

Chapter 1

The Pacific Legacies of Democracy and Dictatorship

Ever since the third wave of democratization reached the shores of Latin America in 1978, it has swept aside nearly every dictatorship in the region, yet without necessarily bringing an end to political violence. To be sure, the Third Wave ushered in an era in which almost all of Latin America's most senior public officials have been chosen on the basis of regularly held free and fair elections — the minimal requirement for democracy in the minimalist, electoralist sense of the term.¹ As the twentieth century drew to a close, however, it became increasingly apparent that the use of violence for political purposes had nonetheless remained prevalent in domestic politics throughout the region. On the demand side of Latin American politics, domestic opposition groups have often undertaken violent activities to achieve their political objectives, such as armed insurgency, terrorism, and political assassinations.² For instance, on the eve of the 2014 presidential elections in Colombia, the Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias de Colombia (FARC) and the Ejército de Liberación Nacional (ELN) had each waged a violent struggle against the state for decades. In Peru, rebels of the Shining Path and the Movimiento Revolucionario Túpac Amaru (MRTA) mounted violent insurgencies against the government that lasted throughout the 1980s and mid-1990s.³ In 1994, the Ejército Zapatista de Liberación Nacional (EZLN) launched a short but highly consequential violent uprising against the Mexican government.⁴

Likewise, on the supply side of domestic politics, Latin American governments have often subjected political opponents, be it armed rebels, peaceful protesters, or opposition party activists, to considerable levels of state-sponsored violence.⁵ In the aforementioned examples of violent rebellion against the government, state authorities intervened with excessive levels of violence.⁶ Other examples abound. For more than a decade, peaceful protesters struggling on behalf of the Mapuche

¹Huntington (1991), Mainwaring and Hagopian (2005, p. 1), Smith and Ziegler (2008, pp. 51-2), Mainwaring and Pérez-Liñán (2005), Smith (2005), and Mainwaring and Pérez-Liñán (2013c). For the electoralist definition of democracy, see Schumpeter (1947, p. 269), Huntington (1991, p. 7), and Diamond (1999, p. 10)

²Schatzman, 2005; Banks and Wilson, 2016.

³Chenoweth, 2011.

⁴Magaloni, 2006.

⁵Smith and Ziegler, 2008.

⁶Gibney et al., 2016.

community in Chile have suffered through several instances of police brutality.⁷ In Mexico in 2014, police authorities played an active role in the forced disappearance of 43 students who were on their way to a peaceful demonstration, as well as in the extra-judicial killing of three of their comrades.⁸ In the run-up and during the 2016 Olympic Games held in Brazil, riot police units and other security forces used excessive violence to quell peaceful protests.⁹

Yet perhaps even more striking than the coexistence between democracy and political violence is the sharp contrast between the political past and the political present. For instance, by the time that the Third Wave reached its crest in Latin America in the late 1990s, Colombia and Venezuela had been continuously governed through democratic institutions for more than four decades, whereas Chile and Uruguay had by that time each suffered through more than a decade of uninterrupted authoritarian rule. But it is the former pair of countries that are still making headlines about rampant political violence and faltering political institutions, while the latter two countries have been held up as the poster children for successful democratization in the region.¹⁰ Indeed, the persistence of democracy amidst violent political activities in Latin America more generally reflects the same pattern of extensive democratic experiences and political violence.

The Latin American experience thus begs several vexing questions. What accounts for the democratization of domestic political conflict in the absence of its pacification? What is to make of the coexistence between democracy and political violence? Has widespread political violence persisted in spite of democracy and a strong democratic history, or exactly because of these extensive experiences with democracy? By the same token, are the legacies left behind by the dictatorships of the past conducive or inimical to domestic peace? What are the prospects for the peaceful resolution of political conflict in Latin America now that the region has largely democratized and accumulated considerable experiences with democracy? These are not novel questions in existing scholarship within the field of Latin American politics, yet the answers remain remarkably ambiguous and undertheorized. On the one hand, the theories that espouse the prevailing view that democracy advances domestic peace do not match the recently established empirical record, which has consistently registered a positive empirical association between democracy and large-scale political violence, while also yielding mixed results for the effects of prior democratic experiences. On the other hand, no alternative theories have emerged that account for these puzzling empirical findings by directly linking democracy to the prevalence of violent political activities in Latin American politics.

The goal of this study is to overcome this theoretical impasse by developing and testing a novel theory about democracy's and dictatorship's causal impact upon the occurrence of large-scale political violence in domestic politics. It does so by shifting the theoretical and empirical focus from exploring the immediate effects of democracy and dictatorship, to investigating *regime legacies*, which refer to the lasting impact of past instances of particular political regime types. The theory developed in this study revolves around two such legacies. The first concerns the impact of the historically accumulated stock of all prior democratic experiences,

⁷Amnesty-International, 2016b.

⁸Amnesty-International, 2015.

⁹Amnesty-International, 2016a.

¹⁰Bejarano, 2011.

which I refer to as the *stock of democracy*. Likewise, I theorize about the legacies left behind by previous instances of dictatorship, which amount to what I term the *stock of dictatorship*. The theory I propose applies to both (1) large-scale armed resistance against the government and (2) widespread state violence in response to peaceful and violent mass movements of resistance. I question democracy's generally pacific impact upon these phenomena, and put forward an alternative perspective by exploring its antithesis — the notion that it is not democracy, but dictatorship that ultimately causes domestic peace.

In doing so, I depart from two theoretical traditions that lie at the core of the current theoretical impasse. The first concerns an entrenched belief that in politics all good things go together; that desirable political phenomena such as democracy, peace and wealth mutually reinforce each other. In this view, domestic peace and democracy rise and fall together. It is a view that is not only prevalent among scholars, but also among policy-makers. For instance, in his 2017 farewell address, United States (US) President Obama proclaimed that “[i]f the scope of freedom and respect for the rule of law shrinks around the world, the likelihood of war within and between nations increases, and our own freedoms will eventually be threatened.”¹¹ Whereas this study is in general agreement with this view's claim that immediately present democratic institutions limit the use of political violence, I also draw upon the broader research literature on comparative democratization and contentious politics to address what I believe is a problematic bias in the main research thrust on regime legacies.

More specifically, the basic undercurrent of this study holds that the balance within conventional thinking on the topic, both inside and outside academia, has wrongfully been tilted in favor of the benevolent, pacific impact of each country's democratic past, while unduly casting an unfavorable light upon the legacies left behind by the authoritarian episodes in each country's political history. I contend that the stock of democracy (1) strengthens the coercive capacity of non-state political actors, which spurs the emergence of coercive, potentially violent mass movements of resistance, which I refer to as *political campaigns*; (2) radicalizes their approach to political conflict, which translates into a stronger inclination to adopt violent as opposed to peaceful methods of coercion; (3) fosters individual-level political attitudes that are conducive to popular involvement in political campaigns, thereby enhancing their mobilization levels; and (4) radicalizes governments, thereby inhibiting the pacification of their repressive responses to political challengers.

By the same token, I assert that the stock of dictatorship both weakens and deradicalizes domestic opposition groups, which is likely to result in coercive activities that are either absent or peaceful. When (violent) political campaigns nevertheless do emerge against the backdrop of extensive authoritarian experiences, their popular appeal is likely to be limited through the authoritarian legacy effects upon feelings of political empowerment among the domestic population, which in turn depresses popular participation in them. Historical experiences with dictatorship also deradicalize governments and as a result pacify the coercive measures meant to quell these political campaigns.

The second theoretical tradition from which I depart is less dominant than the first, and treats democracy in Latin America, typically in conjunction with trade liberalization and economic austerity measures, as a theoretical scope condition

¹¹Obama, 2017.

or empirical testing ground for other causes or mechanisms encouraging political violence, such as excessive levels of economic inequality and state-led efforts to combat crime.¹² Comparisons between democracy and dictatorship are absent in this approach. Instead, the coexistence between democracy and political violence is explained by the presence of overwhelming political conflict, which is either inherent to “neoliberal” democracy, or which democracy is simply unable to resolve. Such political tensions often revolve around the economic austerity policies associated with the Washington Consensus and implemented across the region in the 1980s and 1990s, which elicited considerable levels of domestic political opposition, and which in turn encouraged democratic governments to push through these policies by force. In other accounts, the point of political contention is democracy itself. For instance, Colombia’s “violent democratization” is accounted for by a violent backlash of conservative elites against democratic reforms that empowered formerly excluded leftist organizations.¹³ I depart from this theoretical tradition by treating democracy not as a scope condition, but as the primary causal force driving political violence, which requires a consideration of the effects of non-democratic political regimes as well. Whereas I acknowledge that political violence may be widespread under democracy, I focus more upon the differential effects of prior experiences with democracy and dictatorship upon violent political activities.

In the remainder of this introductory chapter, I present the research literature on the causal relationship between democracy and political violence in Latin America and beyond (Section 1.1); distill from this the main puzzle this study seeks to solve (Section 1.2); discuss its theoretical claims (Section 1.3); summarize the main observable implications that flow from my argument (Section 1.4); present the sources of the empirical evidence I use to test these implications, as well as a justification of this study’s regional empirical focus upon Latin America (Section 1.5); present its contributions to existing research (Section 1.6); and lay out the organization of subsequent chapters (Section 1.7).

1.1 The Literature

Optimistic assessments of Latin America’s Third Wave contend that democracy in the presence of widespread political violence should be taken as proof of democracy’s resilience in the face of inauspicious circumstances, as well as of the need to make democracy work and democratize the region even further.¹⁴ Accordingly, the single most notable achievement of present-day Latin American democracies is their mere survival, if not to say their consolidation. In addition, democracy is here seen as one of the causal forces driving the adoption of peaceful political behavior by both governments and opposition groups.¹⁵ Given the persistence and prevalence of political violence, the primary task at hand is therefore to expand democracy, consolidate it, improve its quality and enhance its performance so as to advance the prospects for domestic peace.¹⁶ Indeed, seen from this perspective, to say that the Third Wave democratized political conflict in Latin America without pacifying

¹²Arias and Goldstein, 2010.

¹³Carroll, 2011.

¹⁴Hagopian, 2005; Mainwaring and Hagopian, 2005.

¹⁵Schatzman, 2005; Smith and Ziegler, 2008; Pérez-Liñán and Mainwaring, 2013.

¹⁶Hagopian and Mainwaring, 2005.

it would gloss over the region's considerable number of incomplete democracies, as well as the handful of blatantly authoritarian governments that survived the Third Wave. In several instances, the collapse of dictatorship did not give way to fully democratized systems of government. Instead, many of the region's competitive regimes that emerged in the wake of dictatorship have been governed in a partially authoritarian manner, prompting scholars to develop a plethora of labels to denote the various democratic deficiencies that this entailed.¹⁷ Some of these competitive regimes even transitioned back and succumbed to outright dictatorship.¹⁸ At the time of the violent insurgencies mentioned in the introduction, Peru, Mexico and arguably Colombia were among these incomplete democracies.¹⁹ For civil peace to thrive, as the logic goes, regimes such as these should democratize as well.

The overall optimism about democracy's prospects and resilience in Latin America has thus been extended to its capacity to bring about and sustain domestic peace. This especially applies to historical experiences with democracy. That is, whereas some have questioned democracy's immediate pacific impact upon political conflict and have even advanced the opposite claim by warning against the destabilizing effects of democracy or any movement towards democracy, no such doubt has been expressed about the pacifying impact of a predominantly democratic political history.²⁰ Instead, several studies within the field of Latin American politics have embraced the notion that, at least in theory, prior experiences with democracy advance the peaceful resolution of political conflict. Schatzman (2005) argued that over time, Latin American democracies have institutionalized power and norms, thereby lessening the need of opposition groups to engage in (potentially violent) disruptive political activities. Smith and Ziegler (2008) contend that previous democratic experiences have attenuated the fears of democracy among elites and as a result weakened their inclination to support and revert to repression. Pérez-Liñán and Mainwaring (2013) maintain that political actors that were formed or appointed under democracy (such as political parties and judges), including the democracies of the distant past, are more supportive of democratic norms and therefore less prone to support repressive governments.

Yet the empirical record established so far on the topic cautions against extending the overall optimism about democracy's prospects and resilience in the region to its pacific potential. Latin America has displayed considerable temporal and cross-country differences in terms of state and non-state political violence.²¹ Quantitatively oriented studies that have compared these different levels of political violence to democratization outcomes within the region have revealed several empirical patterns that do not bode well for democracy's ability to pacify domestic politics. The first such finding concerns a positive empirical association between contemporaneous levels of democracy and the number of violent political challenges carried out by domestic opposition groups against Latin American governments.²² Furthermore, no consistent empirical patterns were registered linking each country's democratic history (or lack thereof) to state and non-state political violence

¹⁷O'Donnell, 1994, 1998; Collier and Levitsky, 1997; Diamond, 1999; Hagopian and Mainwaring, 2005; Smith, 2005; Smith and Ziegler, 2008; Mainwaring and Pérez-Liñán, 2013c.

¹⁸Mainwaring and Pérez-Liñán, 2013c.

¹⁹Ibid.

²⁰Muller and Weede, 1990; Hegre et al., 2001; Sambanis, 2001; Regan and Henderson, 2002.

²¹Schatzman, 2005; Smith and Ziegler, 2008; Banks and Wilson, 2016.

²²Schatzman, 2005.

within the region. On the one hand, Smith and Ziegler (2008) found that the age of present-day democracies inhibited transitions to less repressive forms of government, whereas the number of previous democratic spells exerted no effect upon such transitions. On the other hand, Pérez-Liñán and Mainwaring (2013) found that previous exposure to greater levels of democracy yielded less repressive governments. With respect to non-state political actors, Schatzman (2005) did not register any effect of the age of democracy upon violent political dissent. Indeed, not only have several of these empirical patterns defied theoretical expectations, they have remained theoretically unaccounted for.

In qualitative empirical research on the broader topic of the sources of successful democratization in the region, the evidence in support of optimistic assessments of the pacific potential of historical experiences with democracy is even less conclusive. Here, the benevolent effects of prior democratic experiences are taken as a given, and incorporated into research as an assumption. It is on the basis of this assumption, for instance, that Mainwaring and Hagopian (2005) exclude Costa Rica, Uruguay and Chile from the set of case studies in their edited volume on Latin America's third wave of democratization. Since these countries have experienced "the strongest democratic heritages in Latin America", the editors consider the endurance and the quality of these democratic regimes to be "overdetermined."²³ By contrast, whereas Colombia and Venezuela had been democratic for decades before the Third Wave even started, the erosion of their democratic institutions in the 1990s is not deemed an outcome of each country's extensive exposure to democracy.²⁴ Likewise, albeit often tacitly assumed rather than explicitly articulated, successful instances of democratization are understood in terms of a clear break from the authoritarian past, where the consolidation and deepening of democracy occur not as a result of a dictatorial political history, but in spite of it. Accordingly, it is assumed that authoritarian legacies harm the prospects of successful democratization.²⁵

Furthermore, whereas Mainwaring and Pérez-Liñán (2013c) echo these assumptions in their study of democratization in Latin America, their argument and the quantitative empirical evidence they marshal in its support leave behind considerable room for ambiguity about them. On the one hand, the authors conclude that a long, pre-Third Wave history of democracy has been advantageous for subsequent democratization outcomes in the region, and that a long authoritarian history has exerted adverse effects in this respect. On the other hand, in their exposition of the mechanism that underpins this conclusion, as well as in the empirical operationalization of these claims, the causal force of interest is not prior democracy, but prior democrats. That is, rather than the previous or pre-existing democratic institutions themselves, it is the normative commitment to democracy of the powerful organizations that created them that ultimately advanced democratization in the Third Wave era and beyond.²⁶

The indeterminacy of the area-specific research literature on the topic thus raises the following question: does democracy advance domestic peace? Up until recently, subsequent waves of scholarship spanning several theoretical and methodological traditions and drawing upon empirical evidence from multiple regions of the

²³Mainwaring and Hagopian, 2005, pp. 1, 9.

²⁴Ibid.

²⁵Morlino, 2007.

²⁶Mainwaring and Pérez-Liñán, 2013c, pp. 250-1, 256.

world have answered various versions of this question in the affirmative. Democracy, as opposed to dictatorship, it was generally agreed, reduces both state and non-state political violence, a claim to which I refer to as the *domestic democratic peace*.²⁷ Yet within the last decade or so, several theoretical and empirical advances within the field of contentious politics have cast doubt upon this assertion. First, recent studies investigating the sources of violent political dissent have revealed that democracy is a robust empirical correlate of the escalation of existing political struggles into both small-scale and large-scale political violence. Whatever the origins of behavioral manifestations of political conflict, once they emerge democracy encourages terrorism, guerrilla warfare, political assassinations, militia violence, political riots and large-scale armed rebellion, rather than the adoption of peaceful methods of resistance and disruption — let alone political participation through institutional, more routine channels of political influence.²⁸ Second, recent scholarship has uncovered a negative empirical association between democracy and the emergence and presence of peaceful political campaigns, as well as the frequency of nonviolent protest events more generally, thus suggesting that it is dictatorship, and not democracy, that encourages peaceful political resistance.²⁹ Third, whereas democracy generally reduces state-sponsored human rights violations, its ability to do so is limited, as it is not only weakest with respect to the most lethal instances of state violence, but also not entirely ‘bulletproof’ to begin with.³⁰ That is, where political activities undertaken by domestic opposition groups take a violent turn, whether in the form of small-scale or large-scale violence, the ability of various aspects of democracy to reduce the severity of the government’s coercive response to these political challengers is diminished if not entirely overwhelmed by the intensity of the conflict.³¹ Finally, the long-term pacific impact of democracy, and the effects of historical experiences with democracy specifically, are ambiguous. Whereas consolidated democracies are less likely to witness the outbreak of violent civil conflict than new democracies, any pre-dictatorial experiences with democracy fail to exert any (positive or negative) impact upon the emergence of non-state political violence in democratic political contexts.³² Furthermore, the pacific effects of recent changes towards democracy depend upon the particular issue over which the conflict is fought.³³

These empirical findings thus suggest that, rather than advancing domestic peace, democracy radicalizes political activities, discourages the emergence and continuation of peaceful mass movements of resistance, and fails to prevent violent political dissent from provoking officials into stepping up state violence. They also indicate that the pacifying influence of previous instances of democracy is unclear. Nevertheless, as of yet these recent findings have not led to widespread calls for an overall departure from the received wisdom that democracy produces domestic

²⁷For democracy’s pacific effect upon state violence, see Davenport (2007b). For the influence of democracy upon non-state political violence, see Tilly and Tarrow (2006), McAdam et al. (2009), and Lawrence and Chenoweth (2010).

²⁸Schatzman, 2005; Chenoweth and Stephan, 2011; Cederman et al., 2013; Chenoweth, 2013; Cunningham, 2013; Choi and Raleigh, 2015; Thurber, 2015; Butcher and Svensson, 2016.

²⁹Schatzman, 2005; Chenoweth and Lewis, 2013b; Cunningham, 2013; Dahl et al., 2014; Cunningham et al., 2015; Butcher and Svensson, 2016.

³⁰Davenport, 2007b; Hill, 2016.

³¹Davenport, 2007b.

³²Hegre et al., 2001; Cederman et al., 2013; Cook and Savun, 2016.

³³Cederman et al., 2013.

peace. To start with, the notion that democracy reduces levels of state violence continues to command broad theoretical support.³⁴ In addition, whereas democracy has been increasingly thought of as a causal force driving the emergence and adoption of small-scale political violence at the hands of domestic opposition groups, such as terrorism, militia violence and political riots, no coherent research program has emerged that theoretically accounts for democracy's potentially inimical effects upon domestic peace as it pertains to the emergence of violent large-scale political campaigns.³⁵ The result is a persistent, puzzling tension between the domestic democratic peace proposition and the empirical record.

1.2 The Puzzle

This study seeks to solve a puzzle that existing research in comparative and contentious politics has left unresolved: insofar as violence is antithetical to democracy, then how can one explain the positive if not weakly negative empirical associations between democracy and large-scale political violence? The recently uncovered empirical links between democratic institutions and violent political activities are particularly puzzling given the scale of the violence that is involved. At the very least, one would expect to observe strongly negative empirical associations between democracy and the most severe instances of political violence, yet the recently established empirical record reveals a pattern that contradicts this expectation. This is puzzling for several conceptual and theoretical reasons. First and foremost, lethal violence is inherently anti-democratic. Any form of lethal violence necessarily reduces the level of democracy, as it effectively deprives citizens and elected officials of their ability to exercise their democratic rights and fulfill their representative obligations.³⁶ Democracy's coexistence with political violence is therefore counterintuitive and becomes even more so as the violence under consideration is more severe. Given the definitional overlap between democracy and domestic peace alone, the positive empirical association between democracy and not just any form of political violence, but its most egregious manifestations is therefore all the more remarkable.

Furthermore, as a political phenomenon (as opposed to as a concept) democracy is meant to yield domestic peace. The purpose of its inherent institutional responsiveness is to resolve political conflict peacefully.³⁷ This is a notion shared by influential scholars of democracy and dictatorship alike. The institutional manifestations of democracy identified by Dahl (1973) involve the peaceful transfer of power, and encourage governments to produce policies that are responsive to all those who express their demands peacefully through political institutions open to the general population.³⁸ Huntington (1991, pp. 266-7) operationalized the consolidation of democracy using a "two-turnover test," which involves the peaceful transfer of power from election losers to election winners. Acemoglu and Robinson (2006) trace the origins of democracy to the expectation among authoritarian governments that the introduction of democracy will avert a costly, violent revolution.³⁹ In the

³⁴Hill and Jones, 2014; Hill, 2016.

³⁵Chenoweth, 2013; Choi and Raleigh, 2015.

³⁶Davenport, 2007b; Svobik, 2012, p. 16; Hill, 2016.

³⁷Acemoglu and Robinson, 2006; Krishnarajan et al., 2016.

³⁸Dahl, 1973, p. 20.

³⁹Acemoglu and Robinson, 2006, p. 121.

theoretical account of the politics of dictatorships offered by Svobik (2012), democracy's failure to resolve conflicts peacefully even signals its absence.⁴⁰ Against this theoretical background, the observation that mass opposition movements are more likely to use violent as opposed to peaceful methods of resistance when they protest or demand particular political outcomes in democratic as opposed to authoritarian political contexts is therefore striking. Likewise, democracy's inherent responsiveness to peaceful political demands seems to be at odds with the observation that the most formidable instances of peaceful political action are more likely to emerge in dictatorships than in democracies.

Finally, domestic peace is a public good. One would therefore expect democracy's institutional responsiveness to curb at least the most egregious instances of state violence. That is, whereas state violence directed against specific threats to national security and public order may be justified and driven by popular support, and whereas state violence that counters immediate attacks against the democratic political order may be deemed consistent with democracy, it is hard to conceive how subjecting vast swathes of the general population to state violence would elicit widespread popular support and carry democratic legitimacy.⁴¹

Whereas bridging the gap between the domestic democratic peace and the empirical evidence that contradicts it presents several challenges, the dearth of theories that may account for the observed empirical patterns remains striking. That is, whereas the corresponding research literature has not been entirely silent on the topic, the theoretical attention devoted to it has been marginal so far. First, to the best of my knowledge, the negative empirical association between democracy and the emergence of peaceful political campaigns has theoretically been accounted for only twice. In two unpublished manuscripts, Dahl et al. (2014) and Cunningham et al. (2015) argue that because dictatorships fail to channel popular grievances and openly articulated demands through responsive political institutions, they encourage ordinary citizens to launch or join peaceful mass movements against their authoritarian governments. Yet in both studies it remains unclear why such movements are peaceful rather than violent. Whereas Dahl et al. (2014) assume that the absence of democracy serves as a motivation behind both peaceful and violent political campaigns (29), they do not include violent political campaigns into their empirical analysis. Instead, the authors merely acknowledge that the empirical association between democracy and the onset of civil war is "somewhat ambiguous" (31). Cunningham et al. (2015) claim that once opposition demands have been made public, democracy's inherent responsiveness prevents the emergence of a peaceful mass movement. By the same token, neither dictatorship nor political regimes that fall in between democracy and dictatorship (labeled "anocracies") are responsive and repressive enough to prevent the initial articulation of oppositional political demands from escalating into the initiation of peaceful political campaigns. However, whereas the authors add that democracy does not exert any effect upon the outbreak of violent political campaigns, it is unclear how this assertion is supported by the unsubstantiated claim that the political regime type does not affect the capacity of ordinary people to organize a violent insurgency (11-2). Taken together, it is unclear from these studies why democracy would affect the emergence of peaceful and violent political campaigns differently.

⁴⁰Svobik, 2012, p. 16.

⁴¹Hill, 2016.

Second, the finding that among already existing political campaigns democracy corresponds to violent as opposed to peaceful methods of resistance is only passingly accounted for once by the outbidding processes spurred by democracy's inherent competitive political environment.⁴² Democratically induced competitive outbidding processes are likely to escalate into political violence by encouraging political activists to use political violence in general, or terrorism specifically. Violent political activities garner widespread attention, and if targeted against the domestic population in the form of terrorism, they may produce sufficient popular pressure to force the democratic government into offering concessions to the attackers.⁴³ Yet this explanation cannot account for the fact that violent political campaigns are often geared towards directly challenging or even destroying the coercive capacity of the state, rather than gaining popular attention and pressuring governments via their constituents. Furthermore, in some studies, the particular empirical finding that democracy is positively associated with violent as opposed to peaceful political campaigns is not even presented and discussed in the first place, even though it appears in the full statistical output when the corresponding models are replicated.⁴⁴

Third, whereas scholars continue to debate and empirically examine the well-known alternative argument that democracy exerts a nonmonotonic effect upon the outbreak of large-scale political violence, whereby the risk of armed resistance against the government and subsequent violent government responses is highest at intermediate levels of democracy, and lowest in fully democratic and fully dictatorial regimes (as depicted in Figure 2.1 of Section 2.2), this argument still bodes well for the domestic democratic peace.⁴⁵ These claims present the highest levels of democracy as a check against the emergence of large-political violence. In addition, they do not account for democracy's limited ability to curb state violence amidst social turmoil, nor for the puzzling empirical patterns involving political campaigns identified above. Finally, as I discuss in Section 2.2, this alternative argument shares important limitations with the domestic democratic peace proposition.

1.3 The Argument

The existing research literature on domestic peace and democracy has thus yet to bridge a glaring if not considerable gap between its theories and the recently established empirical record. This study fills this gap by developing and testing a theory that links democracy and its inherent institutional responsiveness to widespread political violence. I ask *whether and how democracy and dictatorship affect the occurrence of large-scale political violence*. The *scale* of political violence refers to the extent of popular involvement in violent political activities, either as victims or as perpetrators. I focus upon large-scale (as opposed to small-scale) political violence, because it is at this scale that the puzzling empirical findings discussed in Section 1.1 are observed. This study develops and empirically explores novel theoretical claims that specify several causal pathways through which democracy and dictatorship — understood as stock concepts — affect the occurrence of large-scale political vio-

⁴²Thurber, 2015, p. 26.

⁴³Chenoweth, 2010.

⁴⁴See Chapter 2, fn. 45.

⁴⁵Muller and Weede, 1990; Hegre et al., 2001; Sambanis, 2001; Regan and Henderson, 2002; Gleditsch and Ruggeri, 2010; Hegre, 2014.

lence. I start with the assertion that the incidence of large-scale political violence is a direct function of three components, all of which are affected by prior experiences with democracy and dictatorship. The first component is the initiation of coercive political activities (the *onset* of political campaigns and state repression); the second involves the choice between violent and peaceful methods of coercion (the *pacification* of political campaigns and state repression); and the third concerns the reach of these coercive activities, both in terms of the extent of active popular participation in political campaigns (the *mobilization* of political campaigns), and in terms of the extent of the population's exposure to state repression (the *scope* of state repression). By way of summary, below I discuss this study's main theoretical claims about democracy's and dictatorship's causal impact upon each of these three constitutive components of the ultimate outcome of interest. I first discuss the effects of prior democratic and authoritarian experiences upon the capacity of political actors to initiate potentially violent coercive activities (Section 1.3.1). This is followed by a discussion of the regime legacy effects upon political actors' radicalism and choice in favor of violent as opposed to nonviolent methods of political resistance and control (Section 1.3.2). I then discuss the legacy effects upon the mobilization of political campaigns as determined by individual-level political attitudes that are conducive to active popular involvement in mass movements of resistance (Section 1.3.3).

1.3.1 Regime Legacies and Coercive Capacity

Domestic peace is in part a function of the capacity of non-state political actors to mount a political campaign, and of governments and their repressive agents to respond through state repression. *Political campaigns* are mass movements of resistance that involve a "series of observable, continual tactics in pursuit of a political objective" that are subject to "discernible leadership."⁴⁶ *State repression* concerns state-imposed costs upon the collective action of the government's adversaries.⁴⁷ The ability of political actors to initiate and sustain coercive activities such as political campaigns and state repression is referred to as their *coercive capacity*. For non-state political actors, such as political parties, labor unions, the Church, and business associations, this concerns their ability to overcome collective action and coordination problems among their members and supporters in the general population.⁴⁸ By pooling ordinary people's resources, coordinating their activities, and channeling their contributions towards a common purpose, non-state political actors empower them to impose costs upon, and hence coerce, their political adversaries.

The stock of democracy enhances the coercive capacity of non-state political actors. Democracy offers non-state political actors institutional access to state resources, such as financial support and the sanctioning of their activities in the form of expansive political rights and civil liberties.⁴⁹ Political actors can in turn harness these institutional resources to broaden their membership base and acquire additional organizational resources as a result, such as membership fees, professional staff, expertise, buildings, supplies and means of communication. Under democracy, organizations such as political parties and labor unions proliferate, survive

⁴⁶Chenoweth and Stephan, 2011, p. 14.

⁴⁷Tilly, 1978, p. 55; Davenport, 2007a.

⁴⁸Albertus and Menaldo, 2018.

⁴⁹Almeida, 2008.

and thrive, yet this does not occur overnight. This is because it takes time for organizations to specialize in the exploitation of particular institutions.⁵⁰ As a result, the organizational resources of non-state political actors operating under democracy accumulate over time. This impact of democracy is therefore best understood as a cumulative effect, where the coercive capacity of non-state political actors is enhanced by the historically accumulated stock of democratic experiences. For example, for more than four decades (1932-1972), democracy in Chile offered political parties continued institutional access to the state apparatus. With the partial exception of the communist Partido Comunista de Chile (PCCh), which was outlawed during the presidency of González Videla (1946-1952), political parties were able to expand their membership and develop strong electoral campaigns, which widened their access to the power of the state even further. In addition, whereas labor unions were at times repressed during this period, over time they acquired more rights that protected their leaders and increased their membership. During Pinochet's authoritarian regime (1973-1990), labor unions and political parties that were opposed to the regime subsequently harnessed the coercive capacity built up under democracy to launch a political campaign and pressure the authoritarian government into reintroducing democracy.⁵¹

By the same token, sustained exposure to dictatorship denies political actors opposed to the government any access to state resources, deprives them of their existing stock of resources, and ultimately eliminates them. As is the case with the effect of democratic experiences, this authoritarian legacy effect is best understood as a function of the duration of the regime experience.⁵² This is because dictators and their repressive agents can only accomplish so much in a limited amount of time. For instance, for more than a decade Pinochet's authoritarian government banned political parties, labor unions and other civic organizations, and jailed, tortured and murdered many of their leaders and activists. These repressive measures did not reach all opposition groups and their supporters all at once. Instead, over time more and more opponents of the regime carried the costs of repression in an increasing number of ways. The effects of the political exclusion and repression of domestic opposition groups thus accumulated over time. As their exposure to the authoritarian regime increased, it diminished their organizational resources and hence their capacity to challenge the government.⁵³ Yet it was not enough to prevent them to launch a political campaign against Pinochet's authoritarian regime in 1983. By contrast, as of yet no such organized resistance has emerged in Cuba and Haiti, where the stock of dictatorship amounts to about sixty and ninety years, respectively, of authoritarian rule.

For governments and their allies, however, the effects of historical experiences with democracy and dictatorship upon their coercive capacities are reversed. By definition, democratic governments do not repress electoral campaigns. In addition, they are less inclined than non-democratic governments to repress their opponents beyond the realm of electoral politics. Because democratic governments are less repressive than their authoritarian counterparts, over time the former develop a weaker specialization in the exercise of coercion than the latter. Accordingly, as authoritar-

⁵⁰North, 1990; Acemoglu and Robinson, 2006.

⁵¹Mainwaring and Pérez-Liñán, 2013a.

⁵²Morlino, 2007; Pop-Eleches and Tucker, 2013, 2017.

⁵³Bernhard and Karakoç, 2007; Morlino, 2007; Roberts, 2016.

ian experiences accumulate, the coercive capacity of governments increases. For instance, for more than seven decades the PRI-led dictatorship in Mexico (1910-1982) deployed a wide array of repressive measures to politically exclude its opponents, and prevent and counter any challenges to its rule. When dissenters emerged in the late 1980s and 1990s, the PRI regime (now partially democratized) could readily draw upon its extensive coercive capacity to respond in kind and repress them.

The same effect applies to allies of the authoritarian government, such as state-sanctioned political parties, labor unions and the military. As members of the authoritarian ruling coalition, they enjoyed institutional access to state resources during their dictatorship's reign. A *ruling coalition* consists of all political actors who together sustain a particular political regime.⁵⁴ Over time, exposure to authoritarian rule augments their organizational resources and enhances their coercive capacity.⁵⁵ For instance, in 1989 several officials who had split from Mexico's ruling PRI party founded the Partido de la Revolución Democrática (PRD). Despite its infancy, the PRD formed a potent opposition party from the outset, because it could readily draw upon the organizational resources its leaders had amassed as active supporters of the longstanding PRI regime, such as links to disillusioned members of the ruling party and regime-sanctioned labor unions. As former members of the authoritarian ruling coalition, PRD leaders and their supporters were in a stronger position to sustain the political campaign that helped bring down the PRI dictatorship in 2000, and initiate an additional protest campaign to contest the outcome of the 2006 presidential elections.

1.3.2 Regime Legacies and Radicalism

Domestic peace is not only a function of the ability of political actors to initiate and sustain coercive activities, but also their decision to use violent as opposed to peaceful methods of coercion. For non-state political actors and their political campaigns, this marks the distinction between violent activities, such as guerrilla warfare, terrorism, and armed insurgency; and peaceful acts of resistance, such as strikes, boycotts and demonstrations. For governments and their repressive agents, this concerns the difference between torture, extrajudicial murder, forced disappearances and other acts of state violence; and the imposition of *restrictions*, which encompass nonviolent violations of personal autonomy, such as bans, curfews and censorship laws. This choice between violent and nonviolent methods of resistance and control is determined by the radicalism and moderation of the political actors that adopt them. *Radicalism* concerns the degree to which political actors are intransigent and/ or unwilling to accept short-term policy losses. By contrast, *moderation* reflects a conciliatory approach to political conflict, even if it involves policy losses on the short term.⁵⁶ For radical political actors, violence as opposed to nonviolence presents a more efficacious method of political influence and control, because the physical elimination of political adversaries secures the immediate attainment of ideal policy preferences. Moderate political actors are reluctant to go that far, and therefore prefer peaceful methods of coercion. Accumulated experiences with democracy and dictatorship are relevant here as well, as they determine the radical-

⁵⁴Svolik, 2012.

⁵⁵Caraway, 2012; Frantz and Geddes, 2016; Loxton, 2016; Albertus and Menaldo, 2018, pp. 65-6.

⁵⁶Mainwaring and Pérez-Liñán, 2013c.

ism and moderation of political actors. Over time, democracy radicalizes political actors, whereas dictatorship deradicalizes them. The particular causal mechanisms underlying these effects depend upon the current political regime type and the type of political actor, but nonetheless yield effects in the same directions.

I start with non-state political actors. As explained above, in most instances the stock of democracy boosts their organizational resources, whereas the stock of dictatorship depletes them. This spurs their radicalization and deradicalization, respectively, through two causal pathways. First, by magnifying the threat posed by and to non-state political actors with opposing policy preferences, stronger organizational resources among them augment the stakes and intensity of political conflict, which in turn rewards radicalism. As political actors with competing objectives proliferate and grow more powerful, the prospect that they will all continuously play a formidable role in the struggle for political power increases. In such a political environment, moderation incurs permanent policy losses, because the willingness to compromise inevitably shifts outcomes in favor of powerful opponents and their divergent policy preferences. This in turn strengthens the appeal of radicalism, because among equally powerful organizations, radical political actors are more likely to check the policy advances of their opponents, and secure the immediate attainment of their own preferred policies. For instance, by the time that Allende's presidency (1970-1973) in Chile came to an abrupt end, both the socialist party supporting the government, the Partido Socialista de Chile (PS), and (as of 1972) the two main opposition parties, the centrist Partido Demócrata Cristiano (PDC), and the conservative Partido Nacional (PN), had been exposed to more than four decades of democracy (1932-1972). The same applies to the left-wing urban guerrilla organization Movimiento de Izquierda Revolucionaria (MIR) and its organizational predecessors in the worker and student movements. During this spell of democracy, these competing organizations were able to accumulate considerable organizational resources. By the early 1970s, the era of heightened competition that emerged from it had instilled in each of these political actors the belief that their opponents had become and would remain forces to be reckoned with, and that a radical approach to political conflict would better safeguard them against sustained policy losses, and at times even yield desired outcomes.⁵⁷ By the same token, through disempowering and eliminating most societal actors, long stretches of authoritarian rule diminish the stakes and intensity of the competition for political power.

Second, the enhanced organizational resources among non-state political actors enable each of them to rely more upon its own organizational capacity, and hence lessen the need to reach compromises with like-minded opposition groups as a means to pool scarce organizational resources. Without the need to join forces with opposition groups that harbor similar policy preferences, such political actors do not face any encouragement to moderate their approach to political conflict. Likewise, prior democratic experiences can enhance an organization's resources to the point where an erstwhile moderate political actor is under the impression it can fully achieve its preferred policies, but only if it also abandons any concerns for the political objectives of other opposition groups. The overall result is radicalization among non-state political actors. For instance, before the urban guerrilla movement Tupamaros started its terrorist campaign in Uruguay in 1963, its organizational predecessors had experienced more than three decades of democracy (1919-1932; and

⁵⁷Mainwaring and Pérez-Liñán, 2013a.

1943 onwards).⁵⁸ The organizational resources accumulated during these two spells of democracy convinced the Tupamaros leadership that a conciliatory approach typical of democratic politics towards other left-wing groups, such as the more moderate Partido Colorado and the Convención Nacional de Trabajadores (CNT) labor union, was no longer necessary to achieve its policy objectives, and that radicalism was a both feasible and efficacious method of political influence. The radicalization of the Tupamaros was reinforced by the organizational strength of the Partido Nacional, one of their main conservative opponents, which had grown stronger under democracy as well. This in turn increased the stakes and intensity of the competition for political power. Accordingly, and inspired by Castro's Cuban Revolution (1956-1959), the Tupamaros leadership embraced a revolutionary approach to politics that involved the physical elimination of its adversaries and their supporters, and embarked upon a decade-long bombing campaign (1963-1972). By the same token, through weakening societal actors, the stock of dictatorship increases the need for cooperation and hence moderation among like-minded political organizations. In this regard, it is telling that in the previous example about Chile, the communist PCCh was the only major political party of the early 1970s that kept embracing moderation. As previously mentioned, unlike its electoral competitors, for some years the PCCh was denied access to democratic institutions. This impeded or at least delayed its development into a powerful organization, which in turn limited the appeal of radicalism in an otherwise radicalized political environment.⁵⁹

For most non-state political actors, prior experiences with dictatorship leave behind two additional deradicalizing legacies. Here I focus upon non-state political actors that were once members of the opposition under the dictatorship of interest (I discuss other non-state political actors further below). Given the tendency and inherent property of authoritarian governments to repress their political opponents, sustained exposure to authoritarian rule leaves behind memories of traumatic experiences among domestic opposition groups, which in turn elicit from them a strong desire for democracy or an end to political violence more generally. Depending on the current political regime type, this leads to moderation through more specific mechanisms. First, having suffered under the dictatorships of the past, in democracies these opposition groups are anxious not to tread on their opponents and provoke them into re-installing a dictatorship. Here, opposition groups adopt moderation as a way to appease powerful political opponents and consolidate democracy.⁶⁰ For instance, by the time that in Guatemala the Marxist rebels of the Unidad Revolucionaria Nacional Guatemalteca (URNG) ended their violent political campaign against the government (1961-1996), they and their organizational predecessors had experienced more than seven decades of dictatorship (1900-1925; 1931-1944; 1954-1986), during which they were harshly repressed.⁶¹ Whereas the URNG continued to espouse radicalism for some time following the demise of the country's last dictatorship in 1986, when democracy was introduced in 1996 it still harbored fears of a military coup that would reinstall a right-wing dictatorship and launch a wave of repression against it once again. The prospect of undergoing yet another authoritarian experience as an outspoken opponent of the government and the need to

⁵⁸Chenoweth, 2011.

⁵⁹Mainwaring and Pérez-Liñán, 2013a.

⁶⁰Roberts, 2016.

⁶¹Chenoweth, 2011; Mainwaring and Pérez-Liñán, 2013a.

prevent a collapse of democracy ingrained in the URNG leadership a more moderate approach to political conflict, even to the extent of transitioning into a political party and alienating some of its core supporters.⁶²

Second, under dictatorship and hybrid regimes, extensive prior experiences with authoritarianism encourage these domestic opposition groups to adopt moderation as a means to facilitate a transition to democracy, knowing that moderation on the part of regime opponents may assuage the anxieties or reservations about democracy among some members of the authoritarian ruling coalition.⁶³ For example, Pinochet's authoritarian government (1973-1990) in Chile severely repressed labor unions. This in turn produced a greater awareness among labor union leaders about the perils of dictatorship, and about democracy's intrinsic value. By adopting a moderate political stance, labor unions sought to engender elite divisions within, and elite defections from Pinochet's authoritarian ruling coalition, pitting regime hard-liners, who wished to hold on to power, against regime soft-liners, who saw no serious threat in introducing democracy and relinquishing control to moderate opposition groups. Accordingly, instead of trying to eliminate their opponents, in 1983 labor unions and their allies launched a wave of strikes and peaceful protest activities, which created loyalty shifts within the authoritarian ruling coalition, and which ultimately brought about democracy.⁶⁴

The radicalizing and deradicalizing effects of the stock of democracy and the stock of dictatorship, respectively, also apply to (former) governments and their allies. For both democratic and non-democratic governments, as well as their allies, a strong democratic political history augments the stakes and intensity of political conflict by ensuring that their opponents can draw upon considerable organizational resources. Governments operating against the backdrop of a long history of democracy face powerful adversaries capable of running effective electoral campaigns under democracy, and mounting coercive political campaigns under dictatorship. Unable to take public office or real governing power for granted even on the short term, and in an attempt to attenuate the heightened uncertainty about the future while they still can (i.e., while they are still in government), as a response these governments revert to radicalism as a means to secure as many of their preferred policies as possible, and obstruct any policy initiatives emanating from opposition groups. For instance, when Correa assumed the presidency in Ecuador in 2007, he faced resourceful political opponents that had been able to thrive under democracy for more than three decades (1979-2007), such as the left-wing indigenous advocacy group Confederación de Nacionalidades Indígenas Ecuatorianas (CONAIE), and the conservative opposition party Partido Sociedad Patriótica (PSP).⁶⁵ Correa's response was radicalism, which was evident from his confrontational style in dealing with the legislature and critics in the media, and which resulted in an erosion of democratic institutions. Once governments leave office, they continue to face these powerful adversaries.

This mechanism operates in the most authoritarian political contexts as well. For example, by the time Pinochet's authoritarian government (1973-1990) came to power, he had witnessed first-hand how his opponents were able to thrive during more than four decades of uninterrupted democratic rule (1932-1972). These

⁶²Mainwaring and Pérez-Liñán, 2013a.

⁶³Mainwaring and Pérez-Liñán, 2013c.

⁶⁴Chenoweth, 2011; Mainwaring and Pérez-Liñán, 2013a.

⁶⁵Mainwaring and Pérez-Liñán, 2013a,b.

extensive experiences with democracy had thus created clear expectations on the part of the authoritarian government about the organizational strength of its main political adversaries, including the Socialist Party, the Communist Party, the Christian Democrats and the main labor unions.⁶⁶ This in turn strengthened Pinochet's resolve to use the power of the state to eliminate his opponents and push through his preferred policies without any delays or room for compromise. Chile's lengthy democratic history had thus radicalized the very same forces that brought it to an end.

The same effect holds true for allies of the government, as they face the same political opponents. For instance, in Venezuela in 2001, supporters of Chávez set up the *Círculos Bolivarianos*, a government-backed grassroots support organization, which would act as a countermovement against domestic opposition groups during the short-lived military coup in 2002, and which would campaign for Chávez in the 2004 presidential recall referendum. As a result of Venezuela's extensive experiences with democracy (1958-1998), the *Círculos Bolivarianos* operated in a political environment where they encountered resourceful adversaries, such as the *Confederación de Trabajadores de Venezuela (CTV)* labor union, and the *Federación Venezolana de Cámaras y Asociaciones de Comercio y Producción (FEDECAMARAS)* business association.⁶⁷ The presence of these powerful opponents intensified the competition for political power, which in turn elicited radicalism on the part of the *Círculos Bolivarianos*.

For formerly authoritarian governments that currently rule under democracy, as well as for their longtime allies, a long dictatorial history in which they were in power reduces both the stakes and intensity of electoral competition and legislative conflict. Three authoritarian legacies are at play here. First, these governments do not face strong opposition groups, since most societal actors had already been severely weakened through their sustained exposure to authoritarian rule. Second, through long stretches of dictatorship, the erstwhile authoritarian government or ruling party (or any of its successors) have accumulated the organizational resources necessary to successfully exploit democracy's electoral and legislative institutions.⁶⁸ As a result, their defeats at the ballot box and in parliament remain temporary setbacks. Third, even if the opposition would manage to win successive elections and legislative battles, former authoritarian elites do not face permanent policy losses, because their continued grip on power in the authoritarian past enabled them to fully achieve and entrench their policy objectives.⁶⁹ As a result, political opposition groups operating against the backdrop of a long history of dictatorship are not only weak, but also face a powerful competitor in the erstwhile authoritarian government, as well as an institutional and policy environment that is stacked against their interests. With little to fear and little to lose, governments that survived the collapse of their longstanding authoritarian regime and oversaw a transition to democracy, as well as their allies, have no need to revert to radicalism as their political mode of operation, even if they lose office. Indeed, democracy's inherent institutional responsiveness sets up additional barriers to radical departures from the policies introduced by the dictatorship of the past, thus lessening the need for radicalism even

⁶⁶Mainwaring and Pérez-Liñán, 2013a.

⁶⁷*Ibid.*

⁶⁸Loxton, 2016; Albertus and Menaldo, 2018, pp. 65-6.

⁶⁹Albertus and Menaldo, 2018.

further.⁷⁰ For instance, following Paraguay's transition to democracy in 1993, Wasmosy successfully campaigned for the presidency under the banner of the Colorado Party, the ruling party during the authoritarian regimes of Stroessner (1954-1989) and Rodríguez (1989-1993). Wasmosy's government could lean upon an extensive authoritarian history in which governments affiliated with the Colorado Party were able to carry out the party's conservative policy agenda, and weaken and destroy its political opponents. With its enemies kept in check and its policies firmly established, by the time democracy was introduced the Colorado Party was facing a political environment that attenuated uncertainty about the future and that was therefore conducive to moderation. Indeed, Wasmosy's government (1993-1998) was one among several democratic governments aligned with the Colorado Party that adopted moderation, alongside the presidential administrations of Macchi (1999-2003) and Duarte (2003-2008).⁷¹

For both former and current authoritarian governments and other members of the authoritarian ruling coalition of a longstanding dictatorship, these two authoritarian legacies yield similar effects. Sustained periods of authoritarian rule have offered these political actors ample opportunity to lock in their preferred policies while politically excluding, weakening and eliminating their adversaries. This diminishes the stakes and intensity of political conflict, and in turn reduces the need for radicalism on the part of the government and its ruling coalition. For example, Mexico's partial democratization in 1982 through the introduction of competitive elections marked the end of an extensive period of outright dictatorship under the PRI (1910-1982). During this long stretch of time, the PRI dictatorship was able to entrench its centrist policies and severely weaken its political opponents. As a result, at the end of this authoritarian spell the Portillo administration (1976-1982) was in a position to adopt moderation without incurring any serious risks to its preferred policies or grip on power. Even in the more politically competitive period that followed (1982-2000), and facing an peaceful pro-democracy political campaign (1987-2000), successive PRI administrations (De la Madrid (1982-1988), Salinas (1988-1994) and Zedillo (1994-2000)) all reverted to moderation.⁷² The authoritarian legacy effects thus also hold true for governments (and their allies) in hybrid regimes.

Similarly, for political actors that are currently in power (whether in a democracy, a dictatorship, or a hybrid regime), but did not hold office during the previous dictatorship of interest, extensive authoritarian experiences have left behind powerful political opponents in what are now former members of the authoritarian ruling coalition. In response, governments and their allies adopt moderation as a way to appease these powerful adversaries and their supporters among the domestic population. A moderate approach to politics diminishes the threats to the policies of the previous longstanding dictatorship, which are already difficult to change in the first place. This may in turn reduce the (relative) electoral appeal of these potent adversaries among their traditional supporters and discourage them from deploying their coercive capacity and launch a political campaign against the government. For instance, since Chile's transition to democracy in 1990 after more than fifteen years of military rule (1973-1990), fears of a military coup by the likes of Pinochet have

⁷⁰ Albertus and Menaldo, 2018.

⁷¹ Mainwaring and Pérez-Liñán, 2013a.

⁷² Ibid.

loomed large among the concerns of successive democratic governments not aligned to any of the conservative forces that sustained the previous dictatorship. The presidential administrations of Aylwin (1990-1994), Frei (1994-2000), Lagos (2000-2006) and Bachelet (2006-2010) were all affiliated to and supported by political parties that had actively opposed Pinochet's authoritarian government, including the centrist Partido Demócrata Cristiano (PDC), the center-left Partido por la Democracia (PPD), and the center-left Partido Socialista de Chile (PS).⁷³ Aware of the military's coercive capacity built up under dictatorship, these governments were careful not to provoke it into overthrowing Chile's newly established democracy. Hence, they embraced moderation to ensure to their conservative opponents that their interests were not seriously at stake in present-day democratic politics.

1.3.3 Regime Legacies and Political Efficacy

The legacies left behind by democracy and dictatorship are also manifested in the mobilization levels of political campaigns. Prior regime experiences shape perceptions of political empowerment among ordinary people, which in turn determine whether and how they participate in politics. People's sense of political empowerment is referred to as *political efficacy*. Over time, democracy strengthens political efficacy as it pertains to what ordinary people can achieve through their own actions (*internal political efficacy*). This is because democratic elections in and of themselves offer citizens first-hand experiences with overcoming collective action problems and jointly achieving political objectives. Under democracy, ordinary people learn that collective action is both possible and effective. By contrast, authoritarian experiences by default weaken internal political efficacy by either closing all regime-sanctioned channels for political activism, which minimizes experiences with collective action, or by reducing such activities to useless, empty rituals that only strengthen the regime, which fosters the view that collective action empowers the rulers, but not the ruled.⁷⁴

Heightened feelings of internal political efficacy encourage ordinary people to participate in politics, yet it remains to be seen whether such activities occur inside or outside political institutions. When perceptions of political empowerment are externalized to political institutions, such that ordinary people feel empowered merely by the perceived responsiveness of these institutions (amounting to *external political efficacy*), they are more likely to channel their political activities through them. But when external political efficacy is weak, their political activities are more likely to operate outside political institutions, such as through political campaigns.⁷⁵ Prior experiences with democracy weaken external political efficacy by serving as a positive point of reference and thereby setting a higher bar for the perceived responsiveness of contemporary political institutions.⁷⁶ By contrast, the dictatorships of the past serve as negative points of comparison, which cast a favorable light upon the political institutions of today. Extensive exposure to dictatorship thus means that ordinary citizens will compare present-day political institutions to an unresponsive form of government. The result is a stronger sense of external political efficacy.

⁷³Ibid.

⁷⁴Bernhard and Karakoç, 2007; Morlino, 2007; Pop-Eleches and Tucker, 2013.

⁷⁵Moseley, 2015.

⁷⁶Camacho, 2014.

Thus, by strengthening internal political efficacy but weakening external political efficacy, prior democratic experiences spur political involvement outside political institutions and thereby enhance the mobilization of political campaigns. For instance, in Colombia the violent political campaign of the FARC (1964-2016) was unable to mobilize more than one thousand fighters during the first decade of its existence. But in the late 1970s, their numbers surpassed that level. By the mid-1990s, the FARC included tens of thousands of active supporters. Throughout the FARC's existence, Colombia has remained a democracy.⁷⁷ For more than half a century, democratic experiences have made successive generations of citizens aware that collective action was both possible and effective. Yet for ordinary citizens such experiences increasingly became the main if not only point of reference for assessing the responsiveness of contemporary political institutions. This heightened expectations, which democracy was unable to meet. Together, these two democracy-induced changes in public opinion amounted to an ever expanding pool of ordinary citizens who harbored a strong sense of political empowerment, but who also believed that their ability to determine political outcomes did not and could not rely upon current political institutions. The corresponding attitudinal combination of strong internal political efficacy and weak external political efficacy matches the activities of political campaigns like that of the FARC, which are driven by mass political participation outside political institutions. Accordingly, as Colombia's democratic experiences accumulated, so did the recruitment level of the FARC.

By the same token, by weakening internal political efficacy but strengthening external political efficacy, authoritarian experiences reduce overall levels of popular involvement in politics, while at the same time encouraging ordinary citizens to channel any such involvement through political institutions. This in turn weakens the mobilization of political campaigns. For example, in Guatemala the URNG ended its violent political campaign (1961-1996) against the backdrop of more than seven decades of authoritarian rule (1900-1925; 1931-1944; 1954-1986). These extensive authoritarian experiences can account for why throughout the URNG's campaign, its recruitment level rarely exceeded ten thousand activists.⁷⁸ The dictatorships of the past had ingrained in ordinary people's mind the notion that successful collective action is hard if not impossible. This reduced overall levels of mass political participation. At the same time, Guatemala's lengthy authoritarian experiences offered ordinary people a negative point of comparison. This in turn dampened expectations about how responsive existing political institutions should be, and by doing so also depressed ordinary people's inclination to participate outside as opposed to through current political institutions. Historical experiences with dictatorship had thus limited the appeal of political campaigns among ordinary people, diminished the pool of potential campaign activists upon which the URNG relied, and hence kept down its mobilization level.

These regime legacy effects also hold among peaceful political campaigns, which tend to attract more activists than their violent counterparts.⁷⁹ This can be illustrated by the difference in mobilization levels between Uruguay's (1984-1985) and Peru's (2000) peaceful pro-democracy movements. In the Uruguayan case, hundreds of thousands of supporters were actively involved in the protest campaign to end

⁷⁷Chenoweth, 2011.


⁷⁸Ibid.

⁷⁹Chenoweth and Stephan, 2011.

the military dictatorship. By contrast, in Peru the campaign to oust Fujimori did not attract more than tens of thousands of activists. This can be accounted for by different regime experiences. In Uruguay, the military government (1973-1984) formed a clear contrast to the more than four decades of democracy that preceded it (1919-1932; 1943-1972). In addition to making the authoritarian regime's lack of institutional responsiveness more pronounced, Uruguay's historical experiences with democracy also fostered feelings of efficacy that are conducive to political activism. Together, these attitudes spurred popular involvement in the pro-democracy movement. Whereas Peru had undergone several spells of democracy by the time of the anti-Fujimori campaign, this amounted to less than three decades of democratic experiences. In addition, its experiences with outright dictatorship were twice as long as was the case in Uruguay (six versus three decades). Compared to Uruguay, Peru's more extensive authoritarian experiences yielded weaker feelings of political empowerment, which reduced overall levels of political activism, and also attenuated negative assessments of contemporary political institutions, which depressed the mobilization of the pro-democracy campaign even further.

1.4 The Implications

The theoretical claims presented above imply several empirical associations that are directly or indirectly related to domestic peace. In Chapter 3, I state these testable implications formally in the form of hypotheses. By way of summary, this section presents the main implications that flow from my argument. Figure 1.1 displays a path diagram of the corresponding causal and conceptual relationships that involve the historically accumulated stock of democratic experiences (for the sake of simplicity, it omits the stock of dictatorship, which exerts the opposite effects). One of these claims bodes well for the domestic democratic peace. State repression is checked by the stock of democracy. Prior experiences with democracy weaken the coercive capacity of state authorities, and therefore limit their ability to initiate and expand the scope of their coercive activities. Yet even as this pacific effect of democracy holds true, previous instances of democracy also leave behind several legacies that weaken the prospects of domestic peace. First, the stock of democracy enhances the coercive capacity of non-state political actors, equipping them with the organizational resources to initiate a political campaign. Second, historical experiences with democracy encourage both state and non-state political actors to adopt violent as opposed to nonviolent methods of coercion. This is because such experiences radicalize political actors. Radicalization, in turn, yields a choice in favor of violent as opposed to peaceful political campaigns on the part of non-state actors, and in favor of state violence as opposed to restrictions on the part of governments. Finally, among ordinary citizens a democratic political history fosters political attitudes that are conducive to popular involvement in political activities that operate outside political institutions, such as political campaigns. By strengthening citizens' sense of political empowerment as to what they can achieve politically through their own actions (internal political efficacy), but weakening the extent to which they externalize these efficacious attitudes to contemporaneous political institutions (external political efficacy), prior experiences with democracy spur the mobilization of (potentially violent) political campaigns. Through the same causal mechanisms, authoritarian legacies yield the reverse, mostly pacific outcomes. Ex-

Figure 1.1 Path Diagram of Specified Conceptual and Causal Relationships

Notes: (In)dependent variables are circled. The ultimate (in)dependent variables are printed in bold. Rectangles indicate mediator variables. Arrows denote the presence and direction of specified causal relationships. Plus and minus signs next to arrows indicate the direction of the corresponding effects. Thick lines (lacking arrowheads) connect variables to the ultimate dependent variables of interest and indicate definitional (as opposed to causal) links. Plus and minus signs next to thick lines denote whether the corresponding conceptual relationships are positive or negative.

tensive experiences with dictatorship inhibit the emergence of political campaigns, pacify their methods of resistance as well as the repressive responses of governments to such challenges, and depresses mass participation in ongoing political campaigns. However, a history of dictatorship also enhances the prospect that governments will initiate and expand the scope of repression in response to organized resistance.

1.5 The Evidence

The theoretical claims developed in this study are probabilistic rather than deterministic. I therefore employ quantitatively oriented approaches grounded in probability theory to test the corresponding hypotheses. Following Coppedge (2012), I adopt an empirical strategy that combines extensive and intensive hypothesis testing. *Ex-*

tensive testing concerns the identification of general empirical patterns, which hold across a large number of political contexts. If this general pattern is in accordance with the hypothesized claims, the next step is *intensive testing*, in which the observed empirical relationships are unpacked in order to determine whether they are produced by the proposed theoretical mechanisms. As this involves a greater number of variables, practical data limitations in effect confine the intensive testing stage of the analysis to a smaller number of observations.

For extensive testing purposes, I investigate a global sample of country-years and political campaign-years to uncover the general empirical association between domestic peace and democracy. This analysis draws upon several global datasets to measure the relevant variables. The onset, pacification and mobilization of political campaigns are measured using Versions 1.1 and 2.0 of the Nonviolent and Violent Campaigns and Outcomes (NAVCO) dataset.⁸⁰ The conceptual and operational definitions of peaceful and violent political campaigns used in this study are directly derived from the associated study of Chenoweth and Stephan (2011). The NAVCO dataset is the first and only global dataset on the topic, and covers the 1900-2006 period for political campaigns (Version 1.1), and the 1945-2006 period for political campaign-years (Version 2.0). Accordingly, it has spurred a considerable amount of research on the causes, conduct and consequences of peaceful and violent political campaigns. Using this particular dataset thus allows for a more straightforward comparison between this study and the existing research literature on the topic.

For the purpose of measuring violent and nonviolent state repression, several global datasets are available. This is particularly helpful for the challenging task of creating separate measures of democracy, state repression and state violence. Given the definitional relationship between democracy and state violence, the empirical analysis is at a serious risk of reaching tautological conclusions.⁸¹ State-sponsored selective violence targeted at peaceful political opponents of the government significantly reduces the level of democracy. The physical elimination of even a handful of active opposition groups raises considerable barriers to electoral contestation, since these groups can no longer initiate and sustain electoral campaigns. By contrast, indiscriminately targeting members of the domestic population only marginally constrains electoral contestation and participation, since state violence does not necessarily victimize electoral competitors, and since the vast majority of the population is not necessarily affected.

In order to assess democracy's causal impact upon state violence, this study's measure of state violence should therefore also incorporate the scope of state violence, in that indiscriminate violence only marginally reduces the level of democracy.⁸² To this end, I use several items of the Varieties of Democracy (V-Dem) Project, which offers the empirical leverage to produce such a variable.⁸³ The V-Dem dataset encompasses the years 1900 to 2016. Its five-point scale distinguishes country-year observations partly on the basis of the prevalence and occurrence of violent acts of state repression. A related measurement requirement concerns the pacification of state repression. I measure nonviolent state repression (restrictions)

⁸⁰Chenoweth, 2011; Chenoweth and Lewis, 2013a.

⁸¹Hill, 2016.

⁸²Ibid.

⁸³Coppedge et al., 2017b.

using several sub-indicators of the civil liberties index of the V-Dem dataset.⁸⁴ Finally, since the outcome of interest concerns coercive state activities that target political campaigns, I employ a measure, included in the NAVCO dataset (Version 2.0), which indicates the severity of state repression to which particular political campaigns are subject.⁸⁵ In order to construct measures of state repression that are only minimally ‘contaminated’ with inherent features of democracy, I estimate latent variable models. Latent class analysis offers the appropriate technique here, as it enables me to identify instances of state violence that only weakly correspond to authoritarian political institutions using categorical data.

Democracy serves as this study’s ultimate independent variable. I operationalize democracy by measuring its two institutional manifestations: competitive elections and executive constraints. To create a measure of competitive elections, I use several sub-indicators of V-Dem’s elections index.⁸⁶ Measuring competitive elections in this fashion prevents the inclusion of non-state political violence into the measure of democracy, a problem that plagues traditional operationalizations of democracy using the Polity IV data.⁸⁷ Similarly, in order to measure executive constraints, I use V-Dem’s executive, judiciary and legislative indices, as well as its measures for the capacity and autonomy of election monitoring bodies (EMB).⁸⁸ The V-Dem dataset extends back to 1900, which is useful for creating measures of the accumulated stock of democratic and dictatorial experiences for any given country-year in my sample. Finally, I employ latent class analysis to explore the multidimensionality of these categorical data and construct a valid measure for the political regime type. More specifically, I determine whether competitive elections and executive constraints are indeed two empirically distinguishable dimensions of democracy, and whether the three-type political regime classification (distinguishing democracy from dictatorship and hybrid regimes) proposed later carries considerable support in the data.

Latin America serves as the empirical testing ground for conducting this study’s intensive tests. As set out above, within the field of Latin American politics scholarly understandings of the problem at hand have hitherto given predominantly positive assessments of the long-term impact of past instances of democracy. By implication, they have pointed towards the detrimental effects of prior experiences with outright dictatorship. Taken together, this has, I believe, overshadowed considerations of potentially pacific effects of past instances of dictatorship, as well as any harmful legacies left behind by previous democracies. Latin America offers a fertile empirical environment to adjudicate between conventional claims about regime legacies and the theory developed in this study. No other world region displays as much variation in regime history as Latin America, both across time and across countries. Costa Rica has maintained uninterrupted democratic rule since at least 1952, whereas Cuba’s communist dictatorship survived the Third Wave and has been in force since it was established in 1959. Peru suffered a series of frequent regime changes, including one from democracy to a hybrid regime in the 1990s, whereas Chile and Brazil showed modest levels of regime instability, and have remained democratic since their Third Wave transitions to democracy. Venezuela and Paraguay underwent decades-

⁸⁴Coppedge et al., 2017b.

⁸⁵Chenoweth and Lewis, 2013a.

⁸⁶Coppedge et al., 2017b.

⁸⁷Vreeland, 2008.

⁸⁸Coppedge et al., 2017b.

long stretches of democracy and dictatorship, respectively, before they transitioned to semi-democracy and continued to move in opposition directions — to democracy in the case of Paraguay (1993), and to dictatorship in the case of Venezuela (2009).⁸⁹ Such stark differences in regime history offer the empirical leverage to unravel the relationship between prior regime experiences and present-day levels of domestic peace with a considerable degree of precision.

To be sure, the variation in regime history and the external validity of the resulting empirical findings can be further enhanced by including additional regions of the world into the empirical analysis. Yet what is gained in external validity may be offset by losses in internal validity. As set out above, the theory developed in this study operates not only at the level of countries, but also at the level of political actors and ordinary citizens. It is at these subnational levels of analysis where democracy's causal impact upon the choice between peaceful and violent methods of resistance and control; upon the coercive capacity of political actors; and upon popular involvement in political campaigns operates. Therefore, these subnational levels of analysis offer the appropriate sites for intensive testing purposes. Given Latin America's relative linguistic homogeneity, a focus upon this region offers a useful advantage for empirically exploring the corresponding theoretical mechanisms. More specifically, the predominance of just two languages (Spanish and Portuguese) within the region facilitates the measurement of two of the variables that operate at these subnational levels of analysis, which are language-related and ultimately non-behavioral: radicalism among political actors and perceptions of political empowerment among ordinary citizens. Extending the empirical analysis to other world regions involves greater linguistic diversity and hence overcoming considerable language barriers to measurement reliability and validity. Therefore, this study limits its empirical investigations to Latin America whenever an exclusively global, albeit more comprehensive scope fails to strike an acceptable balance between internal and external validity.

Accordingly, for the purpose of measuring the radicalism and moderation of political actors, I draw upon evidence from Latin America. I use the codebook of the dataset of Mainwaring and Pérez-Liñán (2013b), which encompasses twenty Latin American countries, and covers the years 1944 to 2010.⁹⁰ The unit of analysis is the presidential administration. Some of these administrations last one electoral cycle, while others last several decades. For each Latin American administration, the dataset codebook lists all powerful political actors (1460 in total, spread across 290 presidential administrations), and specifies each political actor's degree of radicalism and moderation. The radicalism and moderation of political actors are measured on the basis of their political behavior and publicly declared statements that indicate degrees of intransigence and impatience. I also use the information listed in the codebook to measure the coercive capacity of political actors. Since only organizations that have amassed a considerable amount of resources are included into the codebook's list of political actors, the sheer number of non-state political actors listed per presidential administration may serve as an indirect measure of the overall

⁸⁹Smith and Ziegler, 2008, pp. 51-2; Mainwaring and Pérez-Liñán, 2013c, pp. 67-8.

⁹⁰The Mainwaring and Pérez-Liñán (2013b) dataset encompasses the following Latin American countries: Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica, Cuba, the Dominican Republic, Ecuador, El Salvador, Guatemala, Haiti, Honduras, Mexico, Nicaragua, Panama, Paraguay, Peru, Uruguay, and Venezuela.

coercive capacity of non-state political actors.

Likewise, Latin America serves as the empirical testing site for the postulated individual-level relationships. The outcome of interest at the level of ordinary citizens are feelings of (internal and external) political efficacy, which I measure using regional survey data. I draw upon the Latin American Public Opinion Project (LAPOP) and Latinobarometer surveys, which have been conducted in eighteen Latin American countries for several years since the mid-1990s.⁹¹ Both surveys asked respondents questions that may serve as valid indicators of internal or external political efficacy.

1.6 The Contributions

This study offers several theoretical contributions to the existing research literature on contentious politics. Whereas this study is in agreement with the extant literature in acknowledging the importance of contemporaneous levels of democracy for explaining domestic peace, its theoretical contributions come in the form of causal claims that treat democracy and dictatorship as stock concepts, and link present-day levels of political violence to historical experiences with democracy and dictatorship. The stock of democracy imperils domestic peace by enhancing the coercive capacity of non-state political actors, fostering radicalism among both state and non-state political actors, and encouraging mass involvement in (potentially violent) political campaigns. By contrast, the stock of dictatorship exerts opposite (and hence pacific) effects.

These theoretical contributions partly account for three puzzling empirical patterns that were recently uncovered in quantitatively oriented contentious politics research and that motivate this study. Combined with the empirical finding registered by Knutsen and Nygard (2015) that democracies are more durable than dictatorships and even more so than hybrid regimes, I can account for them as follows. The first puzzling observation concerns the finding that among existing political campaigns, democracy is negatively associated with campaign pacification (i.e., the use of peaceful as opposed to violent campaign methods). Because any given democracy is likely to be relatively old, the political actors operating in it are likely to be imbued with a greater degree of radicalism, which in turn encourages the use of violence as opposed to nonviolence.

These theoretical claims are also consistent with the second puzzling observation under consideration here — the finding that dictatorship is positively associated with the emergence of peaceful political campaigns. Because any given dictatorship is likely to be younger than any given democracy, but older than any given hybrid regime, the corresponding authoritarian experiences are likely to be (1) long enough to foster moderation and therefore a preference for nonviolence over violence, but also (2) short enough to safeguard a sufficient coercive capacity for non-state political actors to mount a political campaign.

The third empirical pattern is more established and concerns the finding that, especially under conditions of violent behavioral conflict, the empirical association between democracy and state violence is weakly negative or practically zero. Any given democracy is likely to mask relatively long democratic experiences, which

⁹¹LAPOP, 2016; Latinobarometer, 2016.

in turn spur the onset of political campaigns but also reduce their pacification. Large-scale political violence on the part of non-state political actors is therefore an expected empirical correlate of long democratic experiences. But such experiences also shape the repressive responses of governments. By radicalizing governments, prior democratic experiences encourage them to impose state violence instead of restrictions. At the same time, by weakening the coercive capacity of state authorities, such experiences reduce the overall occurrence of repression. The result is a weakly negative or absent empirical association between (extensive experiences with) democracy and state violence.

This study also offers several empirical contributions. Not only does it empirically test the theory developed in this study at all relevant levels of analysis, it also does so in ways that address several limitations of current formulations and operationalizations of the domestic democratic peace. As I discuss in more detail in Chapter 2, several theoretical, empirical and methodological issues hamper the ability of existing explorations of the domestic democratic peace to draw valid causal inferences about democracy's pacific effects upon domestic political conflict. To begin with, the domestic democratic peace is often *misspecified*, in that the proposed causal mechanisms linking democracy to domestic peace take time to develop and exert their expected effects, whereas the corresponding theoretical specifications and operationalizations typically neglect temporal dimensions of causation by only taking into account the short-term effects of immediately present democratic institutions. Accordingly, this study follows the example of theories and empirical applications of the domestic democratic peace that are specified in ways that reflect the importance of democratic duration and historical experiences with democracy and dictatorship more generally.⁹²

In addition, it is *underspecified*, in that several of the proposed causal mechanisms explaining democracy's pacific effects upon state and non-state behavior are predicated upon domestic peace itself. That is, whereas democracy's pacifying effect upon state actions in part depends on its pacific effect upon non-state behavior, and vice versa, the proposed theories do not address the resulting problem of infinite regress: if democracy needs to reduce (potentially) violent state repression in order to encourage peaceful non-state behavior, and if it needs to advance peaceful non-state behavior in order to yield peaceful state behavior, then how can democracy start encouraging peaceful behavior at all? Indeed, the corresponding empirical models are not specified accordingly either.⁹³ To address the issue of underspecification, the theoretical mechanisms developed in this study are directly tested to the greatest extent possible using causal mediation analyses.

Third, the domestic democratic peace is partially *tautological*, in that democracy itself is already defined in terms of the absence of lethal political violence and the peaceful resolution of political conflict.⁹⁴ In order to avoid tautological conclusions, this study conceptually disaggregates democracy into institutional dimensions (distinguishing democracy from dictatorship in terms of competitive elections and executive constraints) and a dimension reflecting the enforcement of democratic in-

⁹²Davenport, 1996; Snyder, 2000; Hegre et al., 2001; Fearon and Laitin, 2003; Gerring et al., 2005; Teorell and Hadenius, 2008; Cederman et al., 2010; Gerring et al., 2012; Pérez-Liñán and Mainwaring, 2013; Flores and Nooruddin, 2016.

⁹³Hendrix and Salehyan, 2015.

⁹⁴Davenport, 2007b, p. 64; Svobik, 2012; Hill and Jones, 2014; Hill, 2016.

stitutions, which incorporates state violence.⁹⁵ Likewise, I treat the pacification of state repression as a dimension of state repression, alongside its scope. Accordingly, I employ latent variable models (latent class analysis) to explore whether these dimensions of democracy and state repression are empirically distinguishable, and to subsequently construct an institutional measure of democracy that is ‘contaminated’ as little as possible with state violence.

Furthermore, the domestic democratic peace is *endogenous*, in that domestic peace brings about democracy. More specifically, both liberalization (reduced levels of state repression) and large-scale peaceful political campaigns have been linked to democratization outcomes.⁹⁶ To address the issue of reverse causality, the research design of this study draws upon established empirical applications of the potential outcomes framework for causal inference (such as matching), and models the domestic democratic peace accordingly.

Finally, even after fully addressing the concerns about misspecification, under-specification, tautology and endogeneity both theoretically and empirically, there is, of course, still the possibility that the domestic democratic peace is *wrong*. Several empirical patterns discussed above suggest that this is indeed the case. Therefore, this study develops a theory that incorporates the notion that it is not democracy, but dictatorship that ultimately advances domestic peace.

1.7 The Plan

This study proceeds as follows. Chapter 2 reviews the research literature in support of the domestic democratic peace proposition by presenting its main theoretical claims (Section 2.1), and by discussing its main theoretical and empirical shortcomings (Section 2.2). In Chapter 3, I lay the conceptual groundwork of my theory (Sections 3.1-3.2), discuss the theoretical mechanisms linking prior experiences with democracy and dictatorship to domestic peace, and formulate the corresponding hypotheses that are under empirical scrutiny at later stages in the analysis (Section 3.3).

Several empirical chapters follow (Chapters 4-6). Chapter 4 is concerned with extensive (as opposed to intensive) empirical testing. Using a global dataset of country-year observations, I test the hypotheses presented in the previous chapter. Given the global and temporally broad scope of the empirical analysis, it draws broadly generalizable causal inferences about democratic and authoritarian regime legacy effects upon domestic political conflict, thereby enhancing the external validity of the empirical results.

Whereas the empirical results presented in Chapter 4 map out the functional relationship between the stock of democracy and dictatorship and large-scale political violence, they do so without unraveling the underlying causal mechanisms, let alone the specific mechanisms developed in this study. Therefore, Chapters 5-6 complement the analysis by performing several intensive (as opposed to extensive) empirical tests of my theory using data drawn exclusively from Latin American countries.

⁹⁵Levitsky and Murillo, 2009.

⁹⁶O’Donnell and Schmitter, 1986; Huntington, 1991; Linz and Stepan, 1996; Geddes, 1999; Chenoweth and Stephan, 2011; Celestino and Gleditsch, 2013; Hegre, 2014.

More specifically, Chapter 5 unpacks the regime legacy effects upon the emergence, pacification and mobilization of political campaigns, and the scope and pacification of state repression by exploring empirical associations centered around political actors. First, at the level of presidential administration-years, it conducts several analyses to test the theoretical mechanisms linking previous instances of democracy and dictatorship to the coercive capacity of non-state political actors. Second, I model the radicalism of non-state political actors as a function of the regime stock variables. Third, I assess the impact of the stock of democracy and the stock of dictatorship upon the radicalism of governments.

In Chapter 6, I direct attention to the relevant causal processes that operate at the individual level of analysis. I draw upon survey data to explore the individual-level relationship between democratic and authoritarian experiences and (internal and external) political efficacy. I subsequently use these results to cast some light upon the aggregate-level relationship between democratic and authoritarian political histories and the mobilization of political campaigns.

Chapter 8 concludes this study by reiterating its main substantive conclusions, discussing its implications, and offering suggestions for further research. This study also includes several appendices. In Appendix A, I discuss the empirical results that validate my measures of democracy and state repression. Next, Appendix B complements the empirical results of the preceding empirical chapters by presenting the estimates of more parsimonious models and alternative estimation techniques. Finally, Appendix C presents replication results that are relevant for the discussion of the research literature.

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