Under dictatorship, this change is steeper. In authoritarian contexts lacking any history with democracy, the average risk of a radical government is about .40. This exceeds .90 even ‘before’ the stock of democracy has reached twenty years, and approximates 1 as the stock of democracy reaches its within-sample maximum of about 55 years. Figure 5.6 visualizes the changes in the mean predicted probabilities of the most moderate category for the stock of dictatorship. The magnitude of the effect of interest here is limited compared to the ones previously discussed, in part because the mean predicted probability of a moderate government is already .70 in democracies that lack any experience with dictatorship. This approximates 1 as the stock of dictatorship approaches its within-sample maximum of almost ninety years.

5.6 Conclusion

The empirical evidence presented in this section lends considerable support to three components of my core theoretical argument, and accounts for several substantive conclusions reached in Chapter 4. First, the accumulated, logged stock of mild and intense democratic experiences strengthens, but does not create, non-state political actors (particularly in dictatorships), whereas recent episodes of authoritarian rule, including both mild and intense ones, destroy some societal actors (particularly in hybrid regimes), but does not weaken others. These findings validate the proposed

Figure 5.6 Mean Predicted Probabilities of Category “Moderate” of Governments for the Stock of Dictatorship



Source: wkastart-DR-LA-40-77-Graphs-Radicalism-MLM-Gov-vdem7-LN-v01.do

Note: N = 339. Fitted Ordinal Logistic Multilevel Mixed Effects Regression Model (Model 10, presented in Table 5.10). The “V-Dem” measure of the political regime type is used. The ultimate outcome that is modeled is the probability of the “moderate” category of governments. The plotted mean predicted probabilities are estimated by holding the values for the political regime type constant at each of its three values in turn. The independent variable of interest that is included in the model was the (interaction term between the political regime type and the) stock of dictatorship.

mechanism linking the stock of democracy to the onset of political campaigns, and account for why this relationship is observed in authoritarian contexts in Chapter 4’s global analysis. Not only does dictatorship motivate societal actors to oppose the government through active resistance outside political institutions, it also weakens them to the extent that the organizational resources accumulated under democracy can compensate for this loss, tilting their coercive capacity to the point where they can harness it for the initiation of a political campaign. Furthermore, the consistent preference for the non-logged measure of the stock of democracy across the corresponding models reflects the limitations of its effects, which weaken as democratic experiences accumulate. These findings also suggest that some non-state political actors, the members of the authoritarian ruling coalition in particular, either grow stronger or retain their organizational strength under dictatorship. In turn, its two countervailing effects upon the overall coercive capacity of societal actors explain why the stock of dictatorship fails to suppress the emergence of political campaigns, as registered in Chapter 4. These findings also help explain the regime legacy effects upon political campaign onset in the Latin American context.

Second, extensive experiences with democracy radicalize societal actors, whereas the stock of the most severe instances of dictatorship deradicalizes them. They do so by elevating and diminishing, respectively, the stakes and intensity of political conflict. In addition, and contrary to my original argument, the erosion of democratic norms, induced by the sustained exposure to heightened levels of political competition, also mediates the radicalizing effect of the stock of democracy. The preference for the ‘raw’ measure of the stock of democracy reflects a data-generating process where several decades of democratic rule expand the number of societal actors that are included in the dataset. For the stock of democracy to exert its additional, radicalizing effect, even more extensive experiences with democracy are needed to

overcome this selection effect. Its ‘raw’ measure yields a better model fit in this research context, since it does not discount additional years of democracy when its stock is already high. Furthermore, these findings echo Chapter 4’s discussion about the regime legacy effects upon the pacification of political campaigns, where the stock of democracy increases the risk of a violent methods of resistance by radicalizing societal actors, and the stock of dictatorship exerts the opposite effect by fostering moderation among them.

Yet the substantive results of the current chapter do not entirely match those of Chapter 4’s (Section 4.3) analysis of political campaign pacification, in that they involve different conditional effects as well as different functional relationships between the independent and dependent variables. This may be the result of distinct units of analysis and the data-generating processes that underlie them. That is, the distribution of moderate and radical political actors in the political campaign-years analyzed in Chapter 4, and among those that are active in these movements of resistance in particular, is likely to be different from its distribution among the administration-actors investigated in Section 5.4. Most notably, insofar as the stock of democracy spurs the emergence of political campaigns as well as dictatorships, it ‘selects in’ observations with at most a recently accumulated stock of dictatorship, which enhances the fit of models that incorporate its depreciated operationalization. This selection effect is weaker in the process that generates societal actors due to the countervailing effects of the regime stock variables upon the number of societal actors. As a result, the ‘raw’ measure of the stock of dictatorship is preferred. Furthermore, as discussed in Chapter 4, the immediately present political regime type is likely to shape the radical-moderate composition of societal actors at the helm of political campaigns. By contrast, having a democratic political system, as opposed to a non-democratic one, does not affect the radicalism of non-state political actors in any of the models presented in Section 5.4 (Tables 5.5 and 5.7).

Third, the stock of the most expansive forms of democracy radicalizes governments, in particular those that rule through non-democratic regimes. The deradicalizing effect of the stock of dictatorship only materializes among democratic governments. As such, it cannot serve as a mechanism in authoritarian contexts. At first sight, this is at odds with Chapter 4’s analysis of state repression, which registers negative effects of the stock of dictatorship upon levels of state repression (Section 4.5) and state violence (Section 4.6) in authoritarian environments with an active political campaign. The data-generating process that replaces radical, authoritarian governments with moderate, democratic ones, discussed in Section 5.5, may account for this apparent mismatch. The episodes of contention captured by the political campaign-years analyzed in Chapter 4 constitute a distinct phase in this particular data-generating process, since they often involve battles over the political regime. In and of themselves, political campaigns intensify the competition for political power and heighten its stakes. In such an environment, even longstanding authoritarian governments are likely to remain radical. Yet insofar as the stock of dictatorship deradicalizes societal actors, it may nonetheless set in motion the partial liberalization of the authoritarian regime in these settings, where the government relaxes the restrictions that block the collective action of its adversaries and society at large. Understood this way, political campaigns that operate in these contexts are the beginning of the end for radical, authoritarian governments.¹⁹ First,

¹⁹Albertus and Menaldo, 2018.

the deradicalization of the government's political opponents opens up the pathway to meaningful negotiations between the government and moderate opposition forces within the political campaign. For the purpose of facilitating these negotiations, the government is likely to reduce the scope of state repression somewhat. Authoritarian governments may even deradicalize and democratize the political institutions through which they rule, in which case the corresponding transition to a hybrid regime is likely to 'soak up' the deradicalizing effect of the stock of dictatorship. Second, the moderation of opposition groups and non-state allies of the government may engender splits within the authoritarian ruling coalition, pitting regime 'hard-liners', including governments bent on maintaining and imposing repression, against regime 'soft-liners' that push for a conciliatory approach towards engaging the opposition. These splits may take the form of elite defections within the state's security apparatus, which in turn weaken the government's coercive capacity and hence subject the scope of its repressive activities to a downward pressure.²⁰

wkastart-DT-Chapter-05-v03.tex

²⁰Chenoweth and Stephan, 2011.