Chapter 4

Regime Legacies and Domestic Peace: A Global Analysis

The previous chapter formulated five testable implications that flow from my theoretical argument. The purpose of the current chapter is to test these five core hypotheses. It is important to note that these claims only describe empirical associations between independent and dependent variables, and leave unmentioned the mechanisms and mediator variables that link them. Since this simplification eases data collection and measurement requirements, it allows for expanding the scope of the empirical analysis to global and temporally broad proportions. This in turn serves extensive testing purposes, as it enables me to test my argument across widely different contexts and environments, and hence bolsters the external validity of the empirical evidence.[1] Once I have determined the generalizable empirical patterns among the independent and dependent variables, I can offer tentative modifications to my theoretical argument where necessary, and (as I do in the empirical chapters that follow) revert to intensive testing approaches to investigate the (proposed) mechanisms that account for these observed patterns.

The empirical evidence presented in this chapter lends considerable support for my hypotheses, yet also calls for several theoretical revisions if not limitations of my initial argument. The stock of democracy spurs the emergence of political campaigns, while increasing the risk that an existing political campaign is violent as opposed to peaceful. In hybrid regimes, it also enhances the mobilization of political campaigns. By contrast, the stock of dictatorship pacifies political campaigns, yet without affecting their emergence or mobilization. With respect to state repression, the results display an empirical pattern that is the opposite of the hypothesized relationship, in that the stock of dictatorship reduces its scope, yet only in dictatorships (in democracies and hybrid regimes, no effects are registered). In addition, and in accordance with my argument, the stock of dictatorship pacifies the state repression to which political campaigns are subject by diminishing the risk of the most excessive level of state violence, but only in dictatorships. The stock of democracy does not exert any effects in these two respects.

This chapter proceeds as follows. I start by discussing the main dependent and independent variables (Section 4.1). I then model the onset of political campaigns as a function of the historical stock of democracy and dictatorship, and discuss the results (Section 4.2). Section 4.3 assesses the effects of previous democratic and

[1] Coppedge, 2012.

authoritarian experiences upon the pacification of ongoing political campaigns. I then explore their effects upon popular involvement in political campaigns (Section 4.4). The two sections that follow draw attention to the behaviour of governments, and determines how regime legacies affect their repressive responses to ongoing political campaigns in terms of the scope (Section 4.5) and pacification (Section 4.6) of state repression. Each of these sections also discusses and justifies the corresponding research designs, and describes the control variables. Finally, in light of the empirical findings presented in this chapter, Section 4.7 concludes it by assessing the relative strengths of my theory, offering theoretical modifications to account for its shortcomings, and formulating empirical tasks for the intensive tests carried out in Chapters 5-6.

Before I proceed, some general comments about Sections 4.2-4.6 are in order. In addition to standard econometric models, I employ several estimation techniques and model specifications to address concerns about model misspecification, model fit, and estimate precision. Whereas I offer justifications for why I prefer particular models over others, for the sake of parsimony in this chapter I only present the empirical results of the preferred models, i.e., the models that best test my theoretical argument. For the more parsimonious versions of the models presented in this chapter, slightly different model specifications, and the results from alternative estimation techniques, I refer the reader to Appendix B (Section B.1), which also includes a full discussion of the corresponding specification searches and robustness checks. Second, and related to this, Sections 4.2-4.6 not only test my hypotheses, but also devote particular attention to the relative explanatory power of the stock of democracy and dictatorship vis-à-vis the effects of contemporaneous levels of democracy, and through the inclusion of interaction terms assess the robustness of the impact of regime legacies across different immediately present political regime types. Where applicable, I propose changes to or extensions of my initial argument to account for interaction effects that contradict my theory or that at least check the robustness of its claims across different political regime contexts Accordingly, and for the sake of parsimony, I forgo any discussions of the empirical results for the remaining control variables, and omit the corresponding estimates from the regression tables presented in this chapter (as a rule, control variables do not exert effects). Instead, the full results of all models are presented in Section B.1 of Appendix B. Third, unless stated otherwise, (1) the estimated effects that are discussed only apply if all included control variables are held constant; (2) references to statistical significance involve the 5% significance level applied to two-tailed tests; (3) post-estimation estimates of (mean) predicted probabilities are estimated while holding the included control variables constant at observed values; and (4) confidence intervals of such mean predictions involve a 95% confidence level. Finally, I offer general comments about software applications and replicability that apply to Sections 4.1-4.6. All models are estimated using Stata (Version 15). In addition, at the post-estimation stage of the analysis, I utilize wrappers for Stata's `margins` command included in the SPost13 package developed by Long and Freese (2014). For the purpose of replicability, each table and figure is accompanied by a note indicating the filename of the Stata do-file that produced the output shown.

4.1 Measuring Domestic Peace and Democracy

I operationalize the onset, pacification, and mobilization of political campaigns using Versions 1.1 and 2.0 of the NAVCO dataset, which measure these traits at the level of political campaigns (1900-2006) and political campaign-years (1945-2006), respectively.[2] The datasets employ somewhat different coding rules for the relevant variables. When the information of overlapping years is in conflict, I use the data of Version 2.0. In a handful of cases, multiple political campaigns emerge or operate in one and the same country-year, sometimes with opposing methods of coercion, and different mobilization levels. Depending on the specific hypothesis that I test, I apply aggregation rules that I describe in the corresponding sections below.

The corresponding codebooks define a political campaign as

> a series of observable, continuous, purposive mass tactics or events in pursuit of a political objective. Campaigns are observable, meaning that the tactics used are overt and documented. A campaign is continuous and lasts anywhere from days to years, distinguishing it from one-off events or revolts. Campaigns are also purposive, meaning that they are consciously acting with a specific objective in mind, such as expelling a foreign occupier or overthrowing a domestic regime. Campaigns have discernable leadership and often have names, distinguishing them from random riots or spontaneous mass acts.

Furthermore, the datasets only include

> *major* nonviolent and violent campaigns – those that are already "mature" in terms of objectives and membership. We only included cases where the objective was at some point maximalist (i.e. regime change, secession, or selfdetermination) as opposed to limited (i.e. greater civil liberties or economic rights). Such limited goals (greater autonomy and significant institutional reform) are coded only when campaigns' goals were less than maximalist for certain campaign years. Additionally, we only include nonviolent and violent campaigns where we were certain that more than 1,000 people were actively participating in the struggle [original italics].

In most cases, the beginning and end dates of a political campaign delimit the time period during which it had 1,000 activists. For violent political campaigns that are only included in Version 1.1 (i.e., those that emerged prior to 1945), the start date marks the point at which the number of fatal casualties of the conflict surpassed 1,000 individuals. I use these dates (as derived from the corresponding variables *BYEAR*, *year* and *cyear*) to identify the years that witnessed the onset and presence of political campaigns.

I measure the pacification of political campaigns at the level of political campaign-years, and therefore only rely upon Version 2.0 of the NAVCO dataset. Conceptually as well as empirically, the primary method of resistance concerns a difference that is one of kind before it is one of degree. That is, whereas the extent of violence, understood as the use of force to harm or threaten the physical well-being of the opponent, can in principle span a continuous range, the primary method of coercion is clearly either violent or nonviolent. At the same time, the level of violence within each

[2] Chenoweth, 2011; Chenoweth and Lewis, 2013a.

of these two categories displays considerable variability. Among primarily violent campaigns, this concerns the number of fatal casualties, and is partially captured by the mobilization variable (discussed below). When the predominant method of resistance is peaceful, this involves the presence or absence of a *radical flank*, which the codebook defines as

> a group that adopts extremist rhetoric and violent strategies to pursue their goals. They represent a faction within the broader opposition movement. This concept excludes predominantly violent campaigns or other violent groups within the country that are pursuing different political objectives

As such, the presence of a radical flank in an otherwise entirely peaceful political campaign signals the use of violence as the secondary method of coercion. Accordingly, I adopt a trichotomous measure of political campaign pacification that distinguishes between (1) primarily violent political campaigns, (2) primarily peaceful political campaigns with a radical flank, and (3) primarily peaceful political campaigns without a radical flank. This measure is a combination of the *rad_flank* and *prim_method* variables. The former consists of categories that align with the three-class typology of interest, yet sometimes contradicts the latter, dichotomous variable, which marks the distinction between primarily violent and primarily peaceful political campaigns. I recoded the *rad_flank* variable so that (1) all primarily peaceful political campaigns, as measured by *prim_method*, are assigned to the radical flank category if they were originally assigned to the primarily violent category, as measured by *rad_flank* (this affected three observations); and (2) all remaining, violent political campaigns are also coded as such by *rad_flank* (this also affected three observations). It is important to note that these variables do not only register distinctions between political campaigns, but also track changes over time whenever they shift their primary method of resistance.

For the purpose of measuring the mobilization of political campaigns, I recode the (*camp_size*) variable from the NAVCO dataset (Version 2.0), which registers the extent of popular involvement in each political campaign per year of its existence. This concerns an ordinal variable that indicates the absolute number of participants in terms of categories of unequal 'size', in that the threshold values that delimit them increase by unequal increments. The threshold values are as follows: 1-999 ("0"), 1,000-9,999 ("1"), 10,000-99,999 ("2"), 100,000-499,999 ("3"), 500,000-1,000,000 ("4"), and $>$ 1,000,000 ("5"). To enhance the validity of this measure, I create new categories that are 'weighed' by the total population. I do so by assigning each of the original categories a point estimate that equals the (rounded) mean of the corresponding threshold values (i.e., 500, 5,500, 55,000, 300,000, 750,000, and 1,000,000, respectively). I subsequently divide these estimates by the total population of each observation's country-year, as measured in the V-Dem dataset by *e_mipopula*, convert them to percentage scores, and assign them to the following categories: 0-0.001% ("0"), 0.001-0.01% ("1"), 0.01-0.1% ("2"), 0.1-0.5% ("3"), 0.5-1% ("4"), and $>$ 1% ("5"). As was the case with the threshold values of the original categories, the current ones are such that they are separated by increasingly higher increments. This accounts for a bandwagon effect in political participation, where higher levels of popular involvement ease the attainment of additional participants.[3]

[3]Kuran, 1991.

For the scope of state repression, I rely on several violent and nonviolent repression indicators included in the Varieties of Democracy (V-Dem) (Version 7) dataset. The data is measured at the level of country-years. I use the Latent Class Analysis (LCA) scaling technique to explore the substantively relevant multidimensionality among these indicators, and construct a three-level scale that distinguishes between a limited, intermediate and broad scope of state repression. Appendix A (Section A.2) describes the indicators and the empirical results that justify this operationalization in detail. The estimates of the same measurement models also indicate that, at least at the level of country-years, the pacification of state repression is an empirically indistinguishable dimension of state repression. To nonetheless test my argument about state repression pacification, I revert to the level of political campaign-years, and employ the variable *repression* included in the NAVCO (Version 2.0) dataset, which measures the extent of violence in the government's repressive response to one particular political campaign in a given year of its existence.[4]

I use the same procedure to develop my measure of the political regime type, and estimate multiple LCA models to explore the empirical associations among several V-Dem indicators of the freedom and fairness of elections, and the strength of judicial and legislative institutions. As I discuss in detail in Appendix A (A.1), the resulting estimates validate the conceptual distinction between competitive elections and executive constraints as two separate dimensions of democracy, but also indicate that country-year observations move along these dimensions 'in tandem', albeit at different 'speeds'. That is, whereas countries that hold relatively competitive elections also display relatively strong executive constraints, each empirically distinguishable regime category is generally more democratic with respect to the former than the latter. An important implication of these findings is that the hybrid regime categories do not encompass combinations of strong executive constraints and unfree or non-existing elections. Instead, they are all best understood as electoral authoritarian regime types, and depending on the number of permissible categories can be further divided into competitive authoritarian and hegemonic party regimes. For the purpose of testing my argument, I employ a three-type regime typology, where democracy and dictatorship are identified as polar opposites in terms of both competitive elections and executive constraints, and where hybrid regimes reflect a combination of reasonably competitive elections in conjunction with weak executive constraints.

The hypotheses under scrutiny in this chapter are phrased in terms of the two *regime stock variables*: the stock of democracy and the stock of dictatorship. To construct these independent variables, I first count the total number of years that each country-year in the entire V-Dem sample has experienced each of the two political regime types since (but excluding) 1899, and up until but not including the observation year. For the country-years that are missing (i.e., not coded) in the V-Dem dataset, I determine the political regime type as follows (whereas these observations are excluded from my samples, their regime types should count towards the experiences captured by the regime stock variables). Some V-Dem country-years are missing as a result of (temporary) foreign occupation and their immediate integration into the occupying country. In these instances, I use the political regime type of the occupying country. In addition, for about 400 additional missing observations, foreign rule takes the form of colonial rule or temporary military occupation, all

[4]Chenoweth and Lewis, 2013a.

without full political integration into the ruling country. For these cases, I assign the political regime type on the basis of historiography or extrapolation (mostly from later to earlier country-years of foreign rule). The same applies to the few observations that involve independent country-years, but are not yet coded in the V-Dem dataset.

My theoretical argument and the hypotheses that I derive from it do not specify the functional relationships between the regime stock variables and the outcomes of interest in terms other than the presence and direction of the effects. For instance, my theory is agnostic as to whether each additional year of democracy exerts an equally strong effect across both low and high stocks of democracy, or that this effect 'flattens out' as the overall stock of democracy increases. Likewise, whether recent authoritarian experiences exert a greater impact than more distant episodes of dictatorship is theoretically indeterminate as far as my argument goes. In order to explore these functional relationships in greater depth, I operationalize the regime stock variables in three distinct ways. The first leaves these variables unchanged. By counting the 'raw' number of regime years, it treats the effects of all regime experiences as equally lasting. Whether it occurred decades ago or last year, and whether it came on top of long stretches of similar experiences or bucked an historical trend, each regime year contributes the same amount of experiences to the overall stock if measured this way. Under the second operationalization, the regime stock variables equal the natural log of the raw number of regime years (after adding 1). As such, it discounts additional regime experiences to the extent that the country of interest has undergone similar experiences before, and hence treats the effects of regime experiences as equally lasting, but also increasingly marginal. The third operationalization differentiates between regime experiences according to their temporal distance to the current year by applying an annual depreciation rate of 5% to the accumulated stock of regime experiences. Accordingly, each additional regime year adds 0.95 to the current year's stock, 0.95×0.95 to the stock of the year that follows, $0.95 \times 0.95 \times 0.95$ to the stock in the year after that, and so on. Because my theoretical argument is indeterminate as to the preferred operationalization, I treat this issue primarily as an exploratory matter to be adjudicated by specification searches and considerations of model fit.

4.2 Political Campaign Onset

This stage of the empirical analysis draws upon this study's largest dataset, and encompasses a global sample of independent countries that covers the 1900-2006 period. The unit of analysis is the country-year. The ultimate outcome of interest is the probability of the emergence of a political campaign, which I operationalize using a dichotomous dependent variable. I examine both democratic and authoritarian regime legacy effects upon the emergence of political campaigns, and test Hypothesis 1:

> **Hypothesis 1** *A greater stock of democracy (dictatorship) increases (reduces) the probability of the onset of a political campaign.*

It is important to note that, in line with Hypothesis 1, at this stage I do not distinguish between violent and peaceful political campaigns in constructing the dependent variable. Because I employ a country-year dataset, this aggregation decision

partly accounts for observing the emergence of multiple political campaigns in one and the same country-year in a handful of cases. In those instances, I cap the number of political campaign onsets to "1", so as to ensure a binary response variable, which better captures the overall binary structure of the political campaign onset data.

Together with the time-serial, cross-sectional structure of the data, a dichotomous dependent variable dictates modelling requirements that only a limited set of estimation techniques and specifications can meet, yet there remains considerable room for discretion. Within the range of acceptable modelling strategies, and following the example of Haggard and Kaufman (2016), the preferred estimation technique is a binary logistic Multilevel Mixed Effects (MLM) regression model (also referred to as a Hierarchical (Linear) model (HLM)), specified with random intercepts at the level of countries, country-clustered standard errors, and a cubic polynomial of the mere passage of time. For the purpose of demonstrating the robustness of the empirical results of the preferred MLM model, in Appendix B (Section B.1.1) I also present the results of three alternative estimation techniques, which involve pooled random effects (PRE), event history Weibull (EHW) and event history Cox proportional hazards (EHC) models.

The MLM estimation method offers several advantages in this respect. First, the multilevel specification of unobserved cross-sectional heterogeneity insulates the researcher from the need to assume and attain nil omitted variable bias for the purpose of accounting for this latent cross-country variation via the random effects estimator in the more conventional, 'pooled' model.[5] Since the onset of a political campaign is a rare event, model underspecification is a practically insurmountable challenge. For the current task at hand, 'waiving' this requirement through multilevel modelling is therefore a convenient aspect of this estimation technique.

Second, unlike fixed effects specifications, MLM shares with the pooled random effects model the advantage of allowing for the inclusion of time-invariant or slowly changing predictors, which encompass the regime stock variables in at least some regions of the data space. That is, political institutions, like any other institutions, are resistant to change.[6] Accordingly, several countries fail to accumulate any (additional) democratic or authoritarian regime experiences over long stretches of time. The inclusion of country-fixed effects to account for latent cross-sectional variation would therefore deprive the regime stock variables from much of their explanatory power, and as a result confine inferences about their causal impact to a substantively narrow range in the data. Rendering country-fixed effects unnecessary is thus a useful advantage of MLM.

Third, and related to this, the time-dependent structure of the data in conjunction with the predetermined collinearity between the passage of time and the regime stock variables, which is considerable by design (i.e., over time, any increase in the stock of democracy or dictatorship necessarily implies a simultaneous increase in time), presents a peculiar trade-off, which MLM is best able to attenuate. Temporal dependence in binary outcome models calls for specifications that go beyond the inclusion of a lagged dependent variable and the clustering of standard errors.[7] One such solution is to get rid of the serial data structure altogether by incorporating

[5] Haggard and Kaufman, 2016.
[6] North, 1990.
[7] Beck et al., 1998.

time itself in the left-hand side of the regression equation, and defining the outcome of interest in terms of time accordingly. Several types of duration models (also referred to as event history models) exemplify this approach.[8] A serious drawback of empirical applications of these models is the incompatibility between clustering standard errors and estimating shared frailties, which would otherwise account for unobserved heterogeneity in event history analysis. In addition, duration models exclude observations that experience the event of interest during the first discrete time unit. Apart from the loss of information, this is especially problematic for later sections in this chapter, where I model characteristics of ongoing political campaigns and their environments, since there are several political campaigns that do not last beyond the year of their emergence. Excluding these particular observations would therefore truncate the sample to an even narrower range of the dataspace.

Alternatively, temporal dependence can be directly modeled by specifying the effect of time in some form in the right-hand side of logistic regression models. Such specifications may take the form of a cubic polynomial of time, time dummy variables, or splines.[9] Unlike duration models, these solutions do allow for the simultaneous estimation of the effects of latent heterogeneity and standard errors that are appropriate for cross-sectional time-series data. However, given the collinearity between time and the regime stock variables, the inclusion of time variables of some form diminishes the precision of the estimated empirical association between the regime stock variables and the outcome of interest.

Taken together, the third issue presents a trade-off between the specification of unobserved cross-sectional variation (MLM) and substantively relevant precision (event history analysis). MLM strikes the best balance in this trade-off. First, it is important to note that multicollinearity is not a problem in principle, as it does not produce bias of any form, and that increasing the sample size attenuates collinearity-induced empirical imprecision.[10] Second, empirical imprecision takes the form of unduly inflated standard errors. If anything, this places a higher bar for achieving statistical significance and hence creates more demanding empirical tests for my theoretical claims. From the standpoint of falsifiability, this serves as a blessing in disguise. At the very least, significant findings should be interpreted as even stronger empirical evidence in support of my theory.

I include the following control variables. The first of these is the immediately present political regime type, measured as a three-class nominal variable that distinguishes between democracy, dictatorship and hybrid regimes. For non-state political actors, democracy minimizes the relative cost-effectiveness of political campaigns vis-à-vis political activities that operate through political institutions. I therefore expect democracy, as opposed to dictatorship and (to a lesser extent) hybrid regimes, to diminish the prospects of the emergence of a political campaign. First, competitive elections and executive constraints offer political actors and their supporters institutional channels of political influence that are at least as effective at obtaining their desired political objectives as coercive activities, because in democratic contexts the success of both electoral and political campaigns is a direct function of popular mobilization.[11] Second, by default, political campaigns involve more (types

[8] Box-Steffensmeier and Jones, 2004; Box-Steffensmeier et al., 2014.

[9] Beck et al., 1998; Carter and Signorino, 2010.

[10] Wooldridge, 2013.

[11] Chenoweth and Stephan, 2011; Dahl et al., 2014.

of) activities and more costly activities (e.g., protesting, marching, killing) than is the case with electoral campaigns (which mainly involve canvassing and voting). Insofar as political and electoral campaigns are equally effective in democracies, the latter is thus preferred over the former. Third, and related to this, by definition, democracies do not repress electoral campaigns, but may nonetheless impose costs upon political campaigns and the political actors that initiate and sustain them.

In order to test my theoretical argument more directly, I also include interaction terms between the immediately present political regime type and the regime stock variables. The hypothesis under scrutiny in this subsection is derived from the assumption that democratic and authoritarian regime experiences enhance and diminish, respectively, the coercive capacity of non-state political actors. Yet it is only when these political actors are also willing to launch a political campaign that their enhanced coercive capacity is expected to yield such a challenge. Accordingly, I expect the proposed effects of regime experiences to be more pronounced in non-democratic political contexts, where the relative cost-effectiveness of political campaigns is greater than is the case under democracy. The inclusion of the interaction terms thus enables me to develop what amounts to a series of empirical hoop tests of my theoretical argument. That is, at the very least, I expect the regime legacy effects to hold under dictatorship and hybrid regimes. If they hold under democracy as well, the external validity of my theoretical argument is strengthened. If they do not, this does not necessarily rule out my argument about the effects of regime stock-induced coercive capacities. By the same token, the failure to register the expected regime legacy effects (even) in non-democratic political contexts invalidates my argument.

To address concerns about endogeneity, I also control for the count of past political campaign onsets, measured separately for violent and nonviolent political campaigns. Research has shown that peaceful political campaigns produce and consolidate democracy, whereas violent political campaigns produce dictatorship.[12] As such, the outcome of interest may affect the stock of democracy and the stock of dictatorship measured in subsequent years, and this effect is best captured by measuring the historical count of political campaign. I also control for the scope of state repression, arguing that state-imposed costs upon collective action suppress the emergence of political campaigns. Furthermore, I include a battery of socio-economic and demographic control variables, which I draw from the V-Dem dataset (Version 7). Among these, population size (in millions, natural logarithm) (*e_mipopula*), life expectancy (*e_pelifeex*), economic growth (growth in gross domestic product (GDP) (*e_migdpgro*)), and economic development (the natural logarithm of real GDP per capita (*e_GDP_Per_Cap_Haber_Men_2*)) account for the organizational resources that political actors, once they attain them, can use to initiate coercive activities. In order to account for the collective action problems that political actors need to overcome to amass these resources, I control for the level of urbanization (urban population as a percentage of the total population, using *e_miurbpop* and *e_mipopula*). A high urbanization rate reflects a high concentration of resources, most notably manpower, which eases the efforts of political actors to access them.

Finally, I include three time variables (the number of years since 1899, its square and its cube) to account for the time-serial structure of the data. The

[12] Chenoweth and Stephan, 2011.

relative advantage of this specification of temporal dependence through the inclusion of time in the right-hand side of the regression equation is that it lends itself to substantive interpretation. For instance, this technique enables the researcher to estimate the equivalent of the hazard rate specification in duration models, and explore how the mere passage of time affects the emergence of political campaigns.[13] Given the polynomial form of the specified, overall functional relationship between time and the outcome of interest, this captures any linear and cyclical developments in the propensity for political campaign emergence. It is important to note that this includes period effects, such as those stemming from the Cold War era (1945-1989), and the predominance of global bipolarity that defines it. As such, it accounts for the propensity of global superpowers to assist domestic opposition groups in their efforts to challenge governments.

The indeterminate time horizon of the time variables offers additional room for discretion and substantive interpretation. On the one hand, the historical trajectories of political development directly linked to large-scale political contention such as state-making, democratization and modernization are not universal across countries, let alone similar in timing.[14] On the other hand, the basic unit of analysis at the core of the data structure, the country-year, is not randomly produced, and enters or belongs to the observable population of cases by virtue of a minimal degree of locally cohesive political organization.[15] This data-generating process is reinforced by my case selection, which confines the empirical analysis to institutionally homogeneous and cohesive communities (referred to as "governing units" in the V-Dem codebook) that are ruled by states that enjoy considerable levels of internal and external sovereignty ("independent countries"). Narrowed down this way, the population of interest is endogeneous to large-scale political contention. For instance, the colonial systems of oppression put in place in the wake of imperial conquest, the mass movements of resistance that rose up against them, and the repressive attempts of imperial powers to quell these challenges define the political and territorial context in which national liberation struggles succeeded or failed. As such, the ultimate outcome of interest plays a decisive role in the data-generating process that produced the observable population of independent countries in the first place.[16] Taken together, this "march of history" along which the political communities of interest developed did not start at, but preceded the attainment of sovereignty, and, by virtue of my case selection, has been geared towards obtaining a baseline level of stateness. For these reasons, a single time horizon applied to the entire sample is valid. Since the temporal range of my sample extends back to 1900, the base value for the cubic polynomial of time equals the number of years since 1899.

The full results of all estimated models are presented in Appendix B (Section B.1.1). Specification searches among the most complex MLM models reveal that the natural log specification of the regime stock variables yields a better fit to the data, as indicated by lower AIC and BIC scores. For the regressors of interest here, Table 4.1 presents the results of the two most complex models among these (Models 6-7), and displays three different sets of estimates for the interaction model (Model 7), one for each reference category of the current political regime type. Model 6 is the more

[13] Carter and Signorino, 2010.
[14] Moore, 1966; Tilly, 1990.
[15] Coppedge et al., 2017a.
[16] Chenoweth and Stephan, 2011.

Table 4.1 Binary Logistic Multilevel Mixed Effects Regression Models for Political Campaign Onset, Natural Log Specification (Global Sample of Independent Countries, 1900-2006)

	(6)		(7-Dem)		(7-Hyb)		(7-Dic)	
	M06		M07-Dem		M07-Hyb		M07-Dic	
	e^{β}	SE	e^{β}	SE	e^{β}	SE	e^{β}	SE
The Stock of Democracy (ln)	1.31***	(0.13)	0.82	(0.14)	1.27*	(0.18)	1.52***	(0.23)
The Stock of Dictatorship (ln)	1.10	(0.09)	1.05	(0.17)	1.09	(0.10)	0.98	(0.16)
Political Regime Type								
Democracy					1.01	(0.81)	0.64	(0.59)
Hybrid Regime	4.10***	(2.20)	0.99	(0.80)			0.63	(0.43)
Dictatorship	4.46**	(2.61)	1.57	(1.47)	1.58	(1.08)		
Interaction Terms								
The Stock of Dem. (ln) × Dem.					0.65**	(0.14)	0.54***	(0.12)
The Stock of Dem. (ln) × Hyb.			1.55**	(0.34)			0.83	(0.19)
The Stock of Dem. (ln) × Dict.			1.86***	(0.42)	1.20	(0.27)		
The Stock of Dict. (ln) × Dem.					0.96	(0.18)	1.08	(0.25)
The Stock of Dict. (ln) × Hyb.			1.04	(0.19)			1.12	(0.20)
The Stock of Dict. (ln) × Dict.			0.93	(0.21)	0.89	(0.16)		
Wald χ^2	252.18		282.27		282.27		282.27	
Prob. > Wald χ^2	0.000		0.000		0.000		0.000	
AIC	1801.00		1800.61		1800.61		1800.61	
BIC	1920.65		1948.42		1948.42		1948.42	
Countries	148		148		148		148	
Years per Country (Average)	56.9		56.9		56.9		56.9	
Observations	8,420		8,420		8,420		8,420	

Source: wkastart-DR-Global-28-02-Estimation-Campaign-Onset-MLM-Fit-Natural-Log-v02.do

Note: Only substantively relevant coefficients are displayed. For the interaction model (Model 7), three different sets of estimates are displayed, one for each reference category of the current political regime type. The unit of analysis is the independent country-year. The dependent variable is the probability of political campaign onset. Random intercepts at the level of countries. Country-clustered standard errors. For the political regime stock variables, the natural logarithm of the original values was used. See Appendix B (Section B.1.1) for the full results, and the results of more parsimonious models and alternative estimation techniques.

* $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$. Standard errors in parentheses.

parsimonious model, as it omits the interaction terms between political regime type and the regime legacy variables. The estimates indicate that increases in the stock of democracy spur the emergence of political campaigns, but that this positive effect becomes weaker as historical experiences with democracy expand. Model 7, which includes the interaction terms, reveals that this empirical association only holds under dictatorship. Under democratic and hybrid political regime types, the effects of democratic experiences are not significantly different from zero. It is only at the 0.10 significance level that the stock of democracy exerts a distinguishable, positive effect under hybrid regimes. These results echo the estimates for the political regime type of Model 6, which indicate that a non-democratic as opposed to a democratic form of government increases the odds of a political campaign onset by more than a factor of four. That is, the impact of the current political regime type may have dampened the positive effects of the stock of democracy to the extent that they become indistinguishable from zero. As such, whereas the theoretical claim under scrutiny here passes the first empirical hoop test referred to above, in that it holds under the most favorable political circumstances, it fails the more demanding of such tests. Furthermore, these results lend support to the claim advanced by Almeida (2008) that political actors operating in authoritarian contexts can draw upon the organizational resources accumulated under previous spells of democracy to initiate a resistance campaign against the government.

Overall, the results call for a weakened version of my argument. Contrary to my theoretical claims, historical experiences with dictatorship do not affect the outcome of interest. Only the stock of democracy is impactful in this respect, and in the expected, positive direction. Its effect weakens as democratic experiences accumulate. Together, these findings suggest that democratic exposure enhances the coercive capacity of non-state political actors, and that, once empowered, these actors gener-

ally remain resilient throughout long stretches of dictatorship. This organizational resilience in the face of authoritarian rule may stem from two countervailing effects that qualify my theory. One of these accords to my initial argument about the disempowering impact of longstanding dictatorships, but limits it to political opposition groups. At the very least, by closing off institutional access to the power of the state, authoritarian governments deny their adversaries any opportunities to grow stronger throughout their rule. Furthermore, through sustained repression these governments deplete the organizational resources that their opponents built up under democracy. The implication is a reduced risk of political campaign onset. The second effect runs in the opposite direction, and applies to members of the authoritarian ruling coalition. So far I have argued that over time dictatorship enhances the coercive capacity of allies of the incumbent government, yet without broadening its implications for organized resistance once these allies lose direct access to the power of the state. Modifying my theory along these lines would contradict the initial hypothesis, and imply that, rather than suppressing the initiation of a political campaign, the stock of dictatorship increases it among former members of the authoritarian ruling coalition, including the government that led it. For instance, in Nicaragua in the wake of the collapse of the Somoza dictatorship (1967-1979), several former National Guardsmen and other conservative groups allied to Somoza created a rebel group, the Contras, which starting in 1980 waged a decade-long armed struggle against the left-wing government that had ousted and replaced the Somoza regime.[17] To be sure, the Contras heavily relied upon covert US foreign aid to sustain their campaign. Yet they also drew upon the coercive means they accumulated throughout the preceding Somoza dictatorship, including but not limited to military expertise. Armed with these resources, the Contras embarked upon a violent political campaign against the incumbent government. At an aggregated level of analysis, these two countervailing effects may account for the null finding for the stock of dictatorship.

Furthermore, the results suggest that the effectiveness of democratic institutions as a channel of political influence diminishes the appeal of political campaigns even among political actors that, through previous experiences with democracy, have built up the capacity to coerce the government. As a result, the causal impact of the current political regime type 'swamps' the effects of prior democratic experiences. Through participating in free and fair elections, non-state political actors operating under democracy can gain direct access to the state apparatus in a relatively cost-effective way. That is, whereas winning democratic elections requires overcoming considerable collective action problems and expending costly organizational resources, operating outside electoral institutions by mounting and sustaining a political campaign poses distinct challenges that are more costly to overcome, and possibly incurs additional costs as a result of state repression. In addition, participation in electoral campaigns is as least as effective as involvement in political campaigns, since in both cases political success is a direct function of mass mobilization. If non-state political actors are able to rally supporters to the streets or terrorist training camps, they are at least as capable of mobilizing them to the ballot box, where political participation is less costly and at least as effective.

The relative cost-effectiveness of democratic institutions holds for both moderate and radical political actors. For instance, all major political actors during the presidential administration of Bachelet in Chile (2006-2010) espoused moder-

[17] Chenoweth, 2011; Mainwaring and Pérez-Liñán, 2013a.

ation. The Bachelet government enjoyed the support of the center-left Partido Demócrata Cristiano (PDC) in the legislature, but was formally opposed by the Unión Demócrata Independiente (UDI) and Renovación Nacional (RN), the two main conservative political parties. However, both during and following the 2006 presidential campaign, all three political parties supported centrist policies that were similar to those of the Bachelet administration.[18] This signals a willingness to compromise and thus a degree of moderation. Democracy's inherent institutional responsiveness to the demands of ordinary people ensures that policies remain moderate, and therefore encourages moderate political actors to participate in electoral politics in order to steer policies further in their preferred direction. Accordingly, operating under democracy, the UDI and RN felt no need to mount a political campaign to oust the Bachelet government. Instead, they set up an electoral campaign to compete in the 2010 presidential elections. After winning these elections, their candidate Piñera implemented their preferred center-right policy agenda.

The same implication holds for radical political actors, but for a different reason. An example is the Movimiento Bolivariano Revolucionario 200 (MBR 200) in Venezuela. The MBR 200 was established in 1983 by Chávez and other junior military officers with the purpose of advancing their leftist agenda.[19] It espouses an absolutist, revolutionary ideology that leaves no room for compromise and policy delays. This was also evident in 1992, when it (unsuccessfully) launched a violent military coup against the government. Unlike moderate political actors, radical political actors are not likely to participate in democratic institutions for the purpose of gaining policy benefits. Instead, for radical political actors democracy opens up the electoral or parliamentary route to dictatorship.[20] Democratic institutions offer radical political actors a real prospect of winning elections and occupying the government. As soon as they win elections and obtain direct control over the state apparatus, radical political actors are likely to abolish democracy in order to fully implement their ideal policies. For instance, in 1997, the MBR 200 founded its own political party (the Movimiento Quinta República) and competed in the 1998 presidential elections.[21] After winning these competitive elections, its candidate Chávez began to dismantle the legislature and the judiciary, two of Venezuela's core democratic institutions.

However, the results do not appear to indicate that in democratic political regimes non-state political actors use their organizational resources to exploit alternative, institutional methods of political influence. That is, if the latter explanation were true, the stock of democracy would diminish the odds of political campaign onset in democratic political contexts, but its exponentiated coefficient, albeit below 1, fails to reach statistical significance in Model 7 when the political regime type is held constant at democracy. Alternatively, the failure to register a significant effect may be an artifact of the finding that under democracy the emergence of a political campaign is an extremely rare event to begin with. As such, the occurrence rate is 'capped' at such a low level that it can hardly decline any further.

In order to facilitate the substantive interpretation of the effects of the logged stock of democracy under different political regime types, Figure 4.1 plots the mean

[18] Mainwaring and Pérez-Liñán, 2013a.
[19] Ibid.
[20] Levitsky and Ziblatt, 2018.
[21] Mainwaring and Pérez-Liñán, 2013a.

Figure 4.1 Mean Predicted Probabilities of Political Campaign Onset for the Stock of Democracy (Natural Log)



Source: wkastart-DR-Global-28-12-Graphs-Campaign-Onset-MLM-Fit-Natural-Log-v02.do
Note: N = 8,420. Fitted Binary Logistic Multilevel Mixed Effects Regression Model (Model 7, presented in Table 4.1). The ultimate outcome that was modeled was the onset of a political campaign. The plotted mean predicted probabilities were estimated by holding the values for political regime type constant at each of its three values in turn. The independent variable of interest that was included in the model was the (interaction term between political regime type and the) natural log of the stock of democracy, but to facilitate substantive interpretation, the predicted probabilities are plotted against the original, nonlogged values of the stock of democracy.

predicted probabilities of political campaign onset, estimated by Model 7, against the stock of democracy measured in raw numbers of years. With no experience with democracy whatsoever, the emergence of a political campaign is an extremely rare event across all political regime types. But under dictatorship it takes about two-and-a-half decades of democracy for the average predicted rate of occurrence of such an event to exceed ten percent. This rate approaches twelve percent as the stock of democracy approximates the within-sample maximum of 55 years, yet the broad confidence intervals encompass mean predicted probabilities of political campaign onset that start to decline after about three decades of democracy.

4.3 Political Campaign Pacification

This section narrows the analysis down to instances of an ongoing political campaign. The unit of analysis is the political campaign-year. The goal of this section is to determine whether and how historical experiences with democracy and dictatorship affect the method of resistance of political campaigns, and test Hypothesis 2:

> **Hypothesis 2** *A greater stock of democracy (dictatorship) reduces (increases) the probability of the pacification of the political campaign.*

The dependent variable is trichotomous, and for each political campaign in each year of its existence distinguishes between primarily peaceful political campaigns without a radical flank ("1"), primarily peaceful political campaigns with a radical flank ("2"), and primarily violent political campaigns ("3"). The variable is drawn from the NAVCO dataset (Version 2.0), and covers the 1945-2006 period. For the same reasons outlined above, the preferred estimation technique is a MLM regression model. Since the level of measurement of the dependent variable is ordinal,

I estimate ordered logistic versions of the MLM model. I specify this model with random intercepts at the level of countries, country-clustered standard errors, and a cubic polynomial of time, where time represents the number of years since the onset of the political campaign. Unfortunately, the incorporation of additional, political campaign-level intercepts in the random portion of the model stands in the way of model convergence.

The control variables included in the two most complex model are the following. First, I control for the political regime type, which the existing research literature has deemed relevant for the reasons outlined in Chapter 2 (Section 2.1). The full model also includes interaction terms between the political regime type and the regime stock variables. This serves the purpose of developing a series of empirical hoop tests, similar to those of Section 4.2. In the previous section, I argued that democratic institutions minimize the relative cost-effectiveness of political campaigns for both moderate and radical non-state political actors. Whereas there are theoretical reasons to assert that this differs for each of these two types of political actors in authoritarian and hybrid regime contexts (as I discuss below), I contend that this is equally the case for both in democracies. Accordingly, I assume that there are no *ex ante* reasons to expect either radical or moderate political actors to be willing to initiate a political campaign under democracy. Likewise, and more importantly for the issue at hand, I assume that either type of political actor is equally unlikely to do so. If this is indeed the case, under democracy the radical-moderate composition of political actors that are active in political campaigns should on average resemble the radical-moderate distribution among (non-state) political actors in society at large. I use this assumption to my advantage by treating democratic political campaign-years as the 'most likely' cases for my theoretical claims, and hence as the first empirical hoop test. That is, insofar as radical and moderate political actors prefer violence and nonviolence, respectively, the pacification of political campaigns in democracies should more accurately reflect the overall distribution of radical and moderate non-state political actors in society. Accordingly, insofar as the stock of democracy and the stock of dictatorship determine this distribution, at the very least I expect to validate the hypothesis under scrutiny here in democratic political contexts. To the extent that I also observe the expected effects in dictatorship and hybrid regimes, the hypothesis passes the more demanding hoop tests.

As in the preceding analysis, to address concerns about endogeneity I include count variables for the number of violent and nonviolent political campaigns that have emerged in each country's past. These counts include the emergence of the current political campaign, except when the current year equals the year of its emergence. I also include several state repression variables to account for their violent backlash effects, where the repression of opposition groups encourages them to revert to (more) violent tactics. First, I control for the country-wide scope of state repression. Second, I include two state repression variables that are originally measured at the political campaign–year, which I drawn from the NAVCO dataset. One of these indicates whether state repression in response to the political campaign is discriminate (i.e, exclusively targeting challengers) or indiscriminate (*discrim*). The other measures the severity of the government's repressive response to the political campaign (*repression*). Furthermore, I include the same battery of socio-economic and demographic variables presented in Section 4.2 (population size, life expectancy, urbanization, economic development and economic growth). These covariates indi-

Table 4.2 Ordered Logistic Multilevel Mixed Effects Regression Models for Political Campaign Pacification, Regime Stock Variables with Best Fit (Global Sample of Independent Countries, 1945-2006)

	(5)		(6)	
	M05		M06	
	e^{β}	SE	e^{β}	SE
The Stock of Democracy	1.09***	(0.03)	1.10***	(0.03)
The Stock of Dictatorship (5%)	0.82**	(0.07)	0.84**	(0.07)
Political Regime Type (Base: "Democracy")				
Hybrid Regime	25.23***	(28.99)	26.64***	(28.97)
Dictatorship	8.98	(12.34)	12.51**	(15.92)
Wald χ^2	76.14		91.48	
Prob. > Wald χ^2	0.000		0.000	
AIC	640.52		622.70	
BIC	743.13		734.92	
Countries	95		92	
Years per Country (Average)	13.2		13.2	
Political Campaigns	202		193	
Years per Political Campaign (Average)	6.2		6.3	
Observations	1,250		1,213	

Source: wkastart-DR-Global-33-09-Estimation-Campaign-Pacification-MLM-Fit-Country-Best-v01.do

Note: Only substantively relevant coefficients are displayed. The unit of analysis is the political campaign-year. The ultimate outcome that was modeled was the use of violent as opposed to nonviolent coercion by the political campaign. Random intercepts at the level of countries. Country-clustered standard errors. See Appendix B.1.5 (Section B.1.2) for the full results, and the results of more parsimonious models. Regime stock variables that include "(5%)" in their label are subject to an annual depreciation rate of 5%.

* p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01. Standard errors in parentheses.

cate how much is at stake when political actors decide whether or not to use violence. Whereas both violent and nonviolent methods of resistance can bring the economy to a halt, the destructive impact of violence carries a human cost that is permanent and more severe. At higher levels of human development, there is more to lose in this respect. As the potential human cost of violence increases, domestic opposition groups become less inclined to put human advances at risk by reverting to violence. Finally, I include a Cold War dummy variable, which is coded "1" for the years 1945-1989, and "0" otherwise. This is to account for the propensity of rival global superpowers to expand their spheres of influence by supporting and enticing violent insurrections against governments that do not align with their interests.

Appendix B (Section B.1.2) presents the full results of the models that are estimated for the purpose of specification searches and robustness checks. The preferred models combine complexity with superior model fit to the data. Among the three most complex specifications (Models 5-7), model fit guides my selection of models for hypothesis testing and substantive interpretation. Table 4.2 displays the relevant results for the two least complex models among these (Models 5-6). These two models combine the raw version of the stock of democracy with the depreciated specification of the stock of dictatorship. The coefficients of both models lend considerable empirical support to Hypothesis 2. The stock of democracy pushes political campaigns in a more violent direction, whereas the stock of dictatorship pacifies them. More specifically, each additional year in the stock of democracy increases the odds of the use of a more violent method of resistance by about ten percent. Increasing the annually depreciated stock of dictatorship by the same amount corresponds to a factor change of about 0.83 in the odds of a more violent political campaign. Both empirical associations are statistically significant.

The findings about the onset of political campaigns presented in Section 4.2 call for two additional interpretations of the empirical results under consideration here. The first involves the specification of the democratic regime stock variable that offers

the best fit to the data. For the purpose of estimating political campaign onset, this concerns the 'raw' number of democratic regime years. When modeling the pacification of political campaigns, the natural log specification offers superior model fit. A consideration of the sequential 'steps' in the data-generating process may help to substantively link these two distinct measurement preferences. Insofar as political campaigns typically operate against the backdrop of relatively extensive experiences with democracy (which I infer from the finding that the stock of democracy spurs their emergence), the empirical manifestation of any additional democratic regime legacy effect upon political campaigns 'requires' an even more extensive democratic history. Accordingly, whereas the amount of democratic stock that is needed to further promote the initiation of a political campaign is discounted at higher levels of this stock (as indicated by a preference for the natural log specification in the previous section), the realization of an additional democratic legacy effect requires the incorporation of 'full' democratic regime years (hence the preference for the 'raw' regime stock variable when estimation the pacification of political campaigns).

Second, these empirical findings are consistent with my general claim that the stock of democracy radicalizes non-state political actors, and that the stock of dictatorship deradicalizes them. Yet in light of the finding presented in the previous section that the stock of dictatorship fails to suppress the emergence of political campaigns, the range of possible mechanisms driving the authoritarian stock-induced deradicalization of political actors is more limited than I initially proposed, in that the stock of dictatorship does not appear to deradicalize non-state political actors by weakening or eliminating them. Nonetheless, it does not rule out the remaining mechanisms, which treat the stock of dictatorship as a negative point of reference that elicits a commitment to democracy and as a source of power and policy entrenchment for members of the (former) authoritarian ruling coalition.

It remains to be seen, however, whether the effects of the regime stock variables differentiate as much between primarily violent and peaceful methods of coercion as among the two peaceful categories of resistance. That is, if the regime stock variables lack the explanatory power to account for why political campaigns are either primarily violent or peaceful, my argument carries more limited implications for domestic peace. To explore this issue, I estimate several multinomial logit models, where I no longer treat the original dependent variable as an ordinal variable, but as a nominal variable instead. By relaxing the assumption of a single order among the categories, I can readily identify how the regime stock variables affect each particular category. The original, raw regime stock variables offer the superior fit to the data, and are therefore part of the preferred model. All other specifications (in terms of control variables, the levels in the data structure, and the clustering of standard errors) remain the same. Unfortunately, only the models in which the most peaceful resistance category served as the reference category are compatible with model convergence.

Figures 4.2 and 4.3 visualize the regime legacy effects that are estimated by the most complex of these multinomial models. Figure 4.2 bodes well for my argument. As the stock of democracy grows, the mean predicted probability of a primarily violent method of resistance increases. Across the entire range of the stock of democracy, this corresponds to a difference of about .15. The predicted probabilities of the remaining two categories change in the opposite direction. The predictions for the most violent of these are displayed as well. Figure 4.3 tracks

Figure 4.2 Mean Predicted Probabilities of Political Campaign Pacification for the Stock of Democracy



Source: wkastart-DR-Global-33-21-Graphs-Campaign-Pacification-MLM-Fit-MNL-v01.do
Note: N = 1,213. Fitted Mixed Effects Model (Model 6). The ultimate outcome that was modeled was the use of violent as opposed to nonviolent coercion by the political campaign.

the effect of the stock of dictatorship, which yields a rather 'flat' prediction line for the most violent category across the entire range of the independent variable of interest. The mean predicted probability of a primarily violent method of coercion increases somewhat until countries accumulate about 45 years of authoritarian rule, after which it declines slowly. This suggests that the overall positive effect of the stock of dictatorship upon the pacification of the political campaign is driven by its differentiation of the two peaceful categories. The mean predicted probabilities for peaceful political campaigns with a radical flank, which are displayed as well, corroborate this interpretation, as they decline over the entire range of the stock of dictatorship. The pacifying legacy of dictatorship is thus limited to the conduct of peaceful political campaigns, where it prevents the development of a radical flank.

It is important to note that, in line with previous scholarship on the topic, which fails to consider regime legacy effects, the results of the ordered and multinomial logit regression models indicate that the immediately present political regime type exerts distinguishable effects upon the method of resistance, and does so partly in the expected directions. This contradicts the notion suggested in Chapter 1 (Section 1.6) that, unless regime stock variables are included as regressors, the effect of the political regime type masks regime legacy effects, and that this effect is therefore spurious. It also runs counter to the empirical finding of a positive empirical association between the level of democracy and violent as opposed to peaceful methods of resistance described in Chapters 1 (Sections 1.1, 1.2 and 1.6) and 2 (Section 2.2). Yet rather than supporting the domestic democratic peace proposition in these respects, these results echo the inverted-U relationship between democracy and (non-state) political violence described in Chapter 2 (Section 2.2). Consider the results of Model 6 presented in Table 4.2. Whereas being a democracy (as opposed to a non-democracy) pacifies the method of resistance, the magnitude of this effect is largest when hybrid regimes serve as the reference category. Compared to democracy, hybrid regimes increase the odds of using more violent coercive means

Figure 4.3 Mean Predicted Probabilities of Political Campaign Pacification for the Stock of Dictatorship



Source: wkastart-DR-Global-33-21-Graphs-Campaign-Pacification-MLM-Fit-MNL-v01.do
Note: N = 1,213. Fitted Mixed Effects Model (Model 6). The ultimate outcome that was modeled was the use of violent as opposed to nonviolent coercion by the political campaign.

by a factor of almost 27, whereas dictatorship does so by a factor of almost 13. In the multinomial version of this model (not displayed), the democracy-dictatorship contrast even fails to differentiate between the most violent and peaceful categories of resistance.[22] Here, too, hybrid regimes emerge as the main 'culprit', in that relative to democracy it increases the odds of both violent categories over the most peaceful method of coercion.

Table 4.3 presents the results of a more complex model, which includes interaction terms, and involves the 'raw' specification of the regime stock variables, which offers the best fit to the data among the models of this level of complexity. The results reveal that the regime legacy effects identified previously do not hold under all political regime types. To be sure, at the .90 significance level, the stock of democracy remains exerting a positive effect upon the odds of using violence over nonviolence under all political regime types. Yet at the .95 significance level this effect is only distinguishable from zero in hybrid regime contexts. Likewise, whereas the stock of dictatorship remains empirically associated with the outcome variable in the expected, negative direction in democracies, it fails to exert any significant effects under the remaining two forms of government. Whereas these results contest the general applicability of my theory across different regime contexts, they also pass the first empirical hoop test referred to above, in that they support the hypothesis in the 'most likely' cases of democratic political campaign-years, albeit only at the .90 significance level. In the 'least likely' non-democratic observations, the results falsify my argument about authoritarian legacies; at the 0.95 significance level, they also do so with respect to democratic legacy effects in authoritarian regimes.

These differential and conditional effects are not accounted for by my original argument, and call for a consideration of additional conceptual and causal links be-

[22] See wkastart-DR-Global-33-11-Estimation-Campaign-Pacification-MLM-Fit-Country-MNL-v02.

Table 4.3 Ordered Logistic Multilevel Mixed Effects Regression Models for Political Campaign Pacification (Global Sample of Independent Countries, 1945-2006)

	(7-Dem)		(7-Hyb)		(7-Dic)	
	M07-Dem		M07-Hyb		M07-Dic	
	e^{β}	SE	e^{β}	SE	e^{β}	SE
The Stock of Democracy	1.08*	(0.04)	1.09**	(0.04)	1.09*	(0.05)
The Stock of Dictatorship	0.90**	(0.04)	0.97	(0.02)	0.97	(0.03)
Political Regime Type						
Democracy			0.28	(0.25)	0.85	(1.28)
Hybrid Regime	3.57	(3.12)			3.04	(4.02)
Dictatorship	1.17	(1.77)	0.33	(0.44)		
Interaction Terms						
The Stock of Dem. × Dem.			0.99	(0.06)	0.98	(0.06)
The Stock of Dem. × Hyb.	1.01	(0.06)			0.99	(0.03)
The Stock of Dem. × Dict.	1.02	(0.06)	1.01	(0.04)		
The Stock of Dict. × Dem.			0.93**	(0.03)	0.93**	(0.03)
The Stock of Dict. × Hyb.	1.07**	(0.04)			1.00	(0.02)
The Stock of Dict. × Dict.	1.07**	(0.04)	1.00	(0.02)		
Wald χ^2	211.73		211.74		211.73	
Prob. > Wald χ^2	0.000		0.000		0.000	
AIC	626.90		626.90		626.90	
BIC	759.52		759.52		759.52	
Countries	92		92		92	
Years per Country (Average)	13.2		13.2		13.2	
Political Campaigns	193		193		193	
Years per Political Campaign (Average)	6.3		6.3		6.3	
Observations	1,213		1,213		1,213	

Source: wkastart-DR-Global-33-01-Estimation-Campaign-Pacification-MLM-Fit-Country-v02.do

Note: Only substantively relevant coefficients are displayed. For the interaction model (Model 7), three different sets of estimates are displayed, one for each reference category of the current political regime type. The unit of analysis is the political campaign-year. The ultimate outcome that was modeled was the use of violent as opposed to nonviolent coercion by the political campaign. Random intercepts at the level of countries. Country-clustered standard errors. See Appendix B.1.5 (Section B.1.2) for the full results, and the results of more parsimonious models and alternative estimation techniques.

* $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$. Standard errors in parentheses.

tween the concepts incorporated in my theory. In light of these empirical findings, I extend my argument by incorporating the assumption that moderate non-state political actors are less likely to initiate a political campaign in democracies than in dictatorships and (to a lesser extent) hybrid regimes. This is because democratic institutions are more likely to produce moderate policies, i.e., policies that take into account the interests of a broad spectrum of political actors. By contrast, for moderate political actors opposed to the government, authoritarian institutions block access to institutional channels of political influence, while at the same time advancing policies that take into account only a narrow set of preferences. As a result, under dictatorship coercive political campaigns become a more effective alternative for influencing government policies or bringing down the authoritarian regime altogether and installing a democracy. Moderate political actors are moderate about policy, and therefore tend to be radical about democracy.[23] For instance, in Chile in 1983 several political actors joined forces to mount a political campaign to oust Pinochet and his authoritarian government.[24] This coalition included labor unions and the Alianza Democrática, which was a party-centered umbrella organization that united the Christian Democrats and the Socialist Party. All these political actors espoused moderation.[25] Accordingly, their political campaign was peaceful and centered around demonstrations and strikes.

By contrast, whereas democracy encourages radical non-state political actors to pursue their objectives through political institutions, their behavior in dictatorship is indeterminate, as it depends on whether or not they are a member of the

[23] Mainwaring and Pérez-Liñán, 2013c.

[24] Chenoweth, 2011.

[25] Mainwaring and Pérez-Liñán, 2013a.

authoritarian ruling coalition. To be sure, for radical political actors that are opposed to the government, dictatorship blocks the institutional path to establishing their own dictatorship. Apart from acquiescence, coercing the government into relinquishing state power remains the only alternative course of action. For example, in Nicaragua the political exclusion of broad segments of the population under the Somoza dictatorship (1967-1979) also disadvantaged radical left-wing groups. In the early 1960s, this encouraged some of them to establish the Frente Sandinista de Liberación Nacional (FSLN; commonly referred to as the "Sandinistas"), a left-wing guerrilla organization. Supported by the Catholic Church and middle- and upper-class segments of the population, in 1978 the Sandinistas launched a successful violent political campaign against the Somoza government, which they defeated in the following year.[26] Thus, in this instance, dictatorship not only encouraged radical opposition groups to initiate and support a political campaign, but in doing so also revealed their violent inclinations.

Yet this does not hold for radical allies of the government. Under dictatorship, they have no reason to rebel. In the absence of competitive elections and executive constraints, the government can fully implement its radical policies, and thereby appease its allies, solidify the authoritarian ruling coalition, and prevent armed rebellion emanating from within its own ranks. For example, the ruling coalition that sustained Stroessner's longstanding authoritarian regime in Paraguay (1954-1989) included the ruling party (the Colorado Party) and the military.[27] The dictatorship offered these allies of the government a stake in the regime, in that its authoritarian institutions granted them full and continued access to state power. For more than three decades, these radical government supporters saw no reason to leave the ruling coalition and rebel against the government. It is only when Stroessner overstepped authoritarian institutions by hand-picking his successor (choosing his son) without the approval of the military and the Colorado Party that the military decided to intervene (1989).

These assumptions account for the conditional regime legacy effects upon political campaign pacification registered in Table 4.3, where both hypothesized effects hold under democracy (albeit only at the .90 significance level), but less so under dictatorship and hybrid regimes. The theoretical implication is that among already active political campaigns in any given authoritarian political context, by default moderate political actors take up a greater share in the composition of political challengers than is the case under democracy, even if there are relatively few moderate political actors present to begin with. As such, the composition of political challengers in authoritarian contexts reflects the overall share of radical and moderate political actors less accurately than is the case under democracy. Political campaign pacification is therefore associated more strongly with the relative share of moderate and radical political actors in democracies than in any given dictatorship. Because regime legacies shape the radicalism and moderation of political actors generally, and not merely those who are actively resisting the government, the implications for political campaign pacification of (de)radicalizing regime legacies are manifested more consistently in democracies than in dictatorships.

Hybrid regimes create a similar 'distortion', but to a lesser degree than is the case with dictatorship. Whereas hybrid regime contexts encourage moderate oppo-

[26] Chenoweth, 2011; Mainwaring and Pérez-Liñán, 2013a.
[27] Mainwaring and Pérez-Liñán, 2013a.

Figure 4.4 Mean Predicted Probabilities of Political Campaign Pacification for the Stock of Democracy



Source: wkastart-DR-Global-33-06-Graphs-Campaign-Pacification-MLM-Fit-v02.do
Note: N = 1,213. Fitted Mixed Effects Model (Model 7, presented in Table 4.3). The ultimate outcome that was modeled was the use of violent as opposed to nonviolent coercion by the political campaign.

sition groups to challenge the government outside political institutions, the prospect of defeating the government through competitive (but unfair) elections is real. Accordingly, their inclination to initiate a political campaigns is stronger than under democracy, but weaker than under dictatorship. The same applies to their radical counterparts. Likewise, whereas radical allies of governments that rule through hybrid regimes enjoy privileged access to the power of the state, the relatively pluralist regime context puts at risk the attainment of their preferred policies. This weakens their stake in the regime, possibly to the extent of encouraging them to leave the ruling coalition and rebel against their erstwhile partners in government.

Figures 4.4 and 4.5 offer visualizations of the magnitudes of these interaction effects. Figure 4.4 indicates that, on average, a political campaign operating in an incipient democracy has a 70 percent chance of adopting a primarily violent as opposed to a primarily peaceful method of resistance. At the end of the first three decades of democracy, this predicted risk of violence over nonviolence has grown to about 80 percent. It exceeds 90 percent after about four additional decades of democracy, and approximates 95 percent as the stock of democracy reaches its within-sample maximum of 106 years. In hybrid regimes without any previous experience with democracy, the predicted probability of a primarily violent coercive method is about 88 percent. This increases over the entire sample range of the stock of democracy, at the end of which it approximates 100 percent.

The effect of the stock of dictatorship (illustrated in Figure 4.5) in democratic political contexts is even more considerable if considered over its entire range, partly because there is plenty of 'room' for the mean predicted probability of the most violent category, equal to about 0.90 when the stock of dictatorship is at its minimum, to decline. In equally democratic political contexts, the average risk of applying a primarily violent method of coercion drops below 80 percent if the political campaign operates against the backdrop of about three preceding decades of authoritarian rule. If such authoritarian experiences are increased by about two additional decades, this

Figure 4.5 Mean Predicted Probabilities of Political Campaign Pacification for the Stock of Dictatorship



Source: wkastart-DR-Global-33-06-Graphs-Campaign-Pacification-MLM-Fit-v02.do
Note: N = 1,213. Fitted Mixed Effects Model (Model 7, presented in Table 4.3). The ultimate outcome that was modeled was the use of violent as opposed to nonviolent coercion by the political campaign.

risk drops below 70 percent. For political campaigns that are active in democratic countries that have accumulated the highest within-sample stock of dictatorship of 105 years, the mean predicted probability of a primarily violent method of resistance is reduced to about 30 percent.

4.4 Political Campaign Mobilization

I use a similar empirical strategy as in Section 4.3 to model the extent of popular involvement in political campaigns, and test Hypothesis 3:

> **Hypothesis 3** *A greater stock of democracy (dictatorship) increases (reduces) the mobilization of the political campaign.*

The unit of analysis remains the political campaign-year. The dependent variables measures the number of political campaign activists expressed as a percentage of the total population, and categorized along a six-point scale. For the same reasons discussed above, ordered logistic MLM serves as the preferred estimation technique. In addition, I specify random intercepts at the level of countries and political campaigns, and include country-clustered standard errors, as well as a cubic polynomial of time, where the time variable equals the number of years since the start of the political campaign.

The full model contains all the control variables that were included in Model 7 of Section 4.2, and mostly for similar reasons. First, I expect non-democratic forms of government to boost ordinary people's participation in political campaigns, because individuals living in these political contexts are not offered effective channels of political influence. The inclusion of interaction terms between the political regime type and the regime stock variables serves the purpose of testing the robustness of my argument in the form of a series of empirical hoop tests, as I still expect to observe the

hypothesized empirical associations in the 'least likely' case of democracy, which even encourages disaffected citizens to participate in political institutions. To the extent that the hypothesis under scrutiny in this section holds in increasingly democratic environments, my argument passes more demanding hoop tests.

The three state repression control variables account for the deterrent and incapacitating effects of state-imposed costs upon collective action. Such costs deter ordinary people from challenging the government, thus diminishing the mobilization of political campaigns. In addition, repressive interventions such as curfews and travel bans yield a similar effect by limiting people's capacity to participate in political campaign activities. I also control for the pacification of the political campaign, which accounts for the demobilizing effect of the use of violent as opposed to nonviolent methods of resistance. I expect the success of the political campaign at each point in its existence to boost mobilization levels as well. Its victories enhance its perceived effectiveness among ordinary people, thereby increasing the payoff of participation among those who already discount the costs of political activism. I therefore control for the progress that is booked by the political campaign, as measured in the NAVCO dataset (Version 2.0) by the variable *progress*. This 5-scale variable registers the extent to which the government conceded desired policies to the political campaign. I also include several socio-economic and demographic control variables (life expectancy, urbanization, economic development, and economic growth) that proxy for the availability of resources that ordinary people need to participate in politics. Material and physical well-being expands their range of activities, while urbanization facilitates the development of social capital that draws them into political activism. Finally, I control for bipolarity in the international state system through the inclusion of a Cold War dummy variable, which marks the distinction between the years 1945-1989 and the post-Cold War era. This accounts for the tendency of rival superpowers to sustain and strengthen opposition movements that are fighting against hostile governments.

The full range of estimated models are presented in Appendix B (Section B.1.3). Comparisons of model fit indicate that among the second and third most complex MLM models, those that include the natural log specification of the regime stock variables outperform the models that operationalize these variables using the raw or depreciated number of years of regime experiences. Among the full MLM models, which include the interaction terms between the contemporaneous political regime type and the regime stock variables, a combination of the original variable (for the stock of democracy) and its logged version (for the stock of dictatorship) is preferred. Hence I present the results of two sets of preferred models. The first of these is displayed in Table 4.4, and involves two models that use the natural log specification of the regime stock variables, and exclude the interaction terms. Both models only yield null findings as far as my hypothesis is concerned. The empirical associations between the regime stock variables and political campaign mobilization is indistinguishable from zero in both these models.

Table 4.5 displays the results of the remaining, most complex preferred model, which includes the interaction terms. The estimates offer only limited support for my argument. The model yields a significant effect in the expected direction of the stock of democracy, but only in hybrid regime contexts. In democratic and authoritarian regimes, no regime legacy effects are registered. Thus, in hybrid regimes, increases in the stock of democracy spur the mobilization of political campaigns, but contrary to

Table 4.4 Ordinal Logistic Multilevel Mixed Effects Regression Models for Political Campaign Mobilization, Natural Log Specification (Global Sample of Independent Countries, 1945-2006)

	(5)		(6)	
	M05		M06	
	e^{β}	SE	e^{β}	SE
The Stock of Democracy (ln)	1.63	(1.00)	1.54	(0.97)
The Stock of Dictatorship (ln)	1.58	(0.75)	1.59	(0.59)
Political Regime Type (Base: "Democracy")				
Hybrid Regime	1.71	(1.14)	1.68	(1.05)
Dictatorship	1.52	(1.36)	1.60	(1.42)
Wald χ^2	110.35		109.59	
Prob. > Wald χ^2	0.000		0.000	
AIC	2350.35		2297.54	
BIC	2471.30		2427.85	
Countries	87		85	
Years per Country (Average)	13.1		13.1	
Political Campaigns	188		180	
Years per Political Campaign (Average)	6.1		6.2	
Observations	1,141		1,110	

Source: wkastart-DR-Global-37-02-Estimation-Campaign-Mobilization-MLM-Fit-Campaign-Natural-Log-v02.do

Note: Only substantively relevant coefficients are displayed. The unit of analysis is the political campaign-year. The ultimate outcome that was modeled was the increase in the mobilization of the political campaign. Ordinal Logistic Multilevel Mixed Effects Regression Model. Random intercepts at the levels of countries and political campaigns. Country-clustered standard errors. See Appendix B (Section B.1.3) for the full results and results for more parsimonious models.

* p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01. Standard errors in parentheses.

my theory, the stock of dictatorship fails to exert any statistically significant effect. This result suggests that, at least in hybrid regimes, once historical experiences with democracy instill in ordinary people a sense of political self-empowerment, extensive periods of authoritarian rule are unable to diminish it. In addition, the findings cast doubt upon my claim that for ordinary people extensive authoritarian experiences serve as a negative benchmark to assess the responsiveness of contemporaneous hybrid political institutions. Nevertheless, they suggest that previous instances of democracy raise popular expectations in this respect. Ordinary people thus display more resilience and resistance than I initially argued.

In its current form, my argument does not account for this particular conditional effect. I therefore modify my theory as follows. I assume that in democracies, electoral campaigns outperform political campaigns in their efforts to mobilize *alienated* (or *disaffected*) individuals, a term that designates those who are characterized by weak external political efficacy. This contradicts my initial assumption that alienated individuals are more likely than their *allegiant* counterparts (who harbor strong levels of external political efficacy) to actively participate in political campaigns, irrespective of the current political regime type.[28] Under democracy, political alienation is more likely to be channeled through political institutions than through political campaigns. Democratic institutions offer politically alienated citizens a relatively cost-effective means to change the institutions to which their perceptions of powerlessness are externalized, and therefore discourage them to participate in political activities that operate outside political institutions, including political campaigns. Likewise, democracy offers radical political actors the electoral route to dictatorship, which incurs less costs than imposing authoritarian rule by force. Radical political actors therefore tend to exploit environments that combine democratic institutions with political alienation among the general population by running electoral campaigns on populist or anti-democratic platforms. In a similar

[28] I adopt the labels "alienated" and "allegiant" from Seligson (1980).

Table 4.5 Ordinal Logistic Multilevel Mixed Effects Regression Models for Political Campaign Mobilization, Interaction Model, Regime Stock Variables with Best Fit (Global Sample of Independent Countries, 1945-2006)

	(7-Dem)		(7-Hyb)		(7-Dic)	
	M07-Dem		M07-Hyb		M07-Dic	
	e^{β}	SE	e^{β}	SE	e^{β}	SE
The Stock of Democracy	0.98	(0.10)	1.22***	(0.09)	1.07	(0.10)
The Stock of Dictatorship (ln)	1.04	(0.57)	2.08	(1.02)	1.55	(0.87)
Political Regime Type						
Democracy			19.86**	(23.87)	6.22	(12.05)
Hybrid Regime	0.05**	(0.06)			0.31	(0.55)
Dictatorship	0.16	(0.31)	3.19	(5.62)		
Interaction Terms						
The Stock of Dem. × Dem.			0.80***	(0.07)	0.92	(0.10)
The Stock of Dem. × Hyb.	1.25***	(0.11)			1.14	(0.11)
The Stock of Dem. × Dict.	1.09	(0.12)	0.88	(0.08)		
The Stock of Dict. (ln) × Dem.			0.50***	(0.13)	0.68	(0.32)
The Stock of Dict. (ln) × Hyb.	1.99***	(0.52)			1.34	(0.62)
The Stock of Dict. (ln) × Dict.	1.48	(0.71)	0.74	(0.34)		
Wald χ^2	158.60		158.60		158.60	
Prob. > Wald χ^2	0.000		0.000		0.000	
AIC	2276.66		2276.66		2276.66	
BIC	2427.03		2427.03		2427.03	
Countries	85		85		85	
Years per Country (Average)	13.1		13.1		13.1	
Political Campaigns	180		180		180	
Years per Political Campaign (Average)	6.2		6.2		6.2	
Observations	1,110		1,110		1,110	

Source: wkastart-DR-Global-37-09-Estimation-Campaign-Mobilization-MLM-Fit-Campaign-Best-v01.do

Note: Only substantively relevant coefficients are displayed. The unit of analysis is the political campaign-year. The ultimate outcome that was modeled was the increase in the mobilization of the political campaign. Ordinal Logistic Multilevel Mixed Effects Regression Model. Random intercepts at the levels of countries and political campaigns. Country-clustered standard errors. Three different sets of estimates are displayed, one for each reference category of the current political regime type. See Appendix B (Section B.1.3) for the full results and results for more parsimonious models.

* $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$. Standard errors in parentheses.

vein, rather than initiating a protest campaign, moderate political actors that operate under democracy mobilize alienated citizens through the ballot box by pledging to further expand democracy. For these reasons, when political campaigns do occur in democracies, they lose out to political actors running electoral campaigns in their competition for active popular involvement among alienated segments of the population. Insofar as the stock of democracy increases the pool of politically alienated and active citizens, this is nevertheless unlikely to translate into greater mobilization levels of political campaigns. Furthermore, because of its inherent institutional responsiveness, democracy may strengthen external political efficacy to the point that it overwhelms the effect of the stock of democracy, thus diminishing the pool of politically alienated individuals. In non-democratic political contexts, the situation is reversed. Here, the relative cost-effectiveness of political campaigns vis-à-vis electoral campaigns and political institutions is greater than under democracy. In the absence of democracy, the behavioral implication of political alienation is therefore more likely to take the form of mass participation in political campaigns.

For instance, in Mexico's incipient democracy, the peaceful political campaign that was set up in 2006 to contest the outcome of that year's presidential election attracted tens of thousands of active supporters. Yet this was considerably less than was the case in Argentina's, Brazil's and Uruguay's peaceful protest campaigns in the 1980s, which sought to re-establish democracy. At its peak in 1983, the pro-democracy movement in Argentina (1977-1983) involved hundreds of thousands of participants, as was the case in Uruguay in 1984. Their Brazilian counterpart (1984-1985) offers an even starker contrast with the Mexican case, as it attracted more than a million activists.[29] All four political campaigns were vocal about the

[29] Chenoweth, 2011.

need for responsive political institutions, but their call to organized resistance only resonated in political contexts were such institutions were truly lacking, as was the case at the time in Argentina, Brazil and Uruguay. By contrast, the accusations of fraudulent elections leveled at the government by Mexico's 2006 political campaign lacked credibility in a democratic context, which in turn depressed its mobilization level.

Similar differences exist among violent political campaigns, which tend to attract less active participants than their peaceful counterparts.[30] For example, in their armed struggle against Colombia's Conservative Party-led government, which ruled on the basis of somewhat competitive elections and unconstrained executive authority, several opposition groups associated with the Partido Liberal were able to mobilize tens of thousands of fighters for their cause, which culminated into widespread rural violence known as La Violencia (1948-1958). Likewise, operating in a hybrid regime context, the Contras in Nicaragua were able to mobilize similar levels of active popular involvement in their violent political campaign against the Sandinista government (1980-1990). That is markedly more than the extent of mass participation in the terrorist campaign of the Tupamaros in Uruguay against two successive democratic governments (1963-1967; 1967-1972), which failed to enlist more than ten thousand recruits. The Tupamaros were convinced that they were unable to obtain their policy preferences under democracy, yet democracy's inherent institutional responsiveness discouraged ordinary people from joining their ranks. By contrast, Colombia's and Nicaragua's non-democratic political institutions offered ordinary people no viable alternative to participating in coercive political activities.[31]

This explanation accounts for the positive effect of the stock of democracy upon political campaign mobilization in hybrid regimes, and for why this effect is absent in democracies. To be sure, opposition parties operating in hybrid regimes can compete in elections, mobilize alienated voters and defeat the incumbent government. But unconstrained by strong and independent judges and legislatures, such governments are able to create an unequal level playing field that severely disadvantages their electoral opponents. Under these circumstances, political campaigns emerge as a more viable alternative for both political opposition groups and disaffected citizens.

Yet the absence of a significant effect under dictatorship calls for a further modification of my theory. By definition, dictatorships repress autonomous opposition political parties and their activities. Whereas this makes effective electoral mobilization hard if not impossible, it also diminishes the organizational capacity of these electoral contenders to assist political campaigns in their mobilization drives. By contrast, the political freedoms available to opposition political parties in hybrid regimes, though not as expansive as is the case under democracy, can be harnessed by them to help political campaigns mobilize alienated activists. Several examples of political campaign mobilization mentioned previously are useful here as well. Among instances of peaceful political campaigns, the proposed mechanism aptly describes crucial stages in several of Latin America's Third Wave transitions to democracy. In 1983, Argentina's military dictatorship liberalized its regime by lifting bans on opposition political parties and restrictions on their activities, and ceded power to a civilian government aligned with its adversaries. These measures empowered political opposition groups, such that for the first time since

[30] Chenoweth and Stephan, 2011.
[31] Chenoweth, 2011.

they initiated their pro-democracy movement in 1977 they were able to mobilize hundreds of thousands of activists behind their cause of holding elections and reintroducing democracy. Whereas comparable participation estimates are unavailable for Chile's pro-democracy movement (1983-1989), the final years of the Pinochet regime involve a similar institutional environment, where party bans were lifted and free campaigning was allowed for a referendum on the regime's future (1988) and a presidential election (1989). Likewise, under the banner of "Diretas Já" ("General Elections Now"), and operating in a somewhat longer-established hybrid regime context, Brazil's pro-democracy movement managed to mobilize more than a million activists.

Where violent campaign mobilization is at play, the government's tolerance of opposition political parties and their activities that falls short of democracy carries a similar implication. For instance, throughout the late 1940s and 1950s, the institutionalized presence of both the ruling Conservative Party and its adversaries of the Liberal Party further fueled the intraparty violence that plagued Colombia's countryside, as it eased the transition of these parties' local infrastructure into armed groups capable of carrying out organized efforts to recruit tens of thousands of fighters. In Nicaragua's civil war (1980-1990), the support the rebel Contras received from autonomous opposition parties was more subtle, but equally relevant in this respect. Throughout the 1980s, the ruling Sandistas offered their conservative opponents considerable room to compete for electoral support. Whereas this was not enough to create a level playing field, it allowed political parties to campaign freely, including on the salient issue of the ongoing civil war. Yet it was not until the Sandistas pledged to hold democratic elections in 1990 that their conservative electoral opponents openly backed an international agreement that involved the military demobilization and disarmament of the Contras. Instead, until the government offered its democratic concession in 1989, the loose coalition of conservative parties either signaled ambivalence towards, or tacit approval of armed struggle against the Sandinistas. Either way, in a competitive political environment where the explicit disapproval among all major political parties of the Contras' violent resistance would have carried considerable credibility, the absence of such vocal opposition enabled the Contras to sustain their recruitment levels.

The superior fit to the data of this interaction model in comparison with those that include the natural log and depreciated specifications of the stock of democracy may reflect the underlying data-generating process that determines the selection of political campaign-years. I applied the same reasoning in Section 4.3. Because the stock of democracy spurs the emergence of political campaigns only if this stock is increasingly discounted as it grows, any additional democracy legacy effect requires a greater stock of regime years. As a result, the 'raw' number of democratic regime years is preferably not discounted at higher values for modeling purposes.

Furthermore, the superior fit offered by this 'raw' operationalization of the stock of democracy also allows for a substantive interpretation that places an even greater emphasis upon the capacity of political actors to mobilize popular support for their political campaigns, even when alienation is limited among the population. If the natural log specification of the stock of democracy would have offered a better fit in this respect, it would have diminished the importance of increases in the stock of democracy once this stock is already considerable, as they increase political campaign mobilization only marginally. Considering that countries that amassed

the greatest stock of democracy generally also built up extensive experiences with democracy early on in the twentieth century, in effect such a finding would have discounted these early democratic experiences in terms of their contributions to the mobilization of relatively recent political campaigns. Since personal regime experiences often cannot extend back to these early regime histories, this carries an important substantive implication, in that the mobilizing effect of the stock of democracy would have appeared to be primarily driven by more proximate, personal regime experiences, rather than by political history writ-large. By contrast, the interaction model represented in Table 4.5 does not in effect discount the importance of early democratic regime histories for the stock of democracy's mobilizing effect, but imply that they carry as much importance as more recent ones in this respect. Since the regime experiences of political actors and their organizational predecessors may extend back to these early regime histories, this mobilizing effect may in fact operate at the level of political actors and their political campaigns.[32] The relatively weak fit offered by the inclusion of the depreciated regime stock variables is consistent with this interpretation, since they explicitly discount earlier regime experiences.

Modifying my theory along these lines extends the implications of my claims about the regime stock-induced organizational capacity to political campaign mobilization. That is, by strengthening the organizational resources of non-state political actors, the stock of democracy also enhances their capacity to mobilize activists for their electoral and political campaigns. In authoritarian political contexts, this effect is muted as a result of the repression of political parties. Under democracy, this effect takes the form of electoral mobilization. It is only in hybrid regimes that this effect is translated into political campaign mobilization. Nevertheless, the continued relevance of early democratic histories may also signal persistent intergenerational socialization effects that shape individual-level efficacious attitudes at several levels of analysis, including through parental and educational socialization. Indeed, and more importantly for the current testing purposes, the empirical results do not rule out the proposed links between the stock of democracy and political efficacy, which, after all, operate at the level of individuals. Instead, they suggest that an alienated and politicized populace merely constitutes an attitudinal resource that political actors at the helm of political (and electoral) campaigns can exploit for mobilizational purposes. Understood this way, greater experiences with democracy do not only equip these political actors with the organizational capacity to harvest this particular resource, they also help to create it in the first place. Chapter 6 subjects the latter assertion to empirical scrutiny.

In order to illustrate the magnitude of the gap between the various conditional legacy effects, and determine at which ordinal category of the response variable the direction of the estimated effect changes, I plot the mean predicted probabilities of each category against the stock of democracy. Figure 4.6 presents the plot for the highest category of political campaign mobilization, which concerns the active involvement of more than one percent of the domestic population. Within the range of twenty-to-thirty-five years of democratic experiences, the stock of democracy is roughly proportional to the mean predicted probability of mobilization exceeding one percent of the population. Within this range, the change in the mean prediction is considerable, starting at about 0.30 and ending at about 0.80. Five additional years of democracy yields a predicted probability of 0.90. A comparison with the

[32] Pérez-Liñán and Mainwaring, 2013.

Figure 4.6 Mean Predicted Probabilities of the Highest Category of Political Campaign Mobilization for the Stock of Democracy



Source: wkastart-DR-Global-37-11-Graphs-Campaign-Mobilization-MLM-Fit-v02.do
Note: N = 1,110. Fitted Ordinal Logistic Multilevel Mixed Effects Regression Model (Model 7, presented in Table 4.5). The ultimate outcome that was modeled was the increase in political campaign mobilization.

other plots (not displayed) reveals that the positive effect of the stock of democracy in hybrid regimes takes the form of tilting political participation towards the highest category, while reducing the mean predicted probabilities of the four lowest categories of political campaign mobilization. On average, the category in between becomes more likely as the country accumulates twenty years of democratic experiences, after which its predicted probability declines.

4.5 State Repression Scope

In this section, I begin examining the repressive measures of governments in response to ongoing political campaigns. I explore democratic and authoritarian regime legacy effects upon the scope of state repression, thereby testing Hypothesis 4:

> **Hypothesis 4** *During political campaigns, a greater stock of democracy (dictatorship) reduces (increases) the scope of state repression.*

The dependent variable is measured at the ordinal level, distinguishing between a "limited", "intermediate", and "broad" scope of country-wide state repression. Because the response variable is measured at the level of the country-year, treating the political campaign-year as the unit of analysis violates the assumption of independent observations, because political campaigns operating in the same country-year are necessarily assigned the same value of state repression scope. Therefore, I develop a more aggregate unit of analysis by collapsing the political campaign-year data across country-years, thus creating a dataset that distinguishes between country-specific political campaign-spells. Accordingly, the unit of analysis is the country-political campaign-spell-year (CPCSY).

I include several of the control variables presented previously. First, I control for the political regime type. Governments incur higher costs for their repressive

interventions under democracy than is the case under hybrid regimes and, to a greater extent, under dictatorship. Such costs come in the form of losing office in the wake of an electoral defeat, and sanctions imposed by the legislature and the judiciary, such as investigations, policy vetoes, criminal prosecution, and impeachment. These costs deter governments from using and expanding the scope of repression. I thus expect higher levels of democracy to reduce the scope of state repression. To further test the robustness of my argument through a series of more direct, empirical hoop tests, the full model also includes interaction terms between the political regime type and the regime stock variables. The motivation behind this approach is similar to that of Section 4.2. At the very least, I expect the evidence to validate the hypothesis among the 'most likely' cases of dictatorship. This is because authoritarian governments lack the political institutions capable of resolving the underlying conflict with the political campaign. Indeed, these political institutions themselves are often the point of contention that helped spark the political campaign. Without any alternative, institutional methods of political control at their disposal, authoritarian governments therefore harbor a baseline inclination to impose repression upon challengers. I expect the stock of democracy and the stock of dictatorship to weaken and strengthen, respectively, their capacity to do so. In democratic and hybrid regime contexts, this predisposition to repress is weaker or even absent. The coercive capacity of governments is therefore less consequential for the scope of state repression in these more democratic environments. To the extent that the hypothesis nonetheless holds in these 'least likely' cases, the validity of my theoretical argument is strengthened.

I additionally control for political campaign mobilization, arguing that more mobilized political campaigns are more coercive and therefore pose a greater threat to governments, which is more likely to provoke officials into expanding the scope of state repression. Collapsing the data across country-years requires specifying an aggregation rule about how to treat conflicting values if the information of multiple political campaigns is collapsed to a single observation. To construct the political campaign mobilization variable, I add the point estimates of the percentage scores, and assign them to one of the following percentage categories: 0-0.001% ("0"), 0.001-0.01% ("1"), 0.01-0.1% ("2"), 0.1-0.5% ("3"), 0.5-1% ("4"), and $> 1\%$ ("5"). This ensures that the variable captures the popular involvement of all political campaigns combined. For a similar reason, I include political campaign pacification as a control variable. Violent resistance poses a greater threat to governments than its peaceful counterpart, because its destructive impact is lasting, and because it puts at risk their physical survival. With more at stake, governments are more inclined to quell the resistance they face through repression. I apply a downward bias to the operationalization of this variable, and code each CPCSY as violent unless at least one of the political campaigns involved was peaceful, which is a category that includes political campaigns with a radical flank.

From the perspective of the government, the repressive measures themselves may do more harm than good, as they deplete the societal and economic resources that it would otherwise be able to extract to further its own ends. By standing in the way of economic activities, violations of the freedom of assembly and association, and other restrictions such as travel bans and curfews weaken the tax base of governments. Through the depletion of human capital, state violence weakens their tax base in a more permanent fashion. Because they reflect how much resources

are at risk of destruction, I expect economic development, economic growth and urbanization to reduce state repression, and include them as control variables.

The full range of estimated models is presented in Appendix B (B.1.4). For reasons already discussed, the preferred estimation technique is the ordinal logistic MLM model, specified with random intercepts at the level of countries and country-political campaign-spells, country-clustered standard errors, and a cubic polynomial of time, where the time variable equals the number of years since 1899. It is important to note that this operationalization of time is different from the one I used in Sections 4.3-4.4 (where I measure time in years since the emergence of the political campaign), even though the units of analysis are similar (i.e., defined by the presence of a political campaign). Measuring time in terms of an out-of-sample point of reference carries more validity in this research context, because the outcome of interest also operates beyond the realm of political campaigns. Indeed, the sample I use to measure the scope of state repression encompasses country-year observations with and without an ongoing political campaign. As such, the 'history' of the dependent variable is not confined to political campaign spells. Temporal dependencies are thus better captured by a time variable that has a broader coverage. For the same reasons discussed in Section 4.2, a time variable that 'starts' in 1900 (rather than at the year of independence) offers the substantively valid coverage. This also renders the inclusion of period effects (such as through a Cold War dummy variable) unnecessary.

Below I present the relevant results of the three most preferred models among these, which combine model complexity with a better fit to the data. Table 4.6 presents the results for the two models among these that exclude the interaction effects. Model 5 also includes the natural log specification of the regime stock variables, whereas Model 6 only does so for the stock of dictatorship, while using the 'raw' number of years for the stock of democracy. In both models, the estimates fail to offer any evidence in support of Hypothesis 4, but merely involve null findings instead. At the .90 significance level, Model 5 even yields a negative effect for the stock of dictatorship. I interpret this and a similar finding within the context of the interaction model below. It is important to note that the results of the models discussed here strongly support the domestic democratic peace proposition, in that in all models, democracy as opposed to hybrid regimes and especially dictatorship exerts a significant and strongly negative effect upon the scope of state repression.

Table 4.7 presents the results of the most complex model, which includes the interaction terms. The model specification combines the 'raw' number of years for the stock of democracy, and the logged operationalization for the stock of dictatorship. Together, the estimates offer compelling evidence to reject Hypothesis 4 in its entirety. First, the stock of democracy fails to exert any statistically significant effects under any of the three political regime types. Second, under dictatorship, the effect of the stock of dictatorship is negative and statistically significant. At the .90 significance level, this is also true for its effect in democratic contexts. As such, the hypothesis that is most in line with the domestic democratic peace proposition is the only hypothesis that is categorically falsified.

The direction of the significant effect(s) of the stock of dictatorship is the opposite of what I expect, and disqualifies the coercive capacity of the state apparatus as a key mediator variable linking authoritarian legacies to the scope of state repression, as this would in effect imply that such legacies weaken this repressive

Table 4.6 Ordinal Logistic Mixed Effects Regression Models for State Repression Scope, Regime Stock Variables with Best Fit (Global Sample of Independent Countries, 1945-2006)

	(5)		(6)	
	M0502		M06	
	e^{β}	SE	e^{β}	SE
The Stock of Democracy			1.03	(0.04)
The Stock of Democracy (ln)	0.84	(0.39)		
The Stock of Dictatorship (ln)	0.42*	(0.21)	0.44	(0.23)
Political Regime Type (Base: "Democracy")				
Hybrid Regime	439.81***	(619.27)	597.58***	(878.94)
Dictatorship	918724.37***	(2835537.60)	1261001.95***	(4290141.36)
Wald χ^2	36.07		34.45	
Prob. > Wald χ^2	0.000		0.001	
AIC	876.95		828.85	
BIC	953.54		909.71	
Countries	99		96	
Years per Country (Average)	12.3		12.1	
Country-Political Campaign Spells (CPCS)	163		159	
Years per CPCS (Average)	7.5		7.3	
Observations	1,219		1,157	

Source: wkastart-DR-Global-40-29-Estimation-Repression-Onset-Scope-MLM-Fit-Best-v01.do

Note: Only substantively relevant coefficients are displayed. The ultimate outcome that was modeled was the increase in the scope of state repression. The unit of analysis is the country-political campaign-spell-year. Ordinal Logistic Multilevel Mixed Effects Regression Model. Random intercepts at the level of countries and country-political campaign-spells. Country-clustered standard errors. See Appendix B (B.1.4) for the full results and results for more parsimonious models.

* p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01. Standard errors in parentheses.

Table 4.7 Ordinal Logistic Mixed Effects Regression Models for State Repression Scope, Regime Stock Variables with Best Fit (Global Sample of Independent Countries, 1945-2006), Most Complex Model

	(7-Dem)		(7-Hyb)		(7-Dic)	
	M07-Dem		M07-Hyb		M07-Dic	
	e^{β}	SE	e^{β}	SE	e^{β}	SE
The Stock of Democracy	0.97	(0.04)	1.09	(0.06)	0.91	(0.08)
The Stock of Dictatorship (ln)	0.25*	(0.18)	0.69	(0.35)	0.04**	(0.06)
Political Regime Type						
Democracy			0.05	(0.10)	0.00***	(0.00)
Hybrid Regime	19.08	(37.28)			0.00***	(0.00)
Dictatorship[a]	2.85***	(2.11)	1.49***	(1.02)		
Interaction Terms						
The Stock of Dem. × Dem.			0.89**	(0.05)	1.06	(0.10)
The Stock of Dem. × Hyb.	1.13**	(0.06)			1.20**	(0.11)
The Stock of Dem. × Dict.	0.94	(0.09)	0.83**	(0.07)		
The Stock of Dict. (ln) × Dem.			0.36*	(0.19)	6.69	(10.61)
The Stock of Dict. (ln) × Hyb.	2.77*	(1.45)			18.54*	(27.67)
The Stock of Dict. (ln) × Dict.	0.15	(0.24)	0.05*	(0.08)		
Wald χ^2	49.08		49.08		49.08	
Prob. > Wald χ^2	0.000		0.000		0.000	
AIC	811.89		811.89		811.89	
BIC	912.96		912.96		912.96	
Countries	96		96		96	
Years per Country (Average)	12.1		12.1		12.1	
Country-Political Campaign Spells (CPCS)	159		159		159	
Years per CPCS (Average)	7.3		7.3		7.3	
Observations	1,157		1,157		1,157	

Source: wkastart-DR-Global-40-29-Estimation-Repression-Onset-Scope-MLM-Fit-Best-v01.do

Note: Only substantively relevant coefficients are displayed. The ultimate outcome that was modeled was the increase in the scope of state repression. The unit of analysis is the country-political campaign-spell-year. Ordinal Logistic Multilevel Mixed Effects Regression Model. Random intercepts at the level of countries and country-political campaign-spells. Country-clustered standard errors. See Appendix B (B.1.4) for the full results and results for more parsimonious models.

* p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01. Standard errors in parentheses.

[a] Actual values: 2.85e+9 (2.11e+10); 1.49e+8 (1.02e+9).

capacity. A more plausible interpretation is that the hypothesized mechanism is 'overwhelmed' by a mechanism involving an alternative mediator variable, and that the hypothesized effect upon the state's coercive capacity is at best marginal to begin with. I consider two related substantive explanations that motivate this alternative interpretation. The first reconsiders the development of the coercive capacity of governments and the state apparatus that they control. As discussed earlier, the observable population of independent countries, from which the current sample of political campaign-years is drawn, is not randomly generated, but endogenously produced through a process of war-making, state-making, imperial conquest and decolonization. Throughout this international competition for political power and survival, only those countries that had at their disposal a baseline coercive capacity were able to join the international state system and survive the "march of history." Even more so, states are understood as inherently coercive organizations in the first place.[33] As such, the observations included in my initial sample of independent countries entered it by virtue of a strong enough coercive capacity. This is not to say that there is not enough variability in coercive capacity to be explained, or to carry any explanatory power. Rather, the available variability is too limited to help produce a mechanism that determines the direction of the overall relationship between the stock of dictatorship and the scope of state repression.

The second explanation modifies my theory, and treats the scope of the government's coercive activities as an outcome that is best understood as driven by the government's willingness, rather than its capacity to repress. This alternative argument is more in line with the basic undercurrent of this study, and holds that regime stock-induced radicalism and moderation encourage and discourage, respectively, governments to expand the scope of their repressive measures. Understood this way, the scope of state repression is assigned a role that is similar to that of its pacification in my initial argument, in that both are determined by the same mechanism, and for the same or similar reasons. More specifically, the impatient and uncompromising stance that is inherent to radicalized governments leaves no room for tolerating organized resistance, because a successful challenge against their rule would put at risk their preferred policies. In turn, this encourages radical governments to terminate political campaign by all means necessary, without delay, and without offering concessions. So far I have argued that this takes the form of the imposition of state violence as opposed to restrictions, but at this stage I extend radicalism's implications to include a broader scope of state repression overall. As such, by deradicalizing governments that face political challengers, the stock of dictatorship is expected to not only pacify, but also limit the scope of state repression. Latin America does not offer useful examples on the high end of the stock of dictatorship, but on the other extreme, where authoritarian experiences are limited, examples of this mechanism are plentiful. For instance, the military dictatorships that came to power in Argentina and Chile in the 1970s ruled in environments where the stock of dictatorship would barely exceed a dozen years. As a result, the stakes of political conflict would remain high for these authoritarian governments, prompting radicalism as they eliminated their opponents and forced through their preferred policies. This radicalism also took the form of the imposition of a broad scope of state repression once peaceful pro-democracy movements challenged their rule. Near the end of their rule, these authoritarian governments deradicalized, oversaw transitions

[33] Tilly, 1990.

towards hybrid regimes, and even introduced democracy. Their spell in power had not made them more but less radical.

It is important to note that, insofar as opposition groups are indeed resilient enough to survive and maintain their strength throughout sustained periods of authoritarian rule, this deradicalization of governments is not driven by the weakening of their opponents. A more plausible explanation traces this deradicalization to the enhanced organizational strength and entrenchment of the policies of current or previous authoritarian governments and their allies. For instance, for governments of longstanding dictatorships, the organizational resources amassed by them during their rule attenuate their fears about the future and put them in a position where they can afford to lower their guard when confronted by organized resistance. Likewise, their extensive time in office offered these governments ample opportunity to entrench their preferred policies to the extent that they become difficult to change. Thus, confident that their organizational strength and entrenched policies help them to advance and protect their interests in any future political settlement, and knowing that repression carries with it considerable costs, these governments are encouraged to reduce the scope (and severity) of their coercive methods of political control.

This explanation echoes the democratization theory of Dahl (1973, pp. 14-6), who contends that authoritarian governments are inclined to introduce democracy if they consider the costs of tolerating their opponents (in the form of democracy, or "polyarchy") to be low, and the costs of repressing them (in the form of dictatorship, or "suppression") to be high. Likewise, Mainwaring and Pérez-Liñán (2013c) argue that governments who are less uncertain and fearful about the future are more likely to adopt a moderate approach to political conflict, and join the coalition of political actors pushing for democracy. Thus, the enhanced strength of a longstanding authoritarian government reduces the costs of toleration to the extent that the government is confident that it will do well under any ensuing democracy, resulting in moderation and diminished levels of repression.

The strongly negative effect of contemporaneous democracy upon the scope of state repression revealed by the preceding models presented in Table 4.6 may partly account for the conditional effect of authoritarian legacies. As the estimates of the current political regime types indicate, in democratic and hybrid regime where both regime stock variables are at their minima, the scope of state repression is held downwards so strongly, that it can hardly decline any further in the first place. By the same token, the broad scope of state repression that is typically attained in dictatorship leaves ample opportunity to reduce it. Furthermore, in light of my substantive discussions of previous results, there is also a theoretical reason that explains why the negative effect of the stock of dictatorship only applies to authoritarian governments. Insofar as this authoritarian legacy effect is driven by the benefits that accrue to government incumbents that presided over a longstanding dictatorship, and insofar as governments that rule under democracy and hybrid regimes typically replaced (and opposed) them, these political regime types are more likely to involve a government that has not been empowered by such an authoritarian legacy. As a result, this particular legacy is only consequential for state repression in authoritarian regimes.

As a way of illustrating the magnitude of the interaction effects, and determine which of the three categories become more or less probable as a result of changes in the stock of dictatorship, Figures 4.7 and 4.8 plot the stock of dictatorship against

Figure 4.7 Mean Predicted Probabilities of Intermediate State Repression Scope for the Stock of Dictatorship



Source: wkastart-DR-Global-40-31-Graphs-Repression-Onset-Scope-MLM-Fit-v02.do
Note: N = 1,157. Fitted Ordinal Logistic Multilevel Mixed Effects Regression Model (Model 7, presented in Table 4.7). The ultimate outcome that was modeled was the scope of state repression.

the mean predicted probabilities of an intermediate and a broad scope of state repression, respectively. Viewed in combination, these plots indicate that under dictatorship, on average the stock of dictatorship attenuates the scope of state repression by fostering a transition away from a broad scope of state repression and towards an intermediate one. The plot for the limited state repression scope category (not displayed) does not display such changes. The changes are considerable. Across the within-sample range of the stock of dictatorship that I used for this visualization, which runs from 0 to about 98 'raw' years, the estimated mean probability of intermediate state repression scope increases from close to 0 to just over 0.50, which is accompanied by a decline in the probability of the most repressive category from close to 1 to little over 0.40.

4.6 State Repression Pacification

In this section, I continue my investigation of the regime legacy effects upon state repression. I do so by testing Hypothesis 5, which links the stock of democracy and dictatorship to the pacification of state repression in contexts where political campaigns are active:

> **Hypothesis 5** *During political campaigns, a greater stock of democracy (dictatorship) reduces (increases) the probability of the pacification of state repression.*

The dependent variable of interest is drawn from the NAVCO dataset (Version 2.0) and concerns *repression*, which uses a four-point scale to indicate the extent of violence in the government's repressive measures targeted against the political campaign under consideration. The political campaign-year serves as the unit of analysis. For reasons outlined above, MLM offers the preferred estimation technique. I specify the MLM models with random intercepts at the level of countries

Figure 4.8 Mean Predicted Probabilities of Broad State Repression Scope for the Stock of Dictatorship



Source: wkastart-DR-Global-40-31-Graphs-Repression-Onset-Scope-MLM-Fit-v02.do
Note: N = 1,157. Fitted Ordinal Logistic Multilevel Mixed Effects Regression Model (Model 7, presented in Table 4.7). The ultimate outcome that was modeled was the scope of state repression.

and political campaigns, country-clustered standard errors, and a cubic polynomial of time, where the time variable indicates the year since the onset of the political campaign (starting at "0"). The unit of analysis I employ here does not require any aggregation of the data, because the original NAVCO data measures the outcome of interest at the level of political campaign-years. Given the ordinal level of measurement of the dependent variable, I estimate ordinal logistic MLM regression models.

As was the case in Section 4.5, I control for the political regime type, political campaign mobilization, political campaign pacification, economic development, economic growth, and urbanization, and for the same reasons. I also control for the progress that is booked by the political campaign.[34] The extent to which the government conceded desired policies to the political campaign captures the stakes of the conflict for the government in each political campaign-year. In the absence of any concessions, the government still has the most to lose policy-wise. At the other extreme, if the political campaign has achieved full success, the substantive conflict is subdued. Such a downward shift in the intensity of the conflict diminishes the threat that emanates from the political campaign, which I expect to weaken the inclination of the government to violently confront it. Finally, I control for whether governments repress in a selective or indiscriminate fashion in response to political campaigns, using the NAVCO dataset (Version 2) variable discussed earlier. If the government subjects the general population to its repressive measures against the political campaign, the extent to which they take the form of violence becomes more

[34]I did not include this control variable in the models estimating the scope of state repression, because the necessary aggregation of the data would jeopardize the validity of the resulting measure. For instance, when aggregating the information from two political campaigns, taking the modal value of the progress variable would underestimate the intensity of the substantive conflict, because there are two such conflicts to begin with. Likewise, taking the sum would result in internally heterogeneous higher categories. The weak inter-coder reliability, as documented in the codebook, exacerbates this problem.

costly for state authorities, as a greater proportion of the population faces the threat of bodily harm. As a result, governments are encouraged to pacify their coercive response.

Appendix B.1 (Section B.1.5) presents the complete results of all the estimated models. Table 4.8 presents the relevant results of the two most preferred models, which combine complexity with a better fit to the data. The 'raw' regime stock variables are preferred in this respect. The estimates lend limited support to my hypothesis, and are reminiscent of the results of the models explaining the scope of state repression discussed in Section 4.5. On the one hand, the stock of democracy fails to exert any significant effects in any of the models, suggesting that it fails to radicalize governments. On the other hand, the effect of the stock of dictatorship is only significant in authoritarian regimes in the interaction model, where it is negative, as expected. Whereas the latter finding does not rule out the proposed mechanism, which traces this pacifying effect to the deradicalization of authoritarian governments, it bears repeating that in light of earlier evidence this deradicalization is not likely to be the result of weakened opponents, but empowered members of (previous) authoritarian ruling coalitions. It is also important to note that the contemporaneous political regime type does not exert an independent effect upon state repression pacification. This finding puts into doubt the domestic democratic peace proposition, and confirms the notion that amidst severe challenges against the government, democracy fails to attenuate the severity of the state's attempt to quell them.[35]

The conditional effect identified above, where the pacifying effect of authoritarian legacies only holds true under dictatorship, can be explained in part by the different repressive baselines of each political regime type. Where and when democratic and authoritarian regime experiences are at their minima, this involves a difference in the severity of state violence between dictatorship and hybrid regimes that is significantly different from zero, such that there is more 'room' for a reduction in state violence in authoritarian regimes. Yet there is no such baseline difference that involves democracy. An additional explanation calls for a limitation of my initial argument by confining the proposed mechanism to authoritarian incumbents and their allies. I have previously established that authoritarian legacies deradicalize governments by making the members of both current and previous authoritarian ruling coalitions stronger, and their preferred policies more entrenched. Since the outcome of interest is the violent repression of contemporaneous non-state challengers, the government's radicalism towards this immediate challenge matters more than its approach to political conflict more generally. Insofar as these adversaries do not exclusively encompass former authoritarian rulers and their allies, this deradicalization of governments is therefore best understood as primarily driven by the enhanced organizational strength and the entrenchment of policies of current authoritarian rulers and their allies (as opposed to their authoritarian predecessors). As a result, this authoritarian legacy effect only applies to current authoritarian governments.

Figure 4.9 visualizes the magnitude of the interaction effects upon the highest category of state violence. In dictatorships, as the stock of dictatorship increases from its minimum (0 years) to its maximum within-sample value (105 years), the mean predicted probability of the most severe instance of state-sponsored violence

[35] Davenport, 2007b.

Table 4.8 Ordinal Logistic Multilevel Mixed Effects Regression Models for State Repression Pacification (Global Sample of Independent Countries, 1945-2006)

	(6)		(7-Dem)		(7-Hyb)		(7-Dic)	
	M06		M07-Dem		M07-Hyb		M07-Dic	
	e^{β}	SE	e^{β}	SE	e^{β}	SE	e^{β}	SE
The Stock of Democracy	1.00	(0.02)	0.97	(0.02)	1.09*	(0.05)	0.98	(0.03)
The Stock of Dictatorship	0.99	(0.01)	0.98	(0.02)	1.00	(0.01)	0.97**	(0.01)
Political Regime Type								
Democracy					5.58	(7.19)	0.83	(1.29)
Hybrid Regime	0.92	(0.44)	0.18	(0.23)			0.15*	(0.16)
Dictatorship	0.88	(0.36)	1.21	(1.90)	6.77*	(7.10)		
Interaction Terms								
The Stock of Dem. × Dem.					0.89**	(0.05)	1.00	(0.04)
The Stock of Dem. × Hyb.			1.12**	(0.06)			1.12**	(0.06)
The Stock of Dem. × Dict.			1.00	(0.04)	0.89**	(0.04)		
The Stock of Dict. × Dem.					0.98	(0.02)	1.01	(0.03)
The Stock of Dict. × Hyb.			1.02	(0.02)			1.03**	(0.02)
The Stock of Dict. × Dict.			0.99	(0.03)	0.97**	(0.02)		
Wald χ^2	108.50		132.63		132.63		132.63	
Prob. > Wald χ^2	0.000		0.000		0.000		0.000	
AIC	755.77		758.80		758.80		758.80	
BIC	856.01		879.09		879.09		879.09	
Countries	85		85		85		85	
Years per Country (Average)	13.1		13.1		13.1		13.1	
Political Campaigns	180		180		180		180	
Years per Political Campaign (Average)	6.2		6.2		6.2		6.2	
Observations	1,110		1,110		1,110		1,110	

Source: wkastart-DR-Global-47-01-Estimation-Repression-Pacification-MLM-Fit-Campaign-v02.do

Note: Only substantively relevant coefficients are displayed. The ultimate outcome that was modeled was the increase in the severity of state-sponsored violence directed against the political campaign. The unit of analysis is the political campaign-year. Random intercepts at the level of countries and political campaigns. Country-clustered standard errors. For the interaction model (Model 7), three different sets of estimates are displayed, one for each reference category of the current political regime type. See Appendix B.1 (Section B.1.5) for the full results and results for more parsimonious models.

* $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$. Standard errors in parentheses.

drops from about 0.95 to little over 0.80. The plots for the other categories of the pacification of state repression (not displayed) all reveal the reverse pattern, where the mean predicted probabilities increase as more years are added to the stock of dictatorship. In other words, authoritarian experiences advance the pacification of state repression only through facilitating a transition away from the most violent category of state repression. The remaining categories, including the second most violent one, on average become more probable as the stock of dictatorship increases. The pacific effect of dictatorship in this context is thus best understood as attenuating, rather than terminating, large-scale political violence.

4.7 Conclusion

The empirical results presented in this chapter accord with the basic undercurrent of this study, in that historical experiences with democracy are sometimes a positive, but never a negative empirical correlate of several aspects of large-scale political violence, whereas such aspects are sometimes negatively, but never positively associated with the stock of dictatorship. Nevertheless, the evidence contradicts several components of my theory. In the concluding section of this chapter, I briefly reiterate these contradictions, as well as the main suggestions as to how my theoretical argument can be limited and modified to account for these shortcomings. These suggestions complement the theoretical extensions that I proposed in the previous sections to account for the conditional regime legacy effects. Furthermore, in light of my initial argument, the empirical findings and the proposed theoretical adaptations, I devise the empirical tasks to be carried out in the intensive testing stages of the analysis Chapters 5 and 6). For each of these empirical chapters I formulate

Figure 4.9 Mean Predicted Probabilities of the Most Violent Category of State Repression for the Stock of Dictatorship



Source: wkastart-DR-Global-47-06-Graphs-Repression-Pacification-MLM-Fit-v02.do
Note: N = 1,110. Fitted Ordinal Logistic Multilevel Mixed Effects Regression Model (Model 7, presented in Table 4.8). The ultimate outcome that was modeled was the increase in the severity of state-sponsored violence directed against the political campaign.

additional hypotheses in the form of questions. To the extent that the evidence answers these questions in the affirmative, I can validate the strengths and weaknesses of my theoretical argument identified in this chapter, as well as the proposed changes, extensions and assumptions that addressed these shortcomings.

Contrary to my argument, the legacies of dictatorship fail to suppress the emergence and mobilization of mass movements of resistance, suggesting that, once empowered and politicized, and when confronted with, and confronting, longstanding authoritarian rule, opposition groups and the general population can draw upon a considerable degree of organizational and attitudinal resilience. Furthermore, rather than strengthening the coercive capacity of the state apparatus, the stock of dictatorship only seems to deradicalize authoritarian governments. In addition, the empirical results suggest that the implications of this deradicalizing effect extend beyond the pacification of state repression to include decision by authoritarian rulers to reduce the scope of their coercive interventions. Insofar as authoritarian legacies do not encompass the disempowerment of opposition groups, the sources of this deradicalization of authoritarian governments must be sought elsewhere. Instead, and still in line with my original argument, I trace this effect to the political actors currently in power whose organizational resources generally grew stronger, and whose policies became more entrenched, under dictatorship. This concerns members of the current authoritarian ruling coalition, whose enhanced strength and entrenched policies diminish their fear and uncertainty surrounding future political settlements, and encourage a moderate stance towards political conflict. The result is a decline in the scope and severity of state repression. The legacies of democracy do not mirror these effects upon state repression. Insofar as a history of democracy strengthens non-state political actors, these findings echo the earlier suggestion that their strength obtained under democratic rule does not shape the radicalism and repressive measures of their opponents in government.

The purpose of the empirical chapters that follow is to investigate the proposed

theoretical mechanisms that link the stock of democracy and the stock of dictatorship to the aspects of large-scale political violence investigated in the previous sections. Chapter 5 is concerned with modeling the coercive capacity and radicalism of non-state political actors, as well as the radicalism of governments. With respect to the unconditional regime legacy effects upon the onset and pacification of political campaigns registered above, it needs to determine (1) whether the stock of democracy enhances the coercive capacity of non-state political actors; (2) whether the stock of dictatorship fails to deplete it; and (3) whether the stock of democracy and the stock of dictatorship radicalizes and deradicalizes them, respectively.

For the purpose of exploring the mechanisms driving state repression in Chapter 5, the evidence that I have marshaled so far in support of my argument and the theoretical modifications offered above call for assigning a greater role to the degree of radicalism harbored by governments, but only insofar as this radicalism is produced by the stock of dictatorship. To investigate this, in Chapter 5 I determine (1) whether the stock of dictatorship deradicalizes governments; and (2) whether the stock of democracy fails to radicalize them.

Chapter 6 delves into the regime legacy effects upon the individual-level, attitudinal sources of political campaign mobilization. The empirical findings presented in the current chapter suggest that only the stock of democracy shapes individual-level perceptions of political empowerment in the expected directions. In order to investigate the current chapter's substantive conclusions about this, in Chapter 6 I plan to determine (1) whether the stock of democracy strengthens internal political efficacy and weakens external political efficacy; (2) whether the stock of dictatorship fails to exert effects in these respects; and (3) whether higher contemporaneous levels of democracy strengthen external political efficacy to the extent of muting the effect of the stock of democracy.

wkastart-DT-Chapter-04-v03.tex